










Title of dissertation: THE EFFECT OF SUPPORTIVE SOCIAL 
INTERACTION PRIMING ON CHILDREN’S 
PROSOCIAL COMFORTING RESPONSES 
TO DISTRESSED OTHERS 
  
 Bonnie Erin Brett, Doctor of Philosophy, 2016 
  
Dissertation directed By: Professor Jude Cassidy 




The ability to sensitively care for others’ wellbeing develops early in ontogeny 
and is an important developmental milestone for healthy social, emotional, and moral 
development. One facet of care for others, prosocial comforting, has been linked with 
important social outcomes such as peer acceptance and friendship quality, underscoring 
the importance of determining factors involved in the ability to comfort. Although social 
support has been linked with a number of important social outcomes, no study has 
directly examined whether felt social support can foster children’s positive behavior 
toward others. The purpose of the current investigation was to use an experimental 
priming paradigm to demonstrate that felt social support a) enhances children’s ability to 
respond prosocially to the distress of others and b) decreases children’s expressions of 
personal distress when faced with the distress of another person. Participants were 94 4-
year-old children (M = 53.56 months, SD = 3.38 months; 52 girls). Children were 
randomly assigned to either view pictures of mothers and children in close, personal 
 iii 
interactions (supportive social interaction condition), happy women and children in 
separate pictures, presented side-by-side (happy control condition), or pictures of colorful 
overlapping shapes (neutral control condition). Each set of 20 pictures was presented in 
the context of a categorization computer game that participants played 4 times throughout 
the course of the study. Immediately following the first three computer games, children 
were given the opportunity to comfort someone who was distressed; twice it was the 
adult experimenter working with the child, and once it was an unseen infant crying over a 
monitor that participants had been trained to use. Comforting behaviors and 
distress/arousal were coded in 10-second time segments and yielded a global comforting 
score and a distress proportion score for each task. Results indicated that priming 
condition had no effect on either prosocial comforting behavior or expressions of 
personal distress. I discuss these null findings in light of the available literatures on 
priming mental representations in children and on prosocial comforting, and suggest 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The ability to sensitively care for others’ wellbeing develops early in ontogeny 
(Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, 
& Chapman, 1992) and is an important developmental milestone for healthy social, 
emotional, and moral development. Theoretical and empirical work on the motivation 
and capacity to care for others has identified prosocial behavior as a particularly 
important component of this socially complex behavior. Prosocial behavior, defined as a 
voluntary behavior benefitting another person (Grusec, Hastings, & Almas, 2011), is 
often delineated into three categories: helping, sharing, and comforting. It is thought that 
helping, sharing, and comforting are appropriate responses to instrumental, material, and 
emotional needs, respectively (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). Prosocial acts may be 
motivated by positive emotions, such as empathy, or negative emotions such as personal 
distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Staub, 1978). 
Prosocial comforting in the context of another’s distress emerges latest in 
development, with individual differences reliably emerging in the second half of the 
second year of life (e.g., Bischof‐Köhler, 2012). Whereas signs of concern for others are 
evident in the first year of life (e.g., Roth Hanania et al., 2011), it is thought that 
advanced capabilities necessary for enacting comforting behavior are not present until 
later in development.  For instance, one study, using an advanced longitudinal design, 
found that although 8- to 10-month olds showed affective concern towards their 
“distressed” mother, it was not until 16 months that infants showed considerable 
comforting or helping behaviors (Roth Hanania et al., 2011).   
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Specifically, the advent of empathic responding (i.e., prosocial comforting) 
coincides with the advancement of infants’ cognitive and self-regulatory abilities (Decety 
& Meyer, 2008; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). In particular, emotion regulation, or 
“initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, 
intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological, attentional 
processes, motivational states, and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion in the 
service of accomplishing affect-related… adaptation or achieving individual goals” 
(Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004, p. 338) seems to play a key role in the development of 
infants’ and children’s prosocial comforting behavior. Facing the distress of another 
person is in itself a distressing event, and children must be able to regulate their own 
negative emotions to focus on the needs of the other person to respond empathically. If 
they are unable to do so effectively, their principle concern becomes relieving their own, 
rather than the other person’s, distress (Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; 
Eisenberg et al., 1989).  Consistent with this and beginning in toddlerhood, some children 
respond to the distress of others with concerned attention and prosocial overtures, 
whereas others respond with hostility, physical or emotional distancing, or personal 
distress.  These individual differences in the ability to respond to another’s distress are 
linked with important developmental outcomes such as peer acceptance and friendship 
quality (Clark & Ladd, 2000), underscoring the importance of determining predictive 
factors of the ability to care for others. 
 Interestingly, recent research on a number of social outcomes indicates that 
humans flourish in the context of close, supportive relationships, evincing such 
advantages as reduced neural and physiological reactivity to social stressors and the 
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threat of shock (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Eisenberger, Taylor, Gable, Hilmert, 
& Lieberman, 2007), lowered risk for mortality (Holt‐Lunstad & Smith, 2012), and better 
mental health outcomes (Kawachi & Berkman, 2001) in the context of supportive social 
relationships. In other words, humans behave best (and evince the best outcomes) in a 
social context. However, no study has directly examined whether felt social support can 
foster children’s positive behavior toward others. Therefore, the purpose of the current 
study is to employ an experimental design to demonstrate how activation of felt social 
support just prior to experiencing the distress of another person a) decreases personal 
distress in young children, and b) enhances their ability to respond prosocially to the 
distress of others.  In the remainder of this introduction, I will describe the theoretical and 
empirical links between social support and prosocial comforting behavior in young 
children. Given the wide range of social support an individual may encounter in his or her 
life, I will first focus on attachment, and how the quality of early parental support (i.e., 
the extent of a child’s confidence in the parent as a secure based when needed) links with 
prosocial comforting, and then will widen the scope to discuss how social support more 
generally may relate to an increased ability and willingness to provide others with 
comfort. Then, I will discuss how subliminal priming offers an experimental framework 
for examining these links and will outline previous work demonstrating its utility in this 
endeavor.  Finally, I will present the goal and hypotheses of the current study. 
Theoretical Foundations of the Link Between Social Support and Prosocial 
Comforting Behavior 
 A multitude of theoretical perspectives posit that close, supportive relationships 
foster positive human behavior and outcomes. For example, attachment theory posits that 
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all children are evolutionarily endowed with an attachment system that compels them to 
seek proximity to one or more specific individuals in times of distress. This serves the 
biological function of obtaining protection in times of trouble, and increases the chance 
of surviving to reproductive age (Bowlby, 1969 /1982). Attachment figures, most often 
parents, are thought to serve as a secure base from which the child can confidently 
explore the world, and as a safe haven for him/her to return to when needed (e.g., when 
distressed or in danger). Some parents serve both of these roles effectively, supporting 
exploration and being consistently available when needed, whereas other struggle, stifling 
exploration or discouraging attachment behavior. These differences in parental responses 
to attachment-related needs are linked with the quality of the attachment relationship. In 
turn, attachment quality in early childhood has been linked with a large number of social 
and emotional competencies throughout life (see Thompson, 2008, for a review).  
 Beyond the parent-child relationship, social baseline theory posits that the human 
brain has a “baseline” assumption of the environment as one comprised of relationships 
that are familiar, predictable, cooperative, and interdependent (Beckes & Coan, 2011). 
That is, a supportive social network reflects the environment to which humans have 
adapted throughout our evolutionary history which, rather than conferring benefits, 
allows humans to spend fewer cognitive resources on activities such as emotion 
regulation and threat appraisal. This leaves more metabolic resources for other daily 
activities – such as providing comfort to members of the social environment. Indeed, rich 
and accessible social networks have been linked with a multitude of both positive mental 
and physical health outcomes (e.g., Cohen, 2004; Holt-Lunstad & Smith, 2012; Kawachi 
& Berkman, 2001). 
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There are multiple pathways through which social support may be linked with 
later prosocial comforting behavior.  In the following sections, I will describe the roles of 
attachment specifically and social support more broadly in the formation and 
maintenance of emotion regulation strategies, mental representations of relationships and 
the self, and caregiving schemas, and how these, in turn, theoretically contribute to the 
development of prosocial comforting. 
Social support and emotion regulation. First, as was mentioned, a key 
component of effectively caring for others is the ability to control one’s own emotions 
(Batson et al., 1983). It has long been held that early attachment relationships may be the 
context in which children first learn to effectively regulate their emotions (Cassidy, 1994; 
Kopp, 1989; Sroufe, 1979, 1996; Thompson, 1990, 1994). Infants, wholly unequipped to 
deal with powerful emotions themselves, turn to caregivers in times of distress for help 
regulating feelings like fear, sadness, and anger.  Through repeated experiences of co-
regulation and recovery, infants are able to learn effective strategies for reducing 
emotional arousal, laying the foundation for later self-regulation (e.g., Thompson, 1991; 
Tronick, 1989).   
Importantly, the types of strategies learned depend in part on the quality of the 
attachment relationships within which they are learned (Calkins & Leerkes, 2011; 
Cassidy, 1994). Secure children, who are able to use their attachment figures as both a 
secure base and a safe haven, and who have had the experience of being sensitively 
responded to in times of distress, likely learn that negative emotions are an acceptable 
form of communication for expressing needs and that they serve to elicit care from 
concerned caregivers (Bretherton, 1990). Moreover, through repeated, sensitive care, 
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secure children likely learn that emotions are not overwhelming, and should be able to 
develop strategies to effectively regulate their own negative emotions (Calkins & 
Leerkes, 2011; Cassidy, 1994).  
Insecure children, on the other hand, have parents who struggle with either 
providing a secure base or a safe haven and consequently learn entirely different 
strategies for dealing with negative emotions. Avoidant children, whose parents tend to 
reject and devalue negative emotions or to respond to them harshly, are likely to learn 
that negative emotions are unacceptable and should be terminated quickly, or not 
expressed at all.  Consequently, they learn to suppress, rather than regulate negative 
emotions (Cassidy, 1994). For example, in the Strange Situation Procedure (SSP; 
Ainsworth, Blehar, Water, & Wall, 1978), a procedure designed to elicit stress in infants 
through a series of separations and reunions with their caregivers, avoidant infants may 
appear less stressed than other infants and are unlikely to seek out their parents at 
reunion. Despite this, research has shown that avoidant infants do evince cardiac 
acceleration during separations of the SSP, belying their apparent calm (Sroufe & Waters, 
1977).  
Insecure-resistant children, on the other hand, whose parents are only 
inconsistently responsive to their attachment needs, likely learn that only large, dramatic 
emotions are sufficient to elicit a response. As Main and Soloman (1986) noted, “in its 
heightened display of emotionality and dependence upon the attachment figure, this 
infant successfully draws the attention of the parent” (p.112). Consequently, insecure-
resistant children may learn to hyperactive, rather than regulate, negative emotions in the 
service of keeping caregivers close by (Cassidy, 1994; Cassidy & Berlin, 1994). 
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Empirical research supports the notion that the quality of early attachment 
relationships may influence the development of emotion regulation, and has consistently 
shown that individual differences in attachment quality lead to theoretically expected 
individual differences in emotion regulation (see Calkins & Leerkes, 2011, for a review; 
see also Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008). In turn, these learned emotion regulatory capacities 
may be linked with the sensitive, other-focused care children are willing and able to 
provide. Secure children, when faced with the distress of another, should be able to 
regulate their own negative affect and focus on the plight of the other person in a 
sensitive manner.  Insecure children, who may not have learned effective emotion 
regulation strategies, may employ different strategies.  Insecure avoidant children may be 
expected to protect themselves from their own distress by devaluing the needs of the 
other person, by escaping or ignoring the situation, or when this is not possible, reacting 
in an angry or defensive manner.  Insecure-resistant children, on the other hand, might be 
expected to hyperactivate the distress they feel in response to another’s distress, and to 
become overwhelmed and dysregulated. This may lead them to engage in self-focused 
responding with the goal of alleviating their own, rather than the other person’s, distress. 
In addition to specific emotion regulation strategies learned early in life, the 
presence of other people may foster better emotion regulation.  In support of this notion, 
recent research has demonstrated that the mere presence of others, and not necessarily 
supportive others, attenuates neural activity associated with environmental stressors (e.g. 
Coan, et al., 2006). This indicates that the presence of others does not activate regulatory 
mechanisms, but rather, returns the brain to “a baseline state of relative calm (Beckes & 
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Coan, 2011, p. 277).” Put simply, in the presence of others, the human brain is adapted to 
reduce threat monitoring and the associated emotional activation and self-regulation.  
Empirical work with adults has consistently shown that this is case, with the least 
regulatory brain activity in response to threat occurring in the presence of supportive 
others and the most occurring while alone. For example, Coan et al. (2006) found that 
women under the threat of shock while holding the hand of their steady partner evinced 
the least amount of threat-related brain activity and that this effect was moderated by the 
quality of the relationship. Women who reported higher quality relationships showed the 
least threat-related brain activity, followed by women who reported lower quality 
relationships. Women who held the hands of strangers evinced greater threat-related brain 
activity, and those who held no one’s hand showed the most. It is notable that even the 
presence of a stranger was enough to mitigate threat-related brain activity, indicating that 
even minimal social support is associated with regulatory advantages. Consequently, it 
may be that persons in the presence of others have to expend fewer resources to regulate 
their own emotions in the face of another’s distress, leaving more resources for providing 
comfort. This notion is supported in the early childhood emotion regulation literatures as 
well. One study, specifically examining emotion regulation strategies in young children, 
indicated that starting in the preschool years, children elicit social support to help regulate 
their emotions more than any other strategy (Sala, Pons, & Molina, 2014). 
 Social support and mental representations. A second means by which early 
attachment quality specifically and social support more broadly may predict later 
expressed empathy and prosocial comforting behavior is through the formation of 
representations about the self and the environment. Theories in multiple psychological 
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fields (e.g. social psychology, developmental psychopathology) have underscored the 
importance of social relationships in the formation of individual differences in social 
information processing (see Crick & Dodge, 1994, for a review; see also Bowlby, 1973; 
Cassidy & Shaver, 2008; Dykas & Cassidy, 2011). Children’s earliest social experiences 
occur largely in the context of the parent-child relationship, and it is through these early 
repeated relational experiences that children form initial representations of themselves, of 
relationships, and of other people (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; 
Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). The structure of these representations leads to specific, 
predictable patterns of expectations and interpretations of the world and the people in it 
(Dykas & Cassidy, 2011) and are adaptive in helping children to interpret the world 
around them by providing a quick, efficient means for understanding and interpreting 
social information (Bowlby, 1973; Bretherton & Munholland, 2008).  By using 
representations of themselves, others, and the world as a perceptual filter, children are 
able to quickly assign meaning to a range of social cues on a moment-to-moment basis. 
 With respect to care for other people, secure children, who have had the 
experience of being cared for in times of distress, have representations of themselves as 
capable of eliciting care, of others as being kind and worthy of care, and of the world as a 
place where distressed persons are cared for.  Insecure children, however, who have been 
responded to harshly, inconsistently, or not at all, form representations of themselves as 
incapable of eliciting or unworthy of care. Further, they may come to view others as 
unkind and untrustworthy, and of the world as a place where distress is not worthy of a 
response (Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). In fact, research has shown that beliefs about 
the appropriateness of negative emotions significantly influence sympathy and helping 
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behavior in children (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013). Given that insecure children 
learn that negative emotions are often inappropriate, they should be less willing to 
sympathize and help others in distress. Theoretically, the representations formed in early 
relationships are carried with the child throughout development, and serve to guide 
behavior and expectations in new relationships and in new situations. Thus, when faced 
with the distress of another, secure children have the expectation that someone will help 
in a sensitive manner, whereas insecure children do not. These expectations should have 
predictable consequences on prosocial comforting behavior directed toward the distressed 
person. 
 Similarly, broader social experiences with a variety of relationship partners 
inform expectations of future events, adding to these schemas. Coan (2008) likened the 
human brain to a Baysian bet-making machine, through which humans are able to take 
their previous experiences, contextual cues, and conceptual knowledge to estimate the 
likelihood of a particular outcome. Representations of the self, others, and the world, 
gleaned through daily interactions, most certainly play a role in these estimations, as well 
as the social context in which the person finds him or herself, including a person’s 
perceived availability of social resources. In the context of another person’s distress, the 
human brain must compute how costly it will be to the self, including the cost of 
regulating one’s own negative affect, to intervene in a caring and sensitive manner. In 
cases where social support is presumed and self-regulation requires lower effort, a person 
may be more willing and able to respond in such a way. 
 Social support and caregiving scripts. The third avenue by which early 
attachment relationships and broader social support may influence the expression of 
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empathy and prosocial comforting behavior is through scripts. Scripts are enduring 
cognitive representations of an expected sequence of events given a particular situation 
(e.g., visiting a restaurant; Shank & Ableson, 1977) that serve to inform expectations of 
events and guide and organize ongoing behavior (e.g., Shank & Ableson, 1977). Scripts 
are an important component of attachment representations (Waters & Waters, 2006) and 
help to organize behavior and patterns of interaction with attachment partners. For 
example, one type of script, formed through a person’s history of secure base experiences 
(i.e., situations when support was needed and sought and their resolution) is termed a 
secure base script. When accessed (e.g., when the attachment system is activated), a 
secure base script for a specific attachment figure will guide expectations and behavior 
with that person, even if he or she does not always behave according to the script (Waters 
& Waters, 2006). Additionally, these specific script-like representations are carried 
forward into new relationships and can guide expectations about and behavior with new 
people (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). This is likely true for a number of phenomena, from 
specific relationships (as in the case of the secure-base script) to specific kinds of 
situations (as in the case of the “restaurant” script). 
 Accordingly, children’s behavior in relevant situations should reflect the 
expectations and emotions contained in whichever script is readily accessible, given the 
situation. For example, children who have had consistent and reliable support when 
needed theoretically have a complete, coherent, and readily accessible script for such 
occasions that includes successful support seeking, problem resolution, affect regulation, 
and return to play (or exploration, interaction, etc; Waters & Waters, 2006). One study 
examined this notion by presenting 12- to 16-month old infants with animations of two 
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circles meant to portray a child (small circle) and either a sensitive caregiver, who returns 
to the small circle when it pulses and cries, or an insensitive caregiver, who continues 
away from the small circle. Secure infants (i.e., those infants who had a history of 
supportive, consistent care) looked reliably longer at the animation of the insensitive 
caregiver, indicating that this violated their script of typical caregiving behavior.  In 
contrast, insecure infants, whose attachment-relevant script likely reflects a history of 
harsh or inconsistent responses to attachment needs, looked longer at the animation of the 
sensitive caregiver (Johnson, Dweck, & Chen, 2007). 
Importantly, children theoretically learn both sides of a script (i.e., support-
seeking and support-provision) and are motivated to recreate it, even if roles are switched 
and new behavior is required (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986).  Thus, when children with a 
history of receiving support and care find themselves in a position to provide care to 
another, they should have a coherent, sensitive script to follow and be motivated to 
follow it. Insecure children, however, likely do not have a coherent, readily accessible 
script to follow and may become defensive or overwhelmed. 
 In sum, there are numerous pathways by which social relationships may influence 
how children provide care to distressed others and how the felt support of others may 
foster the development of prosocial comforting responses. Empirically, the link between 
felt support and prosocial responding to distress in childhood has been supported. 
Importantly, the entirety of this work has focused on how early attachment relationships 
link with prosocial comforting; none has examined the mere presence of others as a 
predictor of sensitive response to another’s distress. However, this work, although 
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somewhat limited in scope, presents a compelling case indicating that early felt support 
links with care for others.  
For instance, in the first two years of life, attachment security (which results from 
a history of sensitive care during one’s own distress) has been linked with greater 
prosocial responding toward a “baby” (Londerville & Main, 1981) and an unfamiliar 
distressed adult (Van der Mark, van Ijzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2002). 
Although the evidence has been mixed in studies examining this association in childhood 
(see Appendix A, for a review of the links between attachment and empathy and 
prosocial comforting), secure attachment in preschool and beyond has been empirically 
associated with care for others in a number of contexts.  For example, one study of this 
association in preschoolers found that secure attachment was related greater sympathy 
and prosocial responding to maternal simulations of anger and sadness (Denham, 1994).  
In the same study, insecure children were less prosocial and became more upset and 
defensive in response to their mother’s emotional displays, a finding consistent with the 
theory outlined above.  
Another study examined the direction of effects of the proposed link by 
measuring both attachment quality and prosocial comforting (termed “empathy”) at two 
time points (i.e., 42 and 48 months) and then testing two models, one with empathy as a 
predictor and the other with attachment (Murphy & Laible, 2013).  Results indicated that 
attachment at 42 months predicted empathy at 48 months (controlling for empathy at 42 
months), but that the relation did not hold in the opposite direction. This is indicative that 
there may be a causal relation between the two constructs. Secure attachment in the 
preschool years has also been linked with higher maternal reports of child emotion 
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regulation and empathy, which, in turn, predicted prosocial comforting behavior in an 
infant cry task (Panfile & Laible, 2012) and mother reports of prosociallity (Laible, 
2006). In addition, the association between secure attachment and prosocial responding to 
another’s distress is consistently supported in both the adolescent and adult literatures 
(e.g., Laible, Carlo, & Raffaelli, 2000; Feeney & Collins, 2003). 
 Overall, the empirical literature indicates that, consistent with theory, attachment 
security is positively associated with prosocial comforting behavior.  However, this body 
of research is limited in two important ways. First, as mentioned, this work focuses 
entirely on attachment as a predictor of prosocial comforting, rather than felt social 
support in general. This narrow focus unnecessarily limits the development of prosocial 
comforting to the first years of life and ignores “in the moment” influences on comforting 
behavior. Although early relationships undoubtedly play a central role in the formation of 
many social and emotional capacities (e.g., emotion regulation; Cassidy, 1994), it is 
likely that additional factors, such as social support more broadly, also play a role. As 
social baseline theory posits, normally costly human capacities, such as emotion 
regulation, may be less costly in the presence of others. Accordingly, even insecure 
children, who have not had a history of being consistently supported in times of distress, 
will likely feel the bolstering effects of social support and may have an enhanced capacity 
to provide support in the presence of others (a notion supported in the adult attachment 
priming literature, briefly reviewed below). In addition, despite the consistency of the 
literature, due to its correlational and predictive nature, no causal claims about felt 
support (or attachment quality) and prosocial comforting behavior in childhood can be 
made.  Studies examining the broader role of social support (rather than attachment 
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specifically) and employing an experimental design are needed to fill these substantial 
gaps. In the following section, I discuss how priming offers a means of experimentally 
increasing felt social support in children, and discuss research findings that support this 
proposition. 
Priming as a Way of Experimentally Increasing Attachment Security in Children  
 Experimental priming rests upon the notion that mental representations formed 
through past experiences provide a filter for interpreting and acting upon later 
environmental events (Bowlby, 1969 /1982; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). By exposing 
participants to stimuli relevant to a particular mental representation, experimenters can 
“activate” that representation, which then guides subsequent attention, emotion, 
cognition, and behavior (Bargh, 2003, 2006; Hamilton, 2005).  Stimuli can be presented 
either supraliminally (i.e., above the threshold for conscious awareness) or subliminally 
(i.e., below the threshold for conscious awareness). Supraliminal priming can be made 
explicit, by asking participants to concentrate on a particular stimulus, or to imagine or 
write about a relevant scenario, or can be done surreptitiously by discreetly placing 
stimuli in the environment (e.g., a picture on the wall or the background on a computer) 
or exposing participants through an unrelated task (e.g., a word scramble of schema-
relevant words). Subliminal priming, on the other hand, is a more covert method of 
priming, with stimuli being presented below the threshold of conscious awareness 
(usually less than one tenth of a second) and preceded or followed by a mask that is 
presented as long as, or longer, than the prime itself (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Despite 
such quick presentation, research has shown that subliminal primes influence brain 
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activity in predictable ways (Dehaene et al., 1998) and can even have effects lasting up to 
four days (Lowery, Eisenberger, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2007; Study 2). 
 Priming in children. Both subliminal and supraliminal priming have been 
employed to successfully active mental representations in children in a variety of 
contexts. Priming methodologies have largely found use in the domain of cognitive 
development, with researchers using priming to explore representations of number, 
language, and memory (see Stupica & Cassidy, 2014, for a review). More recently, social 
psychologists have employed priming to explore children’s representations in such wide 
areas as in-group and out-group biases, emotional face processing, and the effects of 
maternal support on academic performance (Stupica & Cassidy, 2014). For example, 
using Silverman’s “Mommy and I are one” (MIO) priming paradigm (see Hardaway, 
1990), thought to activate representations of a nurturing and accepting mother, Bryant 
and Silverman (1984) demonstrated that repeated priming had positive lasting effects on 
emotionally disturbed children’s and adolescents’ self-concept, standardized math and 
reading scores, independence in the classroom, and time spent on homework and 
watching television. In a more recent example, Song, Over, and Carpenter (2015) primed 
social exclusion in 4- and 5-year-old children using videos of abstract shapes and found 
that the children who had been primed subsequently drew more affiliative pictures (i.e., 
themselves and a friend standing closer together) than children who hadn’t been primed. 
Similarly, Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, and Clegg (2014) found that priming 
ostracism in children as young as 3 increased imitative behavior, particularly when 
actions were presented as a social convention. These studies and others like it provide 
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preliminary evidence into the utility of priming as a means for examining how socially 
nuanced mental representations influence children’s subsequent behavior. 
 Security priming. Theoretically, mental representations guide reactions to social 
events by influencing thoughts, feelings, and behavior in theoretically predictable ways 
(Bowlby, 1969/1982; Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Main et al., 1985). In fact, in the 
attachment literature, a wide body of work demonstrates that this is the case, with both 
children and adults processing social information (i.e., turning attention toward or away 
from social stimuli, making attributions about) in ways that are consistent with 
attachment theory (see Dykas & Cassidy, 2011, for a review). Thus, experimental 
activation of such representations should have a predictable effect on subsequent 
behavior. Specifically, exposure to positive attachment-relevant stimuli (e.g., a photo of a 
mother and child in close, warm interaction) should activate representations of 
accessibility to a protective figure and being cared for, and consequently, positive 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior in response to attachment-relevant or social events. 
 Security priming in adults.  Until recently, security priming has been utilized 
primarily with adult populations and has been used extensively to explore a variety of 
adult psychosocial phenomena. In general, such studies have supported the notion that 
secure attachment is causally linked with more positive psychosocial outcomes (see 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  For example, Cassidy, Shaver, Mikulincer, and Lavy 
(2009) examined the effects of secure priming on psychological responses to hurtful 
events in young adults. Participants (whose dispositional attachment style were measured 
by the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale; ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) 
were asked to write about a time in which a close relationship partner had hurt their 
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feelings. Then, participants were randomly assigned to either a security priming condition 
(subliminally presented words such as love, secure, and affection) or a neutral priming 
condition (subliminally presented words such as lamp, staple, and building). Afterward, 
participants were asked to reflect upon and answer questions about the hurtful experience 
they had written about.  Consistent with theory, secure priming reduced the propensity 
for anxious individuals to report less constructive reactions and more feelings of 
rejection, crying, and negative emotions in response to the hurtful event. Moreover, 
avoidant individuals in the security priming group evinced a lowered propensity to report 
less intense feelings of rejection and crying and more defensive and hostile reactions, 
indicating that increased feelings of security (manipulated through subliminal security 
priming) was associated with more constructive and less defensive reactions to painful 
social stimuli.  Secure priming in adulthood has also been linked with increased desire for 
intellectual exploration (Green & Campbell, 2000), lowered propensity for risky behavior 
(Taubman-Ben-Ari & Mikulincer, 2007), and more positive thoughts and feelings about 
outgroup members (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). 
 More relevant to the current investigation, Mikulincer and colleagues have also 
repeatedly shown that experimental manipulation of attachment security leads to 
increased concern for others.  For example, one series of three studies in Israeli 
undergraduates examined the effects of security priming, relative to the effects of neutral 
and happy priming, on concern for the wellbeing of close others (i.e., benevolence) and 
for humanity as a whole and nature (i.e., universalism; Mikulincer et al., 2003). Despite 
differences in priming methodology and the outcome measures used, all three studies 
found an effect of security priming, such that, in adults, increased feelings of security 
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lead to more concern for others and higher endorsement of both benevolence and 
universalism, and these effects were not explained by mood (Mikulincer et al., 2003).  In 
other words, secure priming positively influenced values and beliefs related to 
prosociality.   
In another series of studies, Mikulincer and colleagues (2001; Studies 1-4) 
examined the effect of experimentally enhanced attachment security on personal distress 
and empathic reactions to the needs of others.  Employing both subliminal and 
supraliminal priming, these studies indicated that security priming (relative to neutral and 
happy priming) was effective in both reducing personal distress reactions and increasing 
empathic reactions to a story about a person in need (Studies 1-3). In addition, results 
indicated that activation of secure representations increased accessibility to and decreased 
recall time for an experience in which participants had witnessed another person in need 
and responded empathically (Study 4; Mikulincer et al., 2001). Interestingly, although 
there were main effects of dispositional attachment, such that insecure participants were 
less empathic than secure participants, and anxious participants reported the most 
personal distress reactions to the story, there were no interactions between priming 
condition and dispositional attachment (Mikulincer et al., 2001).  The results of this series 
of studies highlight two important concepts in the attachment priming literature.  First, at 
least in adults, security priming is capable of influencing the affective aspects of 
prosocial comforting behavior by decreasing feelings of personal distress and increasing 
feelings of empathy.  Second, the effects of security priming are independent of the 
effects of pre-existing attachment orientations.  
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In a third series of studies by Mikulincer and colleagues (2005), these effects were 
extended to behavioral indices of prosociality (i.e., altruism) and replicated in two 
countries (Israel and the United States). In a series of five studies, participants were 
primed and then watched a video of a women engaging in increasingly aversive tasks and 
becoming increasingly distressed, eventually refusing the participate any longer.  
Following the video, participants were asked to rate their own feelings of empathy and 
personal distress, as well as their willingness to take her place in the aversive tasks. As 
expected, participants in security priming condition reported feeling more empathy, less 
personal distress, and more willingness and agreement to take the woman’s place 
(Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005). Again, these effects were over and 
above those of dispositional attachment, which also occurred in the expected directions, 
such that dispositional attachment avoidance was negatively associated with empathy and 
willingness and agreement to take the woman’s place and dispositional attachment 
anxiety was negatively associated with empathy and helping behavior, and positively 
associated with reports of personal distress (although in some studies, these effects were 
non-significant; Mikulincer et al., 2005).  These studies indicate that security priming 
also has a theoretically expected, positive association with prosocial behavior meant to 
relieve the distress of another person (see also Mikulincer, Shaver, Sahdra, & Bar-On, 
2013, for similar results regarding comforting behavior with a close partner). 
 Taken together, these findings indicate that in adult populations, both subliminal 
and supraliminal security priming, implemented using a number of different 
methodologies, have the capacity to increase empathic concern for others (including 
strangers), to reduce personal distress, and to increase willingness to help a distressed 
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other with no personal gain.  In addition, these effects were found over and above the 
effects of dispositional attachment, indicating that random assignment to priming 
conditions is an effective means of experimentally inducing attachment security in adult 
populations.   
Security priming in children. No one has utilized security priming to examine the 
link between secure attachment and prosocial comforting behavior and, to my 
knowledge, only one study has ever employed security priming with children. Stupica 
and colleagues (2016) examined the effect of security priming on physiological reactivity 
to fear-inducing pictures in 6- and 7-year-old children. Children were subliminally 
primed in three conditions (security priming, happy priming, and neutral priming) using a 
computer game cover and then were shown a fear inducing, excitement inducing, and 
neutral pictures in a counterbalanced order.  Results indicated that children in the security 
priming condition evinced lower electrodermal reactivity to fear inducing, but not 
excitement inducing or neutral, pictures and that these effects were stronger than the 
effects of pre-existing attachment representations (measured with doll stories; Stupica, 
Brett, & Cassidy, 2015).  This, along with the adult literature, indicates that security 
priming can be employed as a means of temporarily increasing one’s sense of 
attachment-related security, and that subsequent behavior can reasonably be expected to 
reflect this in theoretically expected ways. 
Affiliative priming. To my knowledge, only one study has experimentally 
examined the effects of priming felt social support (labeled by the authors as “affiliative 
priming”) on prosocial helping (but not comforting) behavior (Over & Carpenter, 2009). 
In the study, 18-month-old infants were supraliminally primed with affiliation by seeing 
 22 
pictures of common household objects with two dolls facing each in the background just 
prior to seeing an experimenter drop a bundle of sticks. Infants in the affiliative priming 
condition were three times more likely to help the experimenter in the first 10 seconds of 
the task than were the infants in the neutral prime condition (i.e., two small stack of 
blocks in the background) or the individuality prime condition (i.e., two dolls facing 
away from each other or one doll alone in the background; Over & Carpenter, 2009). 
This finding underscores the notion that simple stimuli, meant to activate representations 
of social constructs, can change children’s behavior in meaningful and predictable ways. 
The Proposed Study 
 The literature just reviewed indicates that feeling socially connected to others may 
increase a person’s willingness and ability to sensitively respond to another person’s 
distress. In addition, I discussed how priming offers an experimental method for 
determining the causal nature of this link, and demonstrated how priming has been 
successfully employed to provide support for this notion. Therefore, the goal of this study 
was to experimentally induce a sense of social connectedness in young children and 
examine the effect of social interaction priming (relative to neutral and happy priming) 
on prosocial comforting behavior. Although other experimental manipulations (e.g., a 
short, in-person supportive interaction; videos of children comforting others) could 
justifiably be used for this same purpose, I determined that priming was the most 
appropriate method for inducing felt social support for two reasons. First, this study, 
although examining broader social support, is an extension of previous literature 
indicating that characteristics of particular kinds of support (i.e., attachment quality as a 
reflection of parental support) influence children’s ability to provide emotional support 
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for others (see Appendix D for a review). Given that daily parental support, the type of 
support most common in childhood, cannot be ethically manipulated, priming offers an 
ethical means for activating representations of particular times parents were supportive 
(even if this is not the norm). Second, I was concerned that manipulations modeling the 
target behavior (i.e., those that demonstrate provision of social support) would lead 
children to engage in supportive behavior simply through imitation or attempts to please 
the experimenter. By providing pictures with a cover story rather than a model, I hoped to 
avoid these effects. 
To achieve the goal of experimentally inducing a sense of social connectedness in 
young children to examine the effect of social interaction priming (relative to neutral and 
happy priming) on prosocial comforting behavior, I randomly assigned preschool aged 
children to either be primed with social images (social interaction priming condition), 
affect enhancing images (happy priming condition), or neutral images (neutral priming 
condition).  Children were primed three times, and after each priming instance, were 
given the opportunity to comfort someone who was in distress. This study extends the 
literature by examining for the first time the effect of social interaction priming on the 
comforting behaviors of young children. In doing so, I hoped to provide the first 
experimental evidence of a causal link between social connectedness and prosocial 
comforting behavior and social connectedness and effective regulation of distress. 
 Hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis 1. Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition will 
display more global concern across all tasks than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. 
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 Hypothesis 2.  Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition will 
display less personal distress across all tasks than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
Participants 
Participants were 106 preschool-aged children and their mothers recruited through 
flyers and list-serves in the Washington, D.C. area. The only criteria for inclusion in the 
study were that the child was 4 years old, typically developing, and that both mother and 
child spoke fluent English so they could complete the study protocols. Data from 12 
participants were discarded for the following reasons: the first seven were discarded 
because substantial protocol changes were made after their visits, three because the 
children were not typically developing, one because the child refused to play the priming 
game without substantial experimenter support, and one because the child was not in our 
target age range, leaving us with a final sample size of 94 mothers and children (M = 
53.56 months; SD = 3.38 months; missing exact age data on 10 participants because 
mothers declined to answer, did not come for their second visit to fill out the 
demographics questionnaire, or answered the question incorrectly). We recruited with no 
regard to the race or gender of the children and ended with a final sample comprised of 
42 boys and 52 girls. The racial breakdown of the sample was: 45.7% White, 21.3% 
African American, 10.6% Hispanic, 3.2% Asian or Pacific Islander, 14.9% mixed race, 
and 1.1% other races. Three mothers (3%) declined to comment on their child’s race and 
racial identity could not be determined from videotapes. Mean number of siblings 
reported was 1.31 (SD = 1.33), with 33% of participants having older siblings and 44% 
having younger siblings (three mothers declined to report the number of siblings their 
child had; two answered in confusing ways and we were unable to determine the number 
or age of siblings, and five families did not return for a second visit where this 
 26 
information was reported). Three percent of mothers reported a yearly household income 
of less than $20,000 per year, 12% reported a yearly household income of $20,000 - 
$40,000 per year, 11% reported a yearly household income of $40,000 - $60,000 per 
year, 5% reported a yearly household income of $60,000 - $80,000 per year, 12% 
reported a yearly household income of $80,000 - $100,000 per year, and 44% reported a 
yearly household income of more than $100,000 per year. Eight mothers declined to 
report their yearly household income and five families failed to complete the second visit 
where this information was reported. Eighty percent of families in this study were two-
parent families, and 13% were one-parent families. Two mothers declined to report this, 
and five families did not return for the second visit where this was reported. 
Procedure 
The present study is a one-way experimental design with three levels (priming 
condition: Supportive Social Interaction (SSI) Prime vs. Happy Control Prime vs. Neutral 
Control Prime) that was part of a larger study of caregiving behaviors in childhood.  The 
study was comprised of one short pre-survey, filled out online prior to the first visit, and 
two visits to the research playroom. Although our initial intent was for the second visit to 
occur more than three days after but within two weeks of the first visit, scheduling 
difficulties with some families necessitated that the length of time between visits be 
longer. Of the 89 families who have returned for a second visit, 54 came within two 
weeks of the first visit and 76 within one month. The longest length of time between 
visits was 78 days. Measures collected during the pre-survey and second visit are not a 
part of the present study and will not be discussed further (but see Appendix C for a full 
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list of the measures and procedures for both visits). The first visit was approximately 90 
minutes long and the second was approximately 60 minutes long.  
Upon entering the lab, a research assistant gave an overview of the visit to each 
mother while the experimenter familiarized herself with the child during a brief warm-up 
period in which the child and experimenter played with an age appropriate play set.  
Then, mothers and children were left alone for 5 minutes with an array of toys to help the 
child familiarize with the room. Afterward, the experimenter re-entered with an attractive 
game and engaged with the child. After three minutes had passed, mothers were led to 
another room to complete measures unrelated to this study (Appendix C).  Children were 
then primed four times over the course of one hour. Primes were delivered via a computer 
game, described below. Following each prime, a task occurred in which the child had the 
opportunity to respond to the distress of another person or to share resources they had 
recently acquired. In the first two tasks, children responded to the distress of the adult 
experimenter, in the third task, they responded to the distress of an infant in another 
room, and in the final task, they were given the chance to share with an unknown age and 
gender-matched peer. The fourth task did not involve prosocial comforting and will not 
be considered further (but see Appendix E for the study script, including all tasks). The 
order of adult distress tasks was counterbalanced across participants, and either occurred 
in forward (i.e., phone first and drawing last) or backward (i.e., drawing first and phone 
last) order. The infant task always occurred at the end of the child portion of the visit to 
give children ample time to be comfortable with their surroundings before being left 
alone for a short period. 
Measures and Materials 
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 Demographics.  Mothers were asked to complete a demographics questionnaire 
in which they reported on their child’s race and gender, the number of siblings in the 
house, and their annual income level.  Additional information not relevant to this study 
was also collected (see Appendix F for the complete demographics questionnaire). 
Priming conditions and presentation. Primes were presented in DirectRT 
(Jarvis, 2010) via four different computer games in which children answered a yes or no 
question about 20 randomly presented animal pictures by pressing an assigned key. The 
games asked: Does it fly in the Sky? Does it live in the water? Is it brown? and Is it 
bigger than me? The games were presented in a random order for each participant (see 
Appendix G game stimuli). All children were trained on this protocol at the beginning of 
the experiment and reminded of the procedure before each game. In addition, each 
participant completed a “practice round” of each game before receiving the 20 picture 
primes. A neutral picture prime was presented during the practice round. 
During the game, children were exposed to the picture prime supraliminally for 
two seconds prior to each animal picture presentation. All children were told that the 
picture prime was the “the computer thinking about which animal to show next.”  
All priming conditions were randomly assigned to participants at the start of the 
study. A colleague of the experimenter used a random number generator to assign equal 
numbers of children to each condition and put them in an “autostart” file. The use of an 
autostart file allowed the experimenter to simply type in the child’s participant number at 
the beginning of the game, blindly assigning them to their condition. During the game, 
the experimenter kept her back to the child as much as possible and made every effort to 
avoid seeing which condition the child was in. In cases where she did see the prime, she 
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noted it on the post-lab notes, which were kept in a binder for later referencing. She also 
noted anything unusual about the visit or the procedure. 
Picture primes meant to evoke mental representations of supportive social 
interactions were pictures depicting mothers and children (similar in age to the 
participants) in close, personal interactions (e.g., a mother looking into her child’s eyes or 
a child in his or her mother’s arms; Appendix H).  Happy control primes were two 
separate pictures of happy people with strikingly different backgrounds presented 
simultaneously but separated by a white border. The people presented in the happy prime 
condition were not looking toward each other or toward the camera (Appendix I). Happy 
primes were perceptually matched with social interaction primes in as many ways as 
possible. For instance, both social interaction primes and happy primes had blue borders 
and featured one adult female and one child. Both sets of primes featured ten boys and 
ten girls and had both woman and children of different races. Control primes were 
multiple overlapping abstract shapes (Appendix J). There were 32 participants in the 
supportive social interaction condition, 32 participants in the happy control condition, 
and 30 participants in the neutral control condition. 
DirectRT recorded a log of which condition the child was in, as well as which key 
the child pressed during the game and the length of time the child was playing the game. 
In addition, the research assistant operating the camera wrote which priming condition 
the child was in on the back of the consent form for later referencing. 
Prosocial comforting behavior. Prosocial comforting behavior was assessed 
across three tasks. Two of the three tasks involved responding to the experimenter’s 
distress and the other involved responding to the distress of an infant. The two adult tasks 
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were designed for and successfully implemented with over 140 children in a large-scale 
study in Baltimore and have previously evinced a large range of variability in children’s 
responses (J. Gross, personal communication, September 5, 2015). Adult tasks were 
presented in two orders. Participants assigned to forward order (n = 44) began with the 
phone task and ended with the drawing task. Participants assigned to the backward order 
(n = 50) began with the drawing task and ended with the phone task. The infant task was 
always presented last. 
Adult tasks. Prosocial behavior toward an adult was assessed across two tasks. In 
the broken phone task, the child and experimenter played with an attractive pile of books 
and puzzles for approximately ten minutes. Then, the experimenter’s watch signaled that 
it was “time to play a computer game,” and the prime was delivered. Immediately 
following the prime, the child and experimenter returned to the pile of books and puzzles 
but the experimenter excused herself to “send a quick text message”.  She walked to the 
other side of the room, retrieved a phone, turned towards the child, and pretended to be 
texting. After a few seconds she dropped the phone and cried loudly, “Oh! My phone!” 
She then feigned sadness for two minutes according to a script with subtly increasing 
cues to her distress.  For the first 30 seconds, she sighed and moaned softly. During the 
second 30 seconds, she stated the problem three times (e.g., “I’m so sad that I broke my 
phone!”) without looking at the child. During the third 30 seconds, she stated the problem 
three times while looking at the child. In the final 30 seconds, she explicitly asked the 
child if there was anything he could do to make her feel better, stated the problem again, 
and then again explicitly appealed for comfort. She responded naturally to child overtures 
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throughout. Once two minutes had passed, she “remembered” that her cousin fixes 
phones, recovered, and returned to the table to clean up and present the next activity. 
 In the ruined drawing task, the experimenter first showed each participant a 
simple colored line drawing (standardized across participants) and stated that she had 
been working on it for a long time and was really proud of it. She then gave the 
participant a sheet of paper, making sure to emphasize that it was the last one, and asked 
the child to draw a picture of him- or herself. The experimenter and child then drew for 
approximately ten minutes, during which the experimenter stated that when the drawings 
were complete, she and the child could hang their pictures on the wall.  She also feigned 
thirst and poured a cup of water for herself and the child if desired. After approximately 
ten minutes, the experimenter’s watch signaled that it was time for another game and they 
paused drawing to complete it. Once the child had finished the game, the experimenter 
got a roll of tape to hang up the pictures and used it to knock over the cup of water onto 
her own picture. She cried out, “My drawing!” and then feigned sadness for two minutes 
according to a script with subtly increasing cues to her distress that followed the same 
progression as was described for the phone task. At the end of two minutes, she 
recovered, vowing to make “an even better one next time,” hung the child’s picture on 
the wall, and presented the next task. 
 Behavioral coding of adult tasks. For each participant, the 2-minute adult tasks 
were broken into 10 second segments and each segment was coded for the presence of: 
positive prosocial responses, negative responses, distress / arousal, concerned attention, 
proximity to the distressed adult, and ignoring behaviors (described below, but see also 
Appendix K for the complete coding manual; please note that the clipboard task 
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described in the manual was not used in this study). Segments that were fewer than 8 
seconds were collapsed into the previous 10-second segment. The coding system, which 
was refined based on pilot cases, was adapted from a previously used coding system for 
similar tasks that has demonstrated good reliability (J. Gross, personal communication, 
September 5, 2015). Every moment in every 10-second segment received at least one 
code, and all codes were mutually exclusive (i.e., a comforting behavior could only be 
coded as comforting and nothing else) except distress / arousal and concerned attention 
which could co-occur with each other, and proximity which could co-occur with any code 
except ignoring. Coders also noted any experimenter errors, which included both 
procedural errors (e.g., the experimenter looked at the child in the first minute) and 
timing errors (i.e., a “30 second segment” that lasted fewer than 20 seconds or more than 
45). 
 Positive prosocial responses. Positive prosocial responses included both emotion-
focused and problem-focused responses to the experimenter’s distress. Emotion-focused 
responses were defined as those responses meant to improve the experimenter’s emotions 
without fixing the cause of her sadness. These included things like physical soothing 
(e.g., a pat or a hug), positive reframing (e.g., “It still looks pretty!”), verbal soothing 
(e.g., “It’s ok”), mirroring the experimenter’s sadness (e.g., frowning and saying 
“awww”), personal reflections that ended positively (e.g., “My daddy’s phone broke once 
but it still worked!”), distraction or compensation (i.e., offering up a new activity or some 
compensatory object such as a toy or money), and friendly invitations to play. Problem-
focused responses were defined as responses aimed at fixing the root of the 
experimenter’s sadness and included things like verbal instrumental helping (e.g., 
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offering to fix the phone), physical instrumental helping (e.g., wiping water off the 
drawing), offering the help of other people (e.g., “my mommy can fix it”), any 
suggestions intended to fix the problem (e.g., “You can dry your picture in the sun!”). 
Coders noted both the frequency (i.e., the number of 10-second slices in which emotion 
focused and problem focused responses were offered) and the latency of these types of 
responses. Latency was defined as the interval in which the child first offered each type 
of response (i.e., a one indicated that the child engaged in the behavior before the 
experimenter stated the problem again; a two indicated that the child engaged in the 
behavior after the experimenter stated the problem again but before the experimenter 
looked at the child; a three indicated that the child engaged in the behavior after the 
experimenter looked at the child, but before she directly asked for help; and a four 
indicated that the child engaged in the behavior only after the experimenter directly 
requested assistance), and was factored into the global score. 
 Antisocial (negative) responses. Antisocial responses were defined as any 
responses that would make the experimenter feel worse about her situation and included 
things like laughing at the experimenter, teasing, taunting, or mocking her, callous or 
controlling statements, scolding or yelling at the experimenter, intentionally making the 
situation worse (e.g., ripping the drawing), and withholding help because of the 
experimenter’s emotional state (e.g., “I’ll help you when you stop being sad”). Coders 
noted both the frequency and latency of antisocial responses. The presence of antisocial 
responses was factored into the global score, but will not be considered further. 
 Distress/arousal. Distress/arousal was defined as any behavior indicating that the 
child was emotionally aroused or uncomfortable, including crying, whining, or 
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whimpering, very obvious facial distress, physical self-soothing lasting for more than 
three seconds, verbal statements of distress (e.g., “I wanna go home”), speaking in a 
strained, upset voice, becoming upset about messing up own property, and defensiveness 
(e.g., “Well it’s not MY fault!”). Coders noted both the frequency and latency of distress 
responses, but latency will not be considered further. A distress proportion score was 
created by dividing the number of slices in which distress/arousal occurred by the total 
number of codeable slices. 
 Concerned attention. Concerned attention was coded any time the child remained 
focused on the experimenter or the scene for at least three seconds without offering any 
comfort, and could be verbal or non-verbal. Verbal concerned attention was coded for 
any expression denoting attention to the problem but not offering a solution or comfort 
that also occurred with either a three-second stilling of play or obvious facial concern. 
Statements of verbal concerned attention included factual statements about the child’s 
inability to help if said in a sympathetic manner, statements about items a child has at 
home that relate to the situation (e.g., “I have paper at home.”), questions intended to 
seek more information, reflections on personal experiences that had negative, neutral, or 
ambiguous endings (e.g., “My daddy’s phone broke and it was really expensive”), 
statements indicating the child is thinking of a solution, and sympathetic restatements of 
the problem. Non-verbal concerned attention was only coded if the child was engaging in 
all three of the following behaviors for at least three continuous seconds: focusing on the 
situation or experimenter, showing a reduction in play behavior, and displaying a 
concerned expression. Coders only noted the frequency of concerned attention as there 
was little variation in the latency; most children received a code for concerned attention 
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in first 10-second time segment, as they noticed and processed the situation. Frequency of 
concerned attention was factored into the global scores. 
 Proximity. Proximity was coded in any 10-second segment in which a child 
moved or remained closer to the experimenter than he was in his previous location. To be 
coded as proximity, any movement toward the experimenter had to also include at least 
one look toward the experimenter or situation; this way, if the child happened to pass by 
the experimenter on the way to somewhere else, he would not get proximity unless he 
was also focused on the experimenter or situation. Coders noted the frequency and 
latency of each child’s proximity to the caregiver. Both were considered in deciding upon 
a global score. 
 Ignoring. Ignoring was coded in any 10-second segment in which no other codes 
were issued and reflected active ignoring on the part of the child. Examples include 
keeping attention focused on an activity, smiling at the experimenter, making irrelevant 
conversation, looking around the room, statements about the child’s own property or 
activity, and nodding yes but not offering solutions when asked for help. Coders only 
noted the frequency of ignoring behavior. Ignoring was not considered in the current 
study. 
 Presence of physical comforting. Coders also noted the presence and latency of 
physical comforting (i.e., a pat or a hug). Physical comforting was distinguished from 
non-comforting touch, and only physical comforting was considered in the generation of 
global scores. 
Global comforting score. Using all of this information (i.e., the frequency and 
latency of key behaviors), coders also generated a global comforting score, meant to 
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reflect how comforting overall the child was in each two-minute task. Global scores were 
generated using guidelines that took into account both the quality and quantity of 
comforting attempts, as well as the presence of other non-comforting behaviors such as 
antisocial responses and concerned attention. Global scores ranged from one to five and 
defined as follows: a one indicated that the child did not comfort at all or very briefly 
attempted comfort but did not engage with the situation much; a two indicated that the 
child was focused on the situation but offered little comfort; a three indicated that the 
child offered a few solutions and was engaged with the situation for a good portion of the 
time; a four indicated that the child either offered a few solutions but was engaged with 
the situation the entire time or offered many solutions with partial engagement; and a five 
indicated that the child comforted almost the entire time, or offered many solutions and 
was engaged with the situation when not offering solutions, or engaged in at least one 
large demonstration of comforting (e.g., a hug). In all cases, the presence of any 
antisocial responses reduced the global score by one point. (see Appendix K for a copy of 
the coding manual; see also Appendix L for a copies of the coding sheets).  
Coding procedure for adult tasks, Behavior in response to all adult tasks was 
coded independently by three trained coders and two expert coders (i.e., coders who had 
ample experience using this coding system) who were blind to which priming condition 
the child was in. Coders were trained over the course of two months through weekly 
coding assignments. During training, coders each independently coded approximately 
five videos per week (including pilot cases and randomly selected videotapes) and then 
met with the two expert coders to go over discrepancies and to discuss difficulties in 
coding. Prior to beginning official coding, all coders evinced acceptable reliability (i.e., a 
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value of at least .70 on all variables of interest) with each other. Codes generated during 
the training phase were then discarded.  
Sixty-eight percent of cases were double coded and coder discrepancies were 
resolved by consensus in weekly coding meetings, held to prevent coder drift. 
Discrepancies were defined in the following ways. For high frequency variables (i.e., 
those that occurred in many, if not most, cases; emotion- and problem-focused responses, 
concerned attention, proximity, and ignoring), codes were considered discrepant and 
discussed if they were more than two values apart. If they were only one or two values 
apart, codes were either averaged, or, when coded by an expert coder, the value recorded 
by the expert coder was entered as data. Everything else, including all latency scores, 
experimenter errors, and low frequency variables (i.e., distress and negativity) had to 
perfectly agree between coders or it was considered discrepant and discussed in coding 
meetings. Coders (including the two expert coders) coded five videos per week, four of 
which overlapped with one other coder. That is, each week, every coder overlapped with 
every other coder on one video only and coded one video on their own. In all cases, 
coders were blind to who was coding which video, were not permitted to code in the 
same room at the same time, and hid their folders containing their codes from all other 
coders. This was done to ensure that no coder was influenced by any other during the 
coding process. 
Inter-coder reliability on the 68% of cases that were double coded was calculated 
using Krippendorff’s alpha reliability estimate, capable of generating reliability estimates 
for judgments made at any level of measurement by any number of coders, and of 
generating these estimates in the presence of missing data regardless of sample size. This 
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was desirable as we were working with a multitude of variables at different measurement 
levels. Krippendorff’s alpha takes chance agreement into account and is considered to be 
one of the more conservative measures available (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 
2002). Estimates were generated using KALPHA (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007), an 
SPSS macro, with bootstrapping. Cases that were not coded by at least two judges were 
excluded from reliability estimates. 
Conventional guidelines indicate that reliability of .70 or above (or percent 
agreement above 90%) is sufficient when using conservative indices such as 
Krippendorff’s alpha (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Coding reliabilities for 
the adult tasks were above .7 on most variables of interest (i.e., those used to generate 
global comforting scores and distress proportion scores, as well as those concerning 
procedural errors) and are presented in Table 1. Codes for identification of procedural 
errors fell well below this cutoff as they were infrequent binary variables and 
Krippendorff’s alpha measures observed and expected disagreement, rather than 
agreement (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Thus in cases where most variables are coded 
as zero (i.e., no procedural error), any discrepancies (i.e., one coder puts a one and the 
other puts a zero) are weighted heavily in alpha calculations. For the two variables just 
described, percent agreement was above 90% (94% and 94%, respectively). As with all 
discrepancies, all cases were discussed and agreed upon by all coders, and the data reflect 










Inter-coder Reliability of Key Study Variables (using Krippendorff’s alpha) 
 
Variable Task 
 Ruined Drawing Broken Phone 
 






Latency of emotion-focused comforting* 
 
.70 .70 
Frequency of problem-focused comforting* 
 
.90 .84 
Latency of problem-focused comforting* 
 
.91 .81 
Latency of physical comforting* 
 
1.00 1.00 









Global comforting scores 
 
.80 .74 
Frequency of distress/arousal 
 
.76 .74 










Frequency of antisocial responses* 
 
.66 
Global comforting score 
 
.88 
Frequency of distress 
 
.70 
Presence of procedural error 
 
1.00 
Note. * = codes considered in the assignment of global comforting scores   
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Infant Task. Children saw a research assistant posing as a mother and her “baby” 
upon entering the lab. The baby was in a car seat with a yellow blanket over it to obscure 
any gender cues the child might have gathered. A female research assistant was sitting 
near the entryway as each family walked by to get to the playroom and was tenderly 
stroking the baby’s hand. She made eye contact with the child, smiled, held her fingers to 
her lips, and whispered, “Shhhh, the baby’s sleeping!”  Later in the visit, after the 
experimenter and the child had been playing in an indoor sand table for approximately 
five minutes, the research assistant entered the room with a baby monitor and greeted the 
experimenter and child. The experimenter mentioned that she was glad the research 
assistant had stopped by, as she had forgotten her baby’s pacifier and retrieved it for her. 
A pink pacifier was used for female participants and an orange one was used for male 
participants; the pacifier task (which occurred directly after the baby cry task) is not a 
part of this manuscript and will not be considered further. The research assistant then 
asked if the experimenter and child could watch her sleeping baby while she got some 
water. The experimenter readily agreed, and the research assistant came and knelt 
between the experimenter and the child, turning on the monitor so the child could hear 
baby coos. She then trained the child on how to use the monitor, including teaching him 
or her how to turn the monitor on and off, and how to speak to the baby using the 
monitor. She checked for comprehension after presenting each skill and then departed. 
Immediately after, the experimenter remarked that “the baby must have fallen asleep,” 
checked for comprehension one more time, and initiated a priming game.  Once the 
priming game was complete, the child returned to the sand table and the experimenter, 
realizing she had “lost her favorite toy,” left the room. Approximately 15 seconds after 
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the experimenter’s departure, a baby cry sounded over the monitor for one minute or until 
the child turned it off.  The cry was at a constant volume for all children, and could still 
be heard faintly from outside the room if they turned the monitor off. After one minute, 
the research assistant re-entered the room to initiate the pacifier task. 
 Behavioral coding of infant tasks. For each participant, the 1-minute baby cry 
task was broken into 10 second segments and each segment was coded for the presence 
of positive prosocial responses, antisocial (negative) responses, distress/arousal, 
ignoring the baby, and all other behaviors (described below, but see also Appendix M for 
the complete coding manual). Segments that were fewer than eight seconds were 
collapsed into the previous 10-second segment. The coding system, which was refined 
based on pilot cases, was adapted from the same coding system described above. Every 
moment in every 10-second segment received at least one code, and all codes were 
mutually exclusive (i.e., a comforting behavior could only be coded as comforting and 
nothing else). The only exception to this was the all other behaviors code, which could 
occur with any other code. Coders also noted any timing errors in the task (i.e., whether 
the task lasted fewer than 55 seconds or more than 65 seconds). 
 Positive prosocial responses. Positive prosocial responses included those 
responses intended to make the baby feel better. This included things like soothing, 
saying “shhhhhh,” telling the baby it was ok, and singing to the baby. Given the lack of 
vocal control in four-year-olds, coders were instructed not to consider tone of voice when 
coding positive prosocial responses but rather, the words themselves (except in the case 
of screaming or yelling, which were always considered negative). Children could receive 
a score for positive prosocial responding in any 10-second segment in which they 
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engaged in at least one second of any of the listed behaviors, even if they did not properly 
operate the monitor. So, for instance, a child who did not press the button but sang to the 
baby would receive a code for positive prosocial responding, even though “the baby” 
could not hear what the child was saying. Coders noted both the frequency and latency of 
positive prosocial responses, and factored them into the global score.  
Antisocial (negative) responses. Antisocial responses were considered responses 
that would typically frighten the baby or make the baby feel worse, and included things 
like laughing at the baby, taunting, teasing, or mocking, callous statements (e.g., “shut 
up!”), scolding (e.g., “stop making noise, baby!”), throwing the monitor, and screaming 
into the monitor. Children could receive a score for antisocial behavior in any 10-second 
segment in which they engaged in one of the listed behaviors for at least one second. 
Coders noted both the frequency and latency of antisocial responses. The presence of 
negative responses was factored into the global scores but will not otherwise be 
considered. 
 Distress/arousal. Distress/arousal was defined as any behavior indicating that the 
child was emotionally aroused or uncomfortable, and included the full range of behaviors 
described above, as well as stopping play entirely. Coders noted both the frequency and 
latency of distress responses. Latency is not considered in this study. A distress 
proportion score was also created by dividing the number of slices in which 
distress/arousal occurred by the total number of codeable slices. 
 Ignoring. Ignoring was coded as any response indicating that the child’s focus had 
shifted from the baby cry back to play. To be coded as ignoring, the child had to resume 
his or her activity with no apparent signs of distress. Short (i.e., 3 seconds or less) pauses 
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in play (e.g., to look toward the door or the monitor) did not preclude a code for ignoring 
as long as the child then returned to play. Ignoring was not specifically examined in the 
current study. 
 Other responses. All other responses that did not fit into the described categories 
were coded as “other” and deemed uninterpretable. This included things like pushing 
buttons but not saying anything, stopping play to look at the monitor for more than three 
seconds with no apparent signs of distress or arousal, and walking over to the door and 
peering out the window. The other category was considered a default category for all 
behavior that was not of interest to the present investigation, and will not be considered 
further. 
 Attempts to leave and calling for help. Coders also noted if the children attempted 
to leave the room or called for help and the 10-second segment in which they did so. 
Neither of these variables are considered in the current investigation. 
Global comforting score. Global comforting scores to the baby cry procedure took 
into account the amount of time the child spent comforting the baby and the presence of 
any negative behaviors and were meant to reflect how comforting overall the child was. 
Global scores ranged from one to five and defined as follows: a one indicated that the 
child did not comfort at all; a two indicated that the child comforted briefly; a three 
indicated that the child comforted for about half the time; a four indicated that the child 
comforted for almost the entire time; and a five indicated that the child comforted for the 
duration of the task. In all cases, the presence of any antisocial responses reduced the 
global score by one point (see Appendix M for the coding manual; see also Appendix N 
for a copy of the coding sheet).  
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Coding procedures for infant task. Behavior in response to the baby cry task was 
coded independently by two trained coders and one expert coder, all who were blind to 
which priming condition the child was in. Coders were trained over the course of one 
month through weekly coding assignments. During training, coders each independently 
coded approximately 15 videos per week (including pilot cases and randomly selected 
videotapes) and then met with the expert coder to go over discrepancies and to discuss 
difficulties in coding. Prior to beginning official coding, all coders reached acceptable 
reliability values (i.e., at least .70 on all variables of interest) with the expert coder. Codes 
generated during the training phase were then discarded.  
Forty-nine percent of cases were double-coded and coder discrepancies were 
resolved by consensus in weekly coding meetings, held to prevent coder drift. Coders 
went over every double coded case in weekly meetings, discussing all discrepancies that 
occurred, regardless of how similar or dissimilar codes were. The only category not 
treated this way was the “other” category. As the “other” category was simply a place-
holder and considered uninterpretable, when coders disagreed an average between their 
codes was taken and entered as data. 
Inter-coder reliability on the 49% of cases that were double coded was calculated 
using Krippendorff’s alpha reliability estimate, as described above. Krippendorff’s alpha 
estimates were generated using KALPHA (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007), an SPSS 
macro, with bootstrapping. Cases that were not coded by at least two judges were 
excluded from reliability estimates. Coding reliabilities for the infant cry task were above 
.70 on all variables of interest except for the frequency of negativity, due to its infrequent 
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appearance (as noted above). Percent agreement for the frequency of negativity was 99%. 
Coding reliabilities are presented in Table 1. 
 Missing data. Coders were unable to generate global comforting scores or distress 
proportion scores for one participant on the phone task and two participants on the 
drawing task due to equipment failure (i.e., the videos didn’t have sound or the camera 
cut out prior to task completion). In addition, coders were unable to generate global 
comforting scores for two participants and distress proportion scores for one participant 
on the infant task due to equipment failure. They were also unable to generate global 
comforting scores or distress proportion scores for one participant who became distressed 
as soon as the experimenter left the room. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of social interaction priming 
on preschoolers prosocial comforting responses and personal distress reactions to the 
distress of other people (an adult and an infant). To explore these effects, I originally 
intended to use both generalized estimating equations (GEE) and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) analyses. However, given the substantial methodological changes to my study 
design and the non-normal distributions of some of my outcome variables, my analytic 
plan did not proceed as outlined. For instance, instead of using GEE, which would have 
been ideal for three different, but correlated tasks, I examined the adult tasks and infant 
task separately. The distributions of the global scores and distress proportion scores were 
not similar across tasks, as assessed by visual inspection, lending credence to the fact that 
they were qualitatively different tasks and should be considered in separate models. 
Additionally, although there was a high correlation between the outcome variables in the 
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adult tasks (discussed below), I chose not to combine the two adult tasks due to previous 
literature showing that context is a key factor in predicating prosocial behavior (e.g., 
Demetriou & Hay, 2004). It may be that the broken phone and ruined drawing tasks were 
contextually different in unaccounted for ways and running analyses on them separately 
may illustrate some of these differences. Accordingly, I planned to run a series of t tests, 
ANOVAs, and nonparametric tests when appropriate to examine the outcomes associated 
with each of the tasks. 
Data analyses are presented in three sections. First, I will describe the  
steps taken to prepare my data for analyses, including data entry and checking 
procedures. Then, I will discuss my preliminary analyses, including examination of 
possible covariates, and generation of descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables 
and how they were used to check that data were entered correctly. Finally, I will present 
the main analyses performed to examine my hypotheses. 
Data preparation.  
Priming conditions and delivery. A research assistant who was not part of any 
coding team went through the consent forms for the study and created a variable 
indicating which priming condition each child was in. In the 22 cases where no prime 
was indicated, she reviewed the video of the session and determined which prime the 
child saw while playing the games. This man-made variable was compared to the primes 
indicated in the data log generated by the Direct RT and cleaned using Compare It! (v. 
4.0; Grig Software), a software program that allows direct comparison of two data files 
and highlights any discrepancies. Discrepancies were compared to the autostart file used 
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to place participants in conditions. In all cases, errors were on the part of the human data 
entry, lending confidence to the logs generated by Direct RT. 
In addition, an undergraduate research assistant spot-checked videos of children 
playing the game to ensure that they were watching the screen as primes were delivered. 
She watched at least two instances of prime delivery for 88% of cases. Her checks 
indicated that a nearly all participants watched the screen for the entire duration of the 
priming game, and that those participants who didn’t watched the screen for at least two 
thirds of the time, usually only looking away once the animal prompt was presented (e.g., 
to ask the experimenter a question about the animal or the game). Finally, Direct RT logs 
were examined to ensure that all 20 primes were delivered as intended (i.e., 
supraliminally for two seconds) in each priming game and that each child finished all 
four games. In the two cases where logs did not indicate this, post-lab notes were checked 
for an explanation. Post-lab notes indicated that two children did not finish the final game 
(i.e., the game before the dictator task, not considered in this manuscript), one because of 
equipment failure and one because she exited out of the game before finishing. A third 
child did not complete the priming game prior to the broken phone task because she 
exited the game after seeing only 14 (out of 20) primes. 
Experimenter blindness. During the study, any time the experimenter was made 
aware of the child’s priming condition (e.g., she noticed that the child was not pressing 
buttons and turned just in time to see a prime; or the child shouted “shapes!”), she 
recorded on the post-lab notes at what point in the experiment she had become aware. 
Two independent research assistants went through these notes and generated two 
variables, one indicating cases in which the experimenter became aware of the priming 
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condition prior to the adult tasks, and one indicating cases in which she became aware of 
the priming condition at all. The thinking behind creating these two iterations was that a) 
it is important to know if she was not blind while performing the experiment and b) it is 
particularly important know if she was not blind prior to performing the two adult tasks, 
as such knowledge could have changed her behavior in subtle ways that may not be 
easily apparent. Post-lab notes indicated that the experimenter was made aware of the 
participant’s priming condition before the adult tasks in 11 cases. Accordingly all 
principal adult task analyses were run with and without these cases. In addition, the 
experimenter was made aware of the participant’s priming condition after the adult tasks 
in an additional 11 cases. All principal infant task analyses were run with and without the 
cases in which the experimenter saw the prime at any point in the experiment (total n = 
22). Results for both sets of analyses were not influenced by the exclusion of these cases; 
accordingly, the analyses presented in this manuscript include all cases. 
Task delivery. As mentioned, all videos of the comforting tasks were examined to 
ensure that the tasks were properly administered to each child.  As a part of coding, any 
mistakes in fidelity were noted and entered into a variable indicating the presence of an 
error in administration. Only four presentations of the ruined drawing task included 
procedural errors, whereas 10 presentations of the broken phone task included procedural 
errors. In all cases except two, the errors were timing errors on the part of the 
experimenter (i.e., one or more of the segments was too long or too short, often because 
the child was speaking). In the other two cases, the experimenter looked at the child 
before the third distress segment. Fifteen presentations of the infant cry task included 
procedural errors (i.e., the cry was too long or too short by five or more seconds). All 
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principal analyses were performed first including such cases, and then excluding them to 
ensure that errors in task administration did not influence priming effects. In all other 
cases, the exclusion of such cases made no difference in the pattern of results, so the 
analyses presented include all cases.  
 Data entry. Demographic data was collected online, thereby limiting entry errors. 
However, some questions, such as the child’s race and number of siblings, were in a free-
response format and had to be recoded to be used in data analyses. Whenever this was the 
case, two independent research assistants were trained to recode the data into the proper 
format. In addition, two independent research assistants used an online age calculator to 
calculate and create a variable reflecting each child’s age in months at the date of his/her 
first playroom visit. For both sets of variables, the two files were compared for accuracy 
using Compare It! and any disputed values were checked against original records.  
Prosocial comforting behavior codes were entered into a statistics program by 
coders and double-checked against handwritten coding sheets by a research assistant. In 
addition, discrepancy resolutions were saved in a Word file and entered by research 
assistant the following day. At the completion of coding, a research assistant double-
checked the final data file to ensure that it accurately reflected these resolutions and that 
any data that were averaged rather than discussed were also accurately recorded. She also 
spot-checked individual coder’s codes using original coding sheets. 
 Preliminary analyses.  
Descriptive statistics and data exploration. I generated the means, standard 
deviations, and ranges of all study variables in order to identify any outliers or impossible 
values. If any were found, I examined the source of the data to determine if they were 
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entered in error or were meaningful values. I found no outliers, except in the distress 
proportion scores. It was determined that these values were not in error, and reflected 
children who became highly distressed during the tasks. Accordingly, they were left in 
the data set. I found no impossible values. I also generated the skew and kurtosis statistics 
for each of my outcome variables in order to calculate tests of normality, as the statistical 
tests I intended to use required dependent variables to be normally distributed. Skewness 
and kurtosis ratios were calculated using the procedure outlined by Weinberd and 
Abramowitz (2015), by dividing each statistic by its standard error. By convention, if the 
skewness or kurtosis ratios exceeded 2.0, variables were considered non-normal 
(Weinberd & Abramowitz, 2015). In all cases where variables were found to be non-
normal, I attempted standard, accepted transformations (as outlined by Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007), and if unsuccessful, planned to use non-parametric tests when working 
with skewed outcomes. The only exception to this was when checking interaction effects. 
There is no commonly used or accepted nonparametric alternative to a two-way 
ANOVA, and ANOVA is robust to violations of non-normality (see Maxwell & Delaney, 
2004, for a review), so I intended to run all interaction analyses using two-way 
ANOVAs, assuming all other assumptions were met. In cases where assumptions were 
not met, I planned to employ other analyses. 
Identification of covariates. Previous literature indicates that there may be gender 
differences in the behavioral expression of empathy (e.g., altruistic and prosocial 
behavior; Christov-Moore et al., 2014; Larrieu & Mussen, 1986) even in young children 
(e.g., Blandon & Scrimgeour, 2015), although some studies have not found this 
association (e.g., Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Neal, 1979; Yarrow 
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et. al, 1976). In addition, race has been found to influence ratings of prosocial behavior 
(e.g., Jackson, Barth, Powell, & Lockman, 2006), although few studies have examined 
race-related differences in its expression, and those that did found no effects that were not 
explained in other ways (Rehberg & Richman, 1989; Richman, Berry, Bittle, & Himan, 
1988). Given the contradictory nature of the literature on both of these variables, I 
decided a priori to examine these two covariates and their interactions with priming 
condition in my principal analyses with a series of two-way ANOVAs. Race was divided 
into White children (n = 42) and non-White children (n = 47; missing = 3) to retain 
approximately equal sample sizes in each category. I had no hypotheses regarding the 
associations of gender or race with either comforting behavior or distress. 
To determine if I should include any other covariates in my planned analyses, I 
examined the literature for additional predictors of prosocial behavior and tested their 
bivariate associations with my outcomes of interest. For example, there is some literature 
indicating that the presence of older siblings is associated with lower rates of prosocial 
comforting behavior toward a same-aged peer (Demetriou & Hay, 2004). Accordingly, I 
ran of series of independent samples t tests or Mann-Whitney U tests (if outcomes were 
non-normal or contained many outliers; Ciechalski, 1990) to determine if the presence of 
older siblings was associated with either prosocial comforting behavior or personal 
distress reactions to another’s distress. I expected the presence of older siblings to be 
associated with lower global comforting scores, but had no predictions regarding its 
association with distress or its interaction with the priming conditions. Some theorists 
have also proposed that the mere presence of siblings provides a stage upon which 
children can practice prosocial behavior (Dunn & Munn, 1986); accordingly, I examined 
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the association between the outcomes of interest and the number of siblings a child had 
using either Pearson’s or Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients. Given the scarcity of 
literature examining this association, I had no predictions regarding the effect of number 
of siblings on either prosocial comforting or personal distress. 
Additionally, some studies have noted that the expression of prosocial behavior 
changes across time as children are better able to comprehend and react to situations in 
which someone expresses a need, with some studies noting an increase in both 
comforting sensitivity and number of strategies employed over time (e.g., Burleson, 
1982; Denham & Couchoud, 1991) and others finding no such increase (e.g., Yarrow et 
al., 1976). Some authors have even proposed that prosocial behavior (including prosocial 
comforting) should decrease in the preschool years (Hay, 1994). Accordingly, I examined 
the association between child age in months and each of my dependent variables using 
either Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlation coefficient (again, dependent on the 
assumptions of the tests). I had no predictions regarding child age and my outcomes of 
interest. 
For the adult tasks alone I also examined if the order in which the tasks were 
presented (i.e., either forward or backward) had an effect on children’s responses to adult 
distress using either an independent samples t test or a Mann-Whitney U test, as 
appropriate. I did not expect to find a significant effect. 
Finally, the presence of younger siblings in the home may provide crucial 
opportunities for young children to practice soothing a distressed infant, as well as 
models they can learn from, even if they themselves never soothe the infant. Accordingly, 
differences in infant task outcomes were also examined in relation to the presence of 
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younger siblings in the home using either an independent samples t test or a Mann-
Whitney U test. I expected that children who had a younger sibling in the home would 
evince more comforting behavior toward the distressed infant (i.e., have a higher global 
comforting score) and would have a lower distress proportion score in the infant task, but 
had no specific predictions regarding an interaction with priming condition. 
Importantly, although socioeconomic status has regularly been linked with a 
myriad of socioemotional outcomes in children (e.g., McLoyd, 1990) and with a variety 
of prosocial behaviors in adulthood (e.g., compassion, generosity, helpfulness; Piff, 
Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012), the 
somewhat homogenous nature of the current sample (i.e., 71.2 % of families reporting a 
household income of $40,000 or more) did not allow comparisons of outcomes based on 
income. We also collected maternal education, an often-used proxy for socioeconomic 
status, but recent literature indicates that this practice is faulty, particularly for ethnically 
diverse studies with women of child-bearing age (Braveman et al., 2005). Accordingly, I 
did not test associations with maternal education. In addition, I had hoped to examine the 
effect of one- versus two-parent families on all outcomes of interest, given some 
literature showing that boys in single-mother homes are more comforting than boys in 
two-parent homes or girls in one- or two-parent homes (Rehberg & Richman, 1989; 
Richman et al., 1988). However, the current sample includes only 12 single-parent 
families, which is likely not an adequate representation of the population and limits 




Principal analyses. An a priori power analysis with Power (1-β) set at 0.80 
indicated that a sample size of 90 would be sufficient to detect a medium effect size 
(based on previous literature; e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2009) with up to five predictors 
(condition, prime, identified demographic controls, and interactions if needed). My final 
sample size of 94 exceeds this projected number, giving me confidence in my analyses. 
All preliminary analyses were run using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 
Version 22.0; 2013), a commonly used statistical software package. In cases where my 
planned analyses did not meet assumptions, I ran subsequent analyses in R (v. 3.2.4; 
described below), another commonly used statistical software package. 
Adult tasks. As mentioned, I examined effects for the broken phone and ruined 
drawing tasks separately. For each outcome of interest (i.e., the global comforting scores 
and the distress proportion scores) in each task, I first ran separate models including 
significant covariates. Each model with a covariate also included priming condition and 
the priming condition by covariate interaction. If no significant covariates were detected, 
I ran an ANOVA or Kruskal-Wallis H test (a nonparametric test similar to an ANOVA 
but appropriate for non-normal response variables; Feir-Walsh & Toothaker, 1974) to 
examine the effects of the priming condition on my outcomes of interest. Then, I ran two 
additional models for each outcome in each task, including gender in one and race in the 
other. 
Infant task. Similar to the adult tasks, I first ran separate models for each 
outcome (i.e., the global comforting score and the distress proportion score) including 
significant covariates and priming condition and the priming condition by covariate 
interactions. If no significant covariates were identified, I used ANOVA and Kruskal-
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Wallis tests to examine the effects of priming condition and any identified covariates on 
my outcomes of interest. Finally, I ran two additional models for each outcome, including 
gender in one and race in the other. 
Prior to running any of the above-mentioned tests, I checked the assumptions of 
the test and if assumptions were not met, found and utilized a more appropriate test. I 
intended to report significant main effects and interactions using appropriate test statistics 
and p-values and to explore any significant interactions using common statistical post hoc 
analyses and pairwise comparisons. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
 The results are organized into four sections: descriptive statistics, bivariate 
associations of key study variables, examination of covariates, and principal analyses. 
The examination of covariates and principal analyses sections are divided into 
subsections by the adult tasks and the infant task, and the principal analyses are further 
divided by hypotheses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, and skew and kurtosis statistics for all outcome 
variables are presented in Table 2 and are further broken down by task and priming 
condition in Table 3.  
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, Skew, and Kurtosis of Study Outcome Variables 
 N Mean (SD) Skew (SESkew) Kurtosis (SEKurt) 
Broken Phone Task 
 
    
Global comforting scores 
 
93 2.72 (1.30) 0.17 (0.25) -1.01  (0.50) 
Distress proportion scores 
 
93 .10  (.20) 2.54 (0.25) 6.28 (0.50) 
Ruined Drawing Task 
 
    
Global comforting scores 
 
92 2.23 (1.19) -0.30 (0.25) -0.76  (0.50) 
Distress proportion scores 
 
92 .15  (.25) 1.98 (0.25) 3.33 (0.50) 
Infant Cry Task 
 
    
Global comforting scores 
 
91 2.31 (1.46) 0.75 (0.25) -0.95  (0.50)  
Distress proportion scores 
 






Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Variables by Tasks and Priming Conditions 
 




(1.40) .12 (.23) 
3.20 
(1.30) .12 (.18) 
2.02 




(1.20) .09 (.19) 
3.39 
(1.05) .14 (.26) 
2.56 




(1.30) .06 (.09) 
3.07 
(1.19) .16 (.27) 
2.28 
(1.43) .12 (.25) 
Note. GCS = global comforting score; DPS = distress proportion score; SSI = supportive 
social interaction; HC = happy control; NC = neutral control; all values presented are: 
mean (standard deviation). 
 
Normality analyses indicated that the global comforting scores for the adult tasks 
were approximately normal, whereas the distress proportion skills were non-normal. 
Distress was relatively infrequent in the adult tasks (i.e., 60 children showed no distress 
in the broken phone task; 57 children showed no distress in the ruined drawing task), 
accounting for the extreme skew of these variables. Attempts to normalize the distress 
proportion scores through logarithmic transformation (following the guidelines advocated 
by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) were unsuccessful (phone distress proportion score: skew 
= 2.18, SE = .25; and kurtosis = 4.3, SE = .50 post-transformation; drawing distress 
proportion score: skew = 1.65, SE = .25; and kurtosis = 1.82, SE = .50, post-
transformation). In addition, both outcome variables for the infant cry task (i.e., the 
global comforting scores and the distress proportion scores) were skewed. This is also an 
artifact of the relatively low rates of comforting (i.e., 38 children received a global 
comforting score 1, indicating no comforting behavior) and distress (i.e., 65 children 
showed no distress) in the infant cry task. Attempts to normalize these scores through 
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logarithmic transformation were also unsuccessful (infant cry global comforting score: 
skew = .29, SE = .25; and kurtosis = -1.50, SE = .50 post-transformation; infant cry 
distress proportion score: skew = 1.69, SE = .25 and kurtosis = 1.54, SE = .50 post-
transformation). Although the post-transformation skew statistic for the infant cry global 
comforting scores is within normal range, the kurtosis statistic still indicates non-
normality.  
Bivariate Associations of Key Study Variables 
Correlations between all global comforting scores and distress proportion scores 
for all tasks are presented in Table 4.  In any case where one of the variables was skewed, 
I used Spearman’s rho to estimate the association; otherwise I used Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient.  
Table 4 
Correlations Between Study Outcome Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Phone GCS 
 
---      
Phone DPS 
 
-.20 ---     
Draw GCS 
 
      .61**° -.09 ---    
Draw DPS 
 
  -.27**     .41**  -.26* ---   
Infant GCS 
 
.05 .03 .16 -.06 ---  
Infant DPS 
 
.01 .05 -.14    .24* -.29** --- 
Note. *p < .05; *p < .001; ° calculated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient, all else 
calculated using Spearman’s rho; GCS = global comforting score; DPS = distress 
proportion score. 
Examination of Covariates 
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 In order to assess bivariate associations of demographic and procedural variables 
(i.e., order of adult tasks) and study outcomes, I ran a series of parametric and 
nonparametric tests, described in the following sections. For every analysis, I first 
checked the assumptions of the test. In all cases, assumptions were met unless otherwise 
noted.  
 Broken phone task.  
 Global comforting scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and the order of adult tasks 
with the global comforting scores in the broken phone task using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and independent samples t 
tests (i.e., for the presence of older siblings and for task order; Table 6). Child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and task order were all 
unrelated to the global comforting scores. 
Table 5 
 
Bivariate Associations of Outcome Variables with Continuous Covariates 
 
 Child age in months Number of siblings 
Phone GCS 
 
     -.15 (82) °       .11 (82) ° 
Phone DPS 
 
   .06 (81)    -.10 (82) 
Draw GCS 
 
      .07 (80) °        .02 (81) ° 
Draw DPS 
 
   .16 (80)      -.15 (81) 
Infant GCS 
 
   .22 (81)      .21 (81) 
Infant DPS 
 
  -.17 (80)     -.15 (81) 
Note. *p < .05; *p < .001; ° calculated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient, all else 
calculated using Spearman’s rho; GCS = global comforting score; DPS = distress 





Bivariate Associations of Normally Distributed Outcomes and Categorical Factors 
 




M (SD) t (df) p d 








.16  .32 








.05  .46 
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.60  .11 
 
 Distress proportion scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and the order of adult tasks 
with the distress proportion scores in the broken phone task using Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient (i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and Mann-Whitney U 
tests (i.e., for the presence of older siblings and for task order; Table 7). Neither child age 
in months nor number of siblings was related to the distress proportion scores for the 
phone task. In addition, distress proportions scores for the phone task were not 







Bivariate Associations of Non-normally Distributed Outcomes and Categorical Factors 
 
Presence of Older Siblings Outcome U z p r 
Broken Phone: Distress Proportion 
 
795 -0.13 .90 -.01 
Ruined Drawing: Distress Proportion 
 
749 -0.44 .66  .05 
Infant Cry: Global Comforting 
 
784   0.09 .93  .01 
Infant Cry: Distress Proportion 
 
814   0.27 .78  .05 
  Task Order 
 U z p r 
Broken Phone: Distress Proportion 
 
1,132  0.48 .63  .07 
Ruined Drawing: Distress Proportion 
 
1,269  1.91 .06  .20 
  Presence of Younger Siblings 
 U z p r 
Infant Cry: Global Comforting 
 
1, 029  2.04 .04  .23 
Infant Cry: Distress Proportion 
 
645 -2.19 .03 -.24 
 
Ruined drawing task. 
Global comforting scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and the order of adult tasks 
with the global comforting scores in the ruined drawing task using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and independent samples t 
tests (i.e., for the presence of older siblings and for task order; Table 6). Child age in 
months, number of siblings, and task order, t (90) = 0.53, p = .60, d = .11, were all 
unrelated to the global comforting scores. An independent samples t test revealed that 
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global comforting scores were significantly lower for children with older siblings than for 
children without older siblings. 
 Distress proportion scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and the order of adult tasks 
with the distress proportion scores in the ruined drawing task using Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient (i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and Mann-
Whitney U tests (i.e., for the presence of older siblings and for task order; Table 7). Child 
age in months and number of siblings were unrelated to distress proportion scores in the 
ruined drawing task. In addition, distress proportions scores were not statistically 
significantly different based on the presence of older siblings. 
Infant cry task.  
 Global comforting scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, the presence of older siblings, and the presence of younger 
siblings with the global comforting scores in the infant cry task using Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient (i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and Mann-
Whitney U tests (i.e., for the presence of older and younger siblings; Table 7). The global 
comforting scores were marginally positively associated with child age in months and the 
number of siblings a child had, but neither association reached significance. Global 
comforting scores were not statistically significantly different based on the presence of 
older siblings. However, a Mann-Whitney U test revealed that global comforting scores 
for children with at least one younger sibling (mean rank = 46.16) were statistically 
significantly higher than those for children with no younger siblings (mean rank = 35.96). 
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Accordingly, I planned include the presence of younger siblings an additional factor in 
my principal analyses for the infant cry task global comforting scores. 
 Distress proportion scores. I examined the bivariate associations of child age in 
months, number of siblings, and the presence of older and younger siblings with the 
distress proportion scores in the infant cry task using Spearman’s correlation coefficient 
(i.e., for child age and number of siblings; Table 5) and Mann-Whitney U tests (i.e., for 
the presence of older and younger siblings; Table 7). Child age in months and number of 
siblings were unrelated to distress proportion scores. Distress proportions scores were not 
statistically significantly different based on the presence of older siblings. However, a 
Mann-Whitney U test revealed that distress proportion scores for children with at least 
one younger siblings (mean rank = 36.62) were statistically significantly lower than for 
children with no younger siblings (mean rank = 46.14). Accordingly, I planned to include 
the presence of younger siblings an additional factor in my principal analyses for the 
infant cry task distress proportion scores. 
Principal Analyses 
 For my principal analyses, I ran a series of one- and two-way ANOVAs with 
priming condition as a fixed factor. For all outcomes of interest, I first examined models 
in which identified covariates (or factors; hereafter referred to as covariates) and their 
interaction terms were included. Due to sample size, I did not have enough power to 
include more than two predictors (plus interactions) in a single model and accordingly 
ran models with different covariates separately. If no covariates were identified as 
significant, I first ran a one-way ANOVA (or Kruskal-Wallis test when appropriate) 
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including only priming condition as a predictor. Then, I ran models including gender and 
race (and their interactions with priming condition) as covariates. 
 Broken phone task. 
Hypothesis 1: Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition 
will display more global concern than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. I did not identify any variables that were significantly associated with the 
global scores for the broken phone task. Thus, to examine this hypothesis, I first ran a 
one-way ANOVA with priming condition as the independent variable and the global 
comforting scores for the broken phone task as the dependent variable. Results indicated 
that the comforting global scores for the broken phone task did not differ across priming 
groups, F (2, 90) = 0.36, p = .70, η2 = .01. My hypothesis was not supported.  
To explore whether the effect of priming condition on the global comforting 
scores for the broken phone task was qualified by gender or race, I ran 2 two-way 
ANOVAs, one including gender and the gender by priming condition interaction, and one 
including race and the race by priming interaction. With gender included, the overall 
model was not significant F (5, 87) = 0.38, p = .87, partial η2 = .02. In addition, the main 
effects of priming condition, F (2, 87) = 0.21, p = .81, partial η2 = .01 and gender, F (1, 
87) = 0.05, p = .82, partial η2 < .01, were not significant, nor was the interaction term, F 
(2, 87) = 0.56, p = .57, partial η2 = .01. The effect of gender on global comforting scores 
in the broken phone task was the same across conditions. The model including race as an 
additional factor was not significant F (5, 84) = 0.53, p = .75, partial η2 = .03, nor were 
the main effects of priming condition, F (2, 84) = 0.27, p = .77, partial η2 = .01, and race, 
F (1, 84) = 0.19, p = .67, partial η2 < .01. The interaction term was also not significant, F 
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(2, 84) = 0.91, p = .41, partial η2 = .02. The effect of race on global comforting scores in 
the broken phone task was the same across conditions. 
 Hypothesis 2: Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition 
will display less personal distress than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. I did not identify any variables that were significantly associated with the 
distress proportion scores for the broken phone task. Thus, to examine this hypothesis, a 
Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine if there were any differences in the distress 
proportion scores for the broken phone task across priming conditions. Distributions of 
distress proportion scores for the broken phone task were similar for all participants in all 
priming conditions, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median distress 
proportion scores for the broken phone task were not statistically significantly different 
across priming conditions, χ2(2) = .88, p = .65. My hypothesis was not supported. 
I also explored whether the effect of priming condition on distress proportion 
scores for the broken phone task was qualified by gender or race.  I ran 2 two-way 
ANOVAs, one including gender and the gender by priming condition interaction, and one 
including race and the race by priming interaction. The model including gender was not 
significant F (5, 87) = 0.64, p = .67, partial η2 = .04. The main effects of priming 
condition, F (2, 87) = 1.14, p = .32, partial η2 = .03, and gender, F (1, 87) = 0.10, p = .76, 
partial η2 = .001, were not significant, nor was the interaction term, F (2, 87) = 0.40, p = 
.68, partial η2 = .01. The effect of gender on the distress proportion scores in the broken 
phone task was the same across conditions. The model including race was also not 
significant, F (5, 84) = 0.69, p = .63, partial η2 = .04. The main effects of priming 
condition, F (2, 84) = 0.90, p = .41, partial η2 = .02, and race, F (1, 84) = 1.11, p = .30, , 
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partial η2 = .01, were not significant, nor was the interaction term, F (2, 84) = 0.06, p = 
.94, , partial η2 = .001. The effect of race on the distress proportion scores in the broken 
phone task was the same across conditions. 
 Ruined drawing task. 
Hypothesis 1: Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition 
will display more global concern than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. Given that the presence of older siblings was associated with the global 
scores for the drawing task, I first ran a two-way ANOVA with priming condition, 
presence of older siblings, and their interaction term as the independent variables and the 
global comforting scores for the drawing task as the dependent variable. The overall 
model was not significant F (5, 76) = 1.72, p = .14, partial η2 = .10. In addition, the main 
effects of priming condition, F (2, 76) = 0.40, p = .67, partial η2 = .01, and the presence of 
older siblings, F (1, 76) = 3.47, p = .07, partial η2 = .04, were not significant, nor was the 
interaction term, F (2, 76) = 2.09, p = .13, partial η2 = .05. The effects of priming were 
non-significant, and did not differ based on the presence of older siblings. My hypothesis 
was not supported.  
To explore whether the effect of priming condition on the global comforting 
scores for the ruined drawing task was qualified by gender or race, I ran 2 two-way 
ANOVAs, one including gender and the gender by priming condition interaction, and one 
including race and the race by priming interaction. The model including gender was not 
significant F (5, 86) = 0.38, p = 86, partial η2 = .02. In addition, the main effects of 
priming condition, F (2, 86) = 0.27, p = .77, partial η2 = .01, and gender, F (1, 86) < 0.01, 
p > .99, partial η2 <.01, were not significant, nor was the interaction term, F (2, 86) = 
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0.53, p = .59, partial η2 = .01. The effect of gender on the global comforting scores in the 
ruined drawing task was the same across conditions.  
The model including race was significant, F (5, 83) = 2.66, p = .03, partial η2 = 
.14, and included a statistically significant interaction between race and priming 
condition, F (2, 83) = 4.04, p = .02, partial η2 = .09. Simple main effects analyses 
(performed with statistical significance receiving a Bonferroni adjustment and being 
accepted at the p < .025 level) indicated that there was a statistically significant 
difference in the global comforting scores for the ruined drawing task between White and 
non-White participants in the neutral condition, F (1, 83) = 9.64, p = .003, partial η2 = 
.10. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean global comforting score for non-White 
participants (M = 2.53, SD = 1.18) was 1.38, 95% CI [.50, 2.26] lower than the mean 
global comforting score of White participants (M = 3.91, SD = 0.83) in the neutral 
condition of the ruined drawing task. However, the simple main effects of race on the 
global comforting scores for the ruined drawing task were not statistically significant for 
those participants in the happy, F (1, 83) = 1.72, p = .19, partial η2 = .02, or supportive 
social interaction, F (1, 83) = 0.72, p = .40, partial η2 = .01, conditions, indicating that 




Figure 1. Two-way interaction between priming condition and race in predicting global 
comforting scores in the ruined drawing task. 
 
In addition, priming condition did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
mean global comforting scores in the ruined drawing task for either non-White, F (2, 83) 
= 2.19, p = .12, partial η2 = .05, or White participants, F (2, 83) = 2.36, p = .10, partial η2 
= .05. Global comforting scores in the ruined drawing task for non-White participants in 
the supportive social interaction, happy, and neutral conditions were 3.36 (SD = 1.28), 
3.13 (SD = 1.02),  and 2.53 (SD = 1.18), respectively. Global comforting scores in the 
ruined drawing task for White participants in the supportive social interaction, happy, and 
neutral conditions were 3.00 (SD = 1.37), 3.67 (SD = 1.05), and 3.91 (SD = 0.83), 
respectively.   
 Hypothesis 2: Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition 




































conditions. I did not identify any variables that were significantly associated with the 
distress proportion scores for the ruined drawing task. Thus, to examine this hypothesis, a 
Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine if there were any differences in distress 
proportion scores across priming conditions for the drawing task. The distributions of 
distress proportion scores for the drawing task were similar for all participants in all 
priming conditions, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median distress 
proportion scores in the ruined drawing task were not statistically significantly different 
χ2(2) = .993, p = .609. 
I also explored the interactive effects of priming condition and gender on the 
distress proportion scores for the ruined drawing task.  I ran a two-way ANOVA 
including priming condition, gender, and the gender by priming condition interaction. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test 
for equality of variances, p = .001. A boxplot depicting distress proportion scores by 
gender revealed that the unequal variances were driven by 3 extreme cases where boys 
were distressed for the entire infant cry task. Given that this is meaningful information, 
these cases were not discarded. Although ANOVA is robust to violations of assumptions, 
it is only robust to heterogeneity of variance in cases where the ratio of the largest group 
variance (males in the happy condition; σ2 = .13) to the smallest group variance (females 
in the supportive social interaction condition; σ2 =.02) is less than 3 (Dean & Voss, 
1999). My data did not conform to this parameter, so I ran a robust two-way ANOVA 
using Rfit, a statistical package designed to be used in R, designed to perform rank-based 
estimates that are robust to outliers in response space, hold no assumptions about 
distributions, and work for balanced and unbalanced designs alike (Kloke & McKean, 
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2012). In order to provide robust estimates and to satisfy the Rfit assumptions regarding 
discreteness, I had to jitter the data (i.e., add random noise, uniformly between -.001 and 
.001). Results revealed that neither the interaction, F (87, 2) = .01, p = .99, nor the main 
effects of gender, F (87, 1) = .07, p > .79, or priming conditon, F (87, 2) < .01, p > .99, 
were significant. Rfit did not generate effect sizes. 
I also explored whether the effect of priming condition on the distress proportion 
scores for the ruined drawing task was qualified by participant race.  I ran a two-way 
ANOVA including priming condition, race, and the race by priming condition interaction 
as predictors. The overall model was not significant, F (5, 83) = 0.30, p = .91, partial η2 = 
.02. The main effects of priming condition, F (2, 83) = 0.12, p = .89, partial η2 = .003, 
and race, F (1, 83) = 0.16, p = .69, partial η2 = .002, were not significant, nor was their 
interaction term, F (2, 83) = 0.59, p = .56, partial η2 = .01. 
Infant task. 
Hypothesis 1: Children in the supportive social interaction priming condition 
will display more global concern than children in the happy or neutral priming 
conditions. Given that the presence of younger siblings was associated with the global 
scores for the drawing task, I first ran a two-way ANOVA with priming condition, 
presence of younger siblings, and their interaction term as the independent variables and 
the global comforting scores for the infant cry task as the dependent variable. Results 
indicated that the overall model was significant, F (5, 75) = 2.75, p = .03, partial η2 = .16. 
The interaction between priming condition and younger siblings was not significant, F (2, 
75) = 2.05, p = .14, partial η2 = .05, nor was the main effect of priming condition, F (2, 
75) = 1.62, p = .20, partial η2 = .04. There was, however, a main effect of younger 
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siblings, F (1, 75) = 5.34, p = .02, partial η2 = .07. Pairwise comparisons indicated that, in 
the infant cry task, participants with at least one younger sibling had 0.69, 95% CI [.10, 
1.28] higher global comforting scores than participants with no younger siblings 
regardless of condition. Global comforting scores in the infant cry task for participants 
with at least one younger sibling in the supportive social interaction, happy, and neutral 
conditions were 2.07 (SD = 0.36), 3.33 (SD = 0.34), and 2.36 (SD = .40), respectively. 
Global comforting scores in the infant cry task for participants with no younger siblings 
in the supportive social interaction, happy, and neutral conditions were 1.77 (SD = 0.34), 
1.79 (SD = 0.39), and 2.14 (SD = 0.36), respectively.  
To explore whether the effect of priming condition on the global comforting 
scores for the infant cry task was qualified by gender, I ran a two-way ANOVA including 
priming condition, gender, and the gender by priming condition interaction as predictors. 
The overall model was not significant, F (5, 85) = 1.06, p = .39, partial η2 = .06. The 
main effects of priming condition, F (2, 85) = 1.16, p = .32, partial η2 = .03, and gender, 
F (1, 85) = 2.19, p = .14, partial η2 = .03, were not significant, nor was their interaction 
term, F (2, 85) = 0.24, p = .79, partial η2 = .01. 
I also explored whether the effect of priming condition on the global comforting 
scores for the infant cry task was qualified by participant race. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of 
variances, p = .001. However, the ratio of the largest group variance (non-White 
participants in the happy condition; σ2 = 2.99) to the smallest group variance (White 
participants in the neutral condition; σ2 = 1.29) is less than 3. Under this condition, two-
way ANOVA is robust to heterogeneity of variance (Dean & Voss, 1999). Accordingly, I 
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ran a two-way ANOVA including priming condition, race, and the race by priming 
condition interaction as predictors. The overall model was not significant, F (5, 82) = 
0.45, p = .81, partial η2 = .03. The main effects of priming condition, F (2, 82) = 1.07, p = 
.35, partial η2 = .03, and race, F (1, 82) = 0.10, p = .92, partial η2 < .01, were not 
significant, nor was their interaction term, F (2, 82) = 0.05, p = .95, partial η2 < .01. 
 Hypothesis 2: Children in the supportive social interaction priming 
condition will display less personal distress than children in the happy or neutral 
priming conditions. Given that the presence of younger siblings was associated with the 
distress proportion scores for the infant cry task, I first ran a two-way ANOVA with 
priming condition, presence of younger siblings, and their interaction term as the 
independent variables and the distress proportion scores for the infant cry task as the 
dependent variable. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as 
assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances, p = .001. A boxplot depicting distress 
proportion scores by younger sibling status revealed that the unequal variances were 
driven by 3 extreme cases where children with no siblings were distressed for nearly the 
entire infant cry task. Given that this is meaningful information, these cases were not 
discarded. Although ANOVA is robust to violations of assumptions, it is only robust to 
heterogeneity of variance in cases where the ratio of the largest group variance (children 
with no younger siblings in the neutral condition; σ2 = .1) to the smallest group variance 
(children with younger siblings in the neutral prime condition; σ2 < .01) is less than 3 
(Dean & Voss, 1999). My data did not conform to this parameter, so I ran a robust two-
way ANOVA using Rfit, as described above (Kloke & McKean, 2012). In order to 
provide robust estimates and to satisfy the Rfit assumptions regarding discreteness, I had 
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to jitter the data (i.e., add random noise, uniformly between -.001 and .001). Results 
revealed that neither the interaction, F (77, 2) = .04, p = .96, nor the main effects of the 
presence of younger siblings, F (77, 1) = .21, p = .65, or priming condition, F (77, 2) < 
.01, p > .99, were significant. Rfit did not generate effect sizes. 
To explore whether there was a gender by priming condition interaction, I ran a 
two-way ANOVA, including gender and the gender by priming condition interaction. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test 
for equality of variances, p = .02. A boxplot depicting distress proportion scores by 
gender revealed that the unequal variances were again driven by 3 extreme cases where 
males were distressed for nearly the entire infant cry task. Given that this is meaningful 
information, these cases were not discarded. Although ANOVA is robust to violations of 
assumptions, it is only robust to heterogeneity of variance in cases where the ratio of the 
largest group variance (males in the supportive social interaction condition; σ2 = .11) to 
the smallest group variance (females in the neutral condition; σ2 =.02) is less than 3 
(Dean & Voss, 1999). My data did not conform to this parameter, so I ran a robust two-
way ANOVA using Rfit, a statistical package to R, designed to perform rank-based 
estimates that are robust to outliers in response space, hold no assumptions about 
distributions, and work for balanced and unbalanced design alike (Kloke & McKean, 
2012). In order to provide robust estimates and to satisfy the Rfit assumptions regarding 
discreteness, I had to jitter the data (i.e., add random noise, uniformly between -.001 and 
.001). Results revealed that neither the interaction, F (87, 2) = .02, p = .98, nor the main 
effects of gender, F (87, 1) = .01, p > .91, or priming condition, F (87, 2) = .02, p = .98, 
were significant. Rfit did not generate effect sizes. 
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To determine whether there was a race by priming condition interaction, I ran a 
two-way ANOVA with priming condition, participant race, and their interaction term as 
the independent variables and the distress proportion scores for the infant cry task as the 
dependent variable. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as 
assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances, p = .01. A boxplot depicting distress 
proportion scores by race revealed that the unequal variances were again driven by three 
extreme cases in which non-White children were distressed for nearly the entire infant 
cry task. Given that this is meaningful information, these cases were not discarded. 
Although ANOVA is robust to violations of assumptions, it is only robust to 
heterogeneity of variance in cases where the ratio of the largest group variance (non-
White participants in the supportive social interaction priming group; σ2 = .09) to the 
smallest group variance (White participants in the neutral condition; σ2 =.01) is less than 
3 (Dean & Voss, 1999). My data did not conform to this parameter, so I ran a robust two-
way ANOVA using Rfit, a statistical package to R, designed to perform rank-based 
estimates that are robust to outliers in response space, hold no assumptions about 
distributions, and work for balanced and unbalanced design alike (Kloke & McKean, 
2012). In order to provide robust estimates and to satisfy the Rfit assumptions regarding 
discreteness, I had to jitter the data (i.e., add random noise, uniformly between -.001 and 
.001). Results revealed that neither the interaction, F (84, 2) = .01, p = .99, nor the main 
effects of race, F (84, 1) = .02, p > .89, or priming condition, F (84, 2) = .02, p = .98, 
were significant. Rfit did not generate effect sizes. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 The aim of the current investigation was to experimentally induce a sense of felt 
social support in a randomly selected group of preschool-aged children and to examine 
the effects of supportive social interaction priming (relative to neutral and happy priming) 
on both prosocial comforting behavior and the expression of personal distress in response 
to the distress of another person. Drawing on both social baseline theory and previous 
work in the attachment literature, I hypothesized that children in the supportive social 
interaction priming condition would display more global concern and less personal 
distress in response to a distressed adult and a distressed infant. However, results 
revealed no main effects of priming condition on children’s prosocial comforting or 
personal distress in any of the comforting tasks. Interestingly, there was a significant 
interaction in the drawing task, such that non-White children were less comforting than 
White children in the neutral control condition only. It is also notable that few influences 
on prosocial comforting or distress were detected overall. In fact, I found only three 
effects across all analyses. I found a main effect of the presence of older siblings, with 
children with at least one older sibling displaying less comforting behavior in the drawing 
task than children without older siblings. I also found that children with at least one 
younger sibling were more comforting and less distressed in the infant cry task than 
children without younger siblings. 
 In following sections, I critically examine these findings in light of the known 
literature on prosocial comforting. I begin with a discussion of the findings of my 
principal analyses, at first broadly, looking at the findings as a whole. Then, I examine 
possible limitations of the adult tasks and the infant task separately, and discuss some of 
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the strengths of my design. I then discuss the significant interaction I found and the 
implications of my findings regarding the main effects of gender, age, race, and sibling 
status on prosocial comforting responses. Finally, I suggest future directions for the field, 
given the current state of the literature and the present findings. 
Principal Analysis 
 There were no main effects of priming condition on either prosocial comforting 
responses or distress responses in any of the tasks examined in the present study, a 
surprising finding, given the extant literature reviewed in the introduction of this 
manuscript. The adult literature is rife with examples of supportive (termed: secure) 
priming being an effective means of increasing behaviors such as compassion, altruism, 
and self-reported empathy (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2001; Mikulincer et al., 2003; 
Mikulincer et al., 2005; Mikulincer et al., 2013). A number of explanations may account 
for this observed disconnect. For instance, adults have a lifetime of experiences seeking 
social support from not only their parents and siblings, but from a variety of others, 
including friends, colleagues, mentors, and romantic partners. It is likely that throughout 
this long history, they have experienced at least a few instances of felt social support, 
even if this is not a regular occurrence in their lives. Accordingly, when primed with 
something outside their normative experience, adults may be able to unconsciously call 
upon these previous incidents, rendering the prime effective. In contrast, young children, 
even those who have attended preschool, have likely spent the majority of their lives with 
their parents and siblings, primarily within their parents’ social circles. Given their 
limited social experience, children may be far less likely to have experienced true social 
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support. If this is the case for even a small number of children, the effect of the prime 
may be washed out, rendering the prime ineffective.  
 Even so, previous literature indicates that priming has been a successful means of 
examining how children’s mental representations of the social world influence their 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior (e.g., Cortez & Bugental, 1995; Harris, Bargh, & 
Brownell, 2009; Hoe & Davidson, 2002; Over & Carpenter, 2009a, 2009b, Watson-Jones 
et al., 2014). However, it is important to note that a majority of these studies were 
conducted with children older than those in the current sample. Although the literature in 
cognitive science (i.e., studies of memory, language, and numerical representation) has 
many examples of priming being effectively utilized in young children (and even infants; 
e.g., Hartshorn, 2003; Rovee-Collier, Hartshorn, & DiRubbo, 1999), only two studies to 
date have utilized priming to influence social behavior through mental representations in 
very young children (Over & Carpenter, 2009a; Watson-Jones et al., 2014).  
Given the age of the subjects in the current study, it may then be the case that the 
prime delivery mechanism (i.e., the categorization game) utilized was too cognitively 
complex for the primes to be effective. In both studies of social priming in young 
children, the authors used passive viewing paradigms, in which the children simply 
viewed either pictures with the prime in the background (Over & Carpenter, 2009a) or 
videos depicting abstract shapes (Watson-Jones et al., 2014). Although no studies have 
examined the effect of cognitive load on priming in very young children, it is a 
reasonable hypothesis that a large amount of mental activity may block access to 
unconscious representations. In addition, the primes I used were only presented for two 
seconds each, which may have been too short a duration for the children to fully grasp 
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what they were seeing, particularly in the happy and supportive social interaction priming 
conditions. In both conditions, the priming stimuli were fairly complex, with many 
colors, backgrounds, and people of different races and genders. It is possible that such 
complexity cannot be grasped by young minds in so short a time, and that more time 
might have made a difference. Again, by contrast, the primes in the Over and Carpenter 
(2009a) and Watson-Jones et al. (2014) studies were presented for an unspecified length 
of time, but long enough to produce a few short statements about the picture book in the 
former, and long enough to present a sequence of events in the latter. Future studies 
attempting to prime young children may wish to emulate the procedures utilized by Over 
and Carpenter (2009a) or by Watson-Jones et al. (2014) by employing passive viewing 
paradigms and longer exposure to primes to determine if priming can be an effective 
means of eliciting mental representations in young children.  
 Another possible confound stems from prime delivery procedures. Because the 
experimenter wished to remain blind to priming conditions and because the primes were 
delivered supraliminally, the experimenter had to turn her back to each child while he or 
she was playing the priming game. In addition, she told the children that the “only rule” 
of the animal game was that she and the child could not speak. She then kept dialogue to 
a minimum throughout the game. It is possible that these actions acted as an ostracism or 
rejection prime and counteracted the effects of the supportive social interaction prime. 
This may be particularly true for the children who tried to engage throughout the game 
but were minimally responded to. A stronger design would perhaps employ the use of a 
second experimenter who is not blind to condition to deliver the primes, while making 
the first experimenter unavailable through more natural means. 
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It is also possible that it was not that nature of the primes I was using, but rather, 
the target behaviors I was examining (i.e., comforting and distress) that contributed to my 
null findings. Over and Carpenter (2009a) examined a rather simple behavior (i.e., 
instrumental helping), known to develop early and to be consistently observed in early 
childhood (e.g., Warneken, 2015). It may be that a behavior as multifaceted as 
comforting, which requires a number of developmentally advanced skills (e.g., emotion 
recognition, approach motivation, emotion regulation), is too complex to be influenced 
by the activation of mental representations alone in the preschool years. Perhaps it is only 
as children mature and have more experiences with comforting and being comforted by a 
variety of individuals that they develop quicker access to the schemas and scripts related 
to this socially complex behavior. Regarding the current findings, it may be that prosocial 
comforting behavior is indeed influenced by felt social support, but in the preschool 
years, social support must take the form of the actual physical presence of another person. 
A stronger research design would tackle this problem head on by contrasting felt social 
support, through the use of primes, with actual social support by having close, available 
others accessible but not able to respond to the comforting need. For example, a study in 
which mothers were in the room during distress events but on the phone or “working” 
would better approximate the kinds of social support children are accustomed to 
experiencing and may be more successful at changing behavior. 
In addition, my examination of the effects of felt social support on personal 
distress was limited by the low rate of personal distress evinced by the participants in my 
sample. Even in the task that elicited the most distress (i.e., the ruined drawing task), 
fewer than half of the participants displayed any distress at all, resulting in very skewed 
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distributions and little variability from which to draw conclusions. Research shows that 
the variety and complexity of emotion regulation strategies used by children increase 
over the preschool years and that, aside from seeking social support (a strategy that was 
not available in the present study), the strategies most utilized by 4-year-olds are 
behavioral (i.e., turning attention to another activity to regulate emotions; e.g., Sala et al., 
2014). It is notable that the most distress was found in the ruined drawing task, where 
children had the fewest options to which to turn their attention. In both the broken phone 
task and infant cry task, children had a wide variety of available toys that they could play 
with to regulate distress, whereas in the drawing task, they could only re-engage with 
their drawing. Future researchers hoping to examine influences on distress regulation in 
the face of distressing events could address this concern in a number of ways. First, 
giving children fewer external options to help regulate distress may increase the amount 
of visible distress displayed across tasks. In addition, using more sensitive measures of 
distress / arousal, such as physiological indices (e.g., heart rate, electrodermal activity), in 
combination with behavioral measures may uncover a wider range of distress responses. 
For example, physiological measure could distinguish those children who are 
behaviorally regulated (i.e., not showing an outward signs of distress) but physiologically 
dysregulated. In both cases, a wider range of measured distress would allow for a more 
statistically sound examination of subtle influences on individual differences in this 
outcome. Alternately, it may be that examining such influences would be more 
appropriate in a younger sample, when children are less likely to have a variety of 
strategies available for regulating distress. 
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I must also consider the possibility that felt social support does not play a central 
role in prosocial comforting behavior or the ability to regulate one’s emotions in stressful 
situations in preschool children. It may be that other personal or contextual factors, such 
as temperamental shyness or the familiarity or similarity of the distressed other, play a 
larger role in the production of prosocial comforting and the ability to regulate one’s own 
distress in comforting situations in the preschool years. This notion is bolstered by the 
somewhat inconsistent findings regarding attachment and prosocial comforting in 
preschool age children (Appendix D). The quality of a child’s attachment to his or her 
parents could be considered a measure of social support in the early years, given that 
individual differences in attachment quality are linked with parental responses to infant 
distress (i.e., support in times of need). Children whose parents respond sensitively to 
their distress most of the time (i.e., provide consistent social support) are considered 
secure. The fact that security is not consistently linked with prosocial comforting 
suggests that there are other more salient influences at play, at least in the early years.  
Finally, as mentioned, few studies utilizing priming have examined effects in 
populations as young as the current sample, particularly in the social and developmental 
literatures. In fact, only one published study to date (Over & Carpenter, 2009a) has 
successfully utilized priming to tap into children’s social representations. It may be that 
this dearth of evidence reflects a “file-drawer” problem, in which priming was attempted 
but not reported due to weak or null findings. 
Task-Specific Considerations 
The tasks I chose to assess prosocial comforting may also have influenced 
children’s responses in unintended ways. In the following sections, I discuss the designs 
 82 
of and specific issues with the adult tasks and the infant task in turn, and discuss possible 
limitations of each. I then discuss study strengths before considering the additional 
findings of the current investigation. 
 Adult tasks. In both the broken phone task and the ruined drawing task, children 
were given the opportunity to comfort a distressed, unfamiliar adult. Previous studies 
(e.g., van der Mark et al., 2002) have successfully employed similar designs and indeed, 
the high levels of comforting behavior seen in the present study attest to the fact that 
young children will comfort in these situations. However, it is important to note that 
previous research also indicates that children engage in differential prosocial responding 
based on who is expressing the need (e.g., van der Mark, et al., 2002) and, in the 
developmental course of prosocial comforting, respond first to caregivers, then to family 
members, and then eventually, to unfamiliar others (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). At 
preschool age, children’s prosocial comforting responses to unfamiliar others may be 
determined more by temperamental variables, such as inhibition or approach motivation, 
by experimenter variables, such as the experimenter’s friendliness, or by a combination 
of the two, rather than by purely cognitive mechanisms such as mental representations of 
felt social support.  
In addition, children rarely find themselves in naturally occurring circumstances 
in which they must comfort adults, limiting the ecological validity of this design. One 
may reasonably ask, are we assessing a child’s proclivity to engage in prosocial 
comforting behavior? Or, rather, their willingness to approach an unfamiliar adult who is 
behaving strangely? The validity of future studies examining prosocial comforting might 
be enhanced by utilizing more naturalistic settings where the age and gender of the 
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subjects are matched to the distressed other. Alternately, training someone familiar to the 
child to play the role of the distressed person may yield different results, as has been done 
in a number of studies (e.g., Denham, 1994; van der Mark et al., 2002). 
Additionally, there are undoubtedly a number of underlying motivations for 
engaging in comforting behavior, and this study made no attempts to discover or untangle 
these varying motivations that could have influenced behavior in meaningful ways. For 
instance, children who are strongly motivated by social engagement may have comforted 
in an attempt to return the experimenter to play, whereas children who are strongly 
motivated by toys and solitary play may not have comforted as they were uninterested in 
obtaining a social partner. While it is possible that felt social support may foster the 
ability to comfort, it is equally possible that different children’s motivations play a much 
larger role in their willingness to provide comfort in particular situations. A stronger 
research design may be one in which children have the opportunity to comfort someone 
else who is not currently engaging with them, thus making the motivation inherently 
intrinsic, rather than potentially based on circumstance. 
Infant task. In the infant task, children were given the opportunity to comfort a 
distressed infant in another room through the use of a baby monitor. While some children 
did comfort, the overall rates of comforting were much lower in the infant task than in the 
broken phone or ruined drawing tasks, whereas the distress rates were comparable. This 
reduced variability in children’s responses likely limited my ability to examine individual 
differences in comforting and regulation abilities in the infant cry task. A few reasons this 
attenuation in child behavior may have occurred are offered. 
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First, the baby monitor chosen appears to have been too complex for some 
children to effectively use. Many children pressed buttons somewhat haphazardly once 
the baby started crying, but didn’t say anything, and it was unclear whether they were 
trying to turn it off and couldn’t, or whether they thought that pressing buttons alone was 
enough to help the baby fall back asleep. Although all children demonstrated 
understanding of how to use the monitor during the comprehension check, it is possible 
that they forgot, either because of the cognitive demands of the priming game or because 
of the discomfort associated with being left alone in the room, the discomfort of hearing a 
baby cry, or both. Future studies using an infant cry paradigm with young children should 
make the baby monitor as easy to use as possible to get clean, interpretable data. For 
instance, rather than using a real baby monitor, researchers could construct a button box 
with only two, very clearly labeled buttons. 
It is also possible that at younger ages, the combined effect of being alone and 
with an aversive infant cry was too overwhelming to see the full range of comforting 
behaviors that might have been possible with a different design. Although I did not find 
the most distress in this task, as mentioned, it may be that my measurement of distress 
was obscured by the availability of a fun, exciting set of toys (i.e., the sand table and 
toys) and that a more precise measure (e.g., a physiological measure) might may have 
found that even children who continued to play were actually somewhat distressed. 
Future studies using the infant cry task in younger populations might consider having the 
experimenter in the room but unable to respond to reduce the stress associated with being 
left alone. This would also offer the children the option to attempt to elicit adult help in 
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resolving the situation, an age appropriate and often used strategy among preschoolers 
(e.g., Caplan & Hay, 1989; Sala et al., 2014).  
Study strengths.  
However, despite the issues just discussed, the results of the present study should 
not be dismissed, as the study has many strengths as well. For instance, the adult tasks 
consistently elicited comforting behavior in the children, with 86% attempting at least 
one strategy, demonstrating that the tasks were both believable and age appropriate. 
Furthermore, the strong and significant correlation between the global scores for the adult 
tasks lends credence to their validity and reliability (Table 4). Children who comforted in 
one task appeared, by and large, to comfort at a similar rate in the other, indicating that 
something about the children, rather than the tasks, was driving comforting behavior.  In 
addition, although no effects of priming condition were found, the measures of prosocial 
comforting and distress did relate to other theoretically meaningful child characteristics, 
such as the presence of older and younger siblings, lending further support to their 
validity. In addition, the rich behavioral coding employed to generate the global 
comforting scores was able to capture not only the quantity, but also the quality and 
diversity of children’s prosocial responses, giving confidence that the scores truly reflect 
the entirety of each participant’s behavior. This notion is bolstered by the consistently 
negative correlations between the distress proportion scores and the global comforting 
scores. It makes intuitive sense that children who were distressed would engage in less 
comforting behavior, a finding that seems to be reflected in the present data (Table 4). 
Furthermore, no children seemed to question the infant cry task, with many remarking on 
the presence of the infant throughout the study, lending credibility to the task as a 
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promising avenue to study children’s prosocial responses to a distressed infant, a 
sentiment bolstered by previous work using a similar paradigm with children across a 
wide range of ages (e.g., Zahn-waxler, Friedman, & Cummings, 1983). The infant cry 
task also offered children two options that most comforting tasks cannot: a clear avenue 
by which to offer comfort (i.e., talking to the baby) and nearly complete escape if desired 
(i.e., turning the monitor off). This makes the infant cry task an excellent candidate for 
future research aimed at identifying individual differences between children who decide 
to comfort and those who do not. Moreover, the primes used in the present study were 
similar to primes that have been used to successfully influence children’s reactivity to 
stimuli in previous studies (e.g., Stupica et al., 2016), lending support to their validity. 
Although the design issues just discussed may cast doubt on the findings just presented, 
the study’s strengths lend support to the notion that it is equally likely that priming felt 
social support simply does not influence prosocial comforting in 4-year-old children. 
Future studies aimed at addressing the methodological inconsistencies between this study 
and the one other study that effectively used a social priming paradigm (Over & 
Carpenter, 2009a) will add to this body of evidence and are crucial for determining the 
utility of priming as a experimental means of influencing social behavior. 
Additional Findings 
Despite finding no support for my hypotheses, I did find some effects of note. I 
found a significant interaction between priming condition and race such that non-White 
participants showed less comforting behavior in the ruined drawing task than White 
participants, but only in the neutral control condition. Given that the neutral condition is 
meant to reflect children’s natural propensities to respond in a certain way (i.e., it is the 
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condition most reflective of “real life”), this would seem to indicate that, at least in the 
ruined drawing task, non-White participants were less comforting than White 
participants. Although there is no literature that speaks directly to this finding, research 
does show that children begin to prefer ingroup members on the basis of perceptual 
similarities as a very early age (e.g., Mahajan & Wynn, 2012), and that context plays an 
important role in determining when and to whom children will direct prosocial behavior 
(Demetriou & Hay, 2004). Given that the experimenter in the current study was White, it 
may be that non-White children viewed her as part of their out-group and were thereby 
less willing to provide her with comfort. There is little research examining cross-racial 
provision of prosocial behavior in childhood, and none in non-White populations, but the 
few studies that have examined this have found that White children were slightly more 
likely to share with and behave prosocially (as measured by a composite of self-reported 
helping, sharing, and comforting in response to vignettes) toward other White children 
than African American children (Zimmerman & Levy, 2000, Zinser, Rich, & Bailey, 
1981). It may be that examining in-group and out-group biases will prove fruitful in 
examining the development of prosocial comforting behavior. 
Interestingly, if non-White participants were inclined to be less comforting in the 
ruined drawing task than White participants, this also implies that the effect of priming 
felt social support only worked for non-White participants, at least in the ruined drawing 
task. Research shows that ethnic minorities are disproportionately at risk to live in 
poverty (e.g., Costello, Keeler, & Angold, 2001; National Center for Education Statistics, 
2007) and that children in poverty experience less social support than those children in 
more affluent homes (Evans, 2004). While our sample did not contain many families 
 88 
living under the poverty line, it is possible that ethnic minority participants in our sample 
had lower incomes than White participants. Employing a post hoc chi-square test of 
association between race (defined as White and non-White) and yearly household income 
(defined as above and below $60,000 per year) indicated that there was a statistically 
significant association between the two, χ2(1) =17.64, p < .001 and that this effect was 
moderately strong (φ = -.47, p < .001). Examining the cell counts revealed that there were 
many fewer non-White participants in the higher income bracket than the lower. This 
could contribute to the ethnic minority children in our sample experiencing less social 
support in their daily lives and thereby making it more likely that they would feel the 
bolstering effects of the supportive social interaction priming in all but the neutral control 
priming condition. It is indeed unfortunate that the sample in the present study was so 
homogenous with regard to socioeconomic status. It is a well researched and replicated 
finding that living in poverty has myriad effects on children’s social and emotional 
outcomes and is associated with a number of developmental challenges (see Letourneau, 
Duffett-Leger, Levac, Watson, & Young-Morris, 2013, for a review). Had I recruited a 
sample with a wider range of incomes, I may have also found meaningful variability in 
children’s behavior. Future studies examining the effects of supportive social interaction 
priming should attempt to recruit more economically diverse samples and may consider 
including a baseline measure of social support. 
It is also possible that this finding is simply a chance finding, due to the number 
of analyses run. Given that there was no effect of priming condition in any task (i.e., 
children’s rates of comforting were the same across priming conditions in all tasks), and 
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that non-White participants did not differ from White participants in any other task (even 
in the neutral condition), this possibility seems especially likely. 
Gender and age.  
I did not find any gender or age related differences in the expression of prosocial 
comforting behavior or proportions of distress / arousal in any task. Given the somewhat 
inconsistent evidence of gender related differences in prosocial comforting in different 
stages of childhood, this result is in keeping with a growing literature on the development 
of prosocial behavior. While many studies of exclusively older children or those 
examining a large age range find that older children and girls engage in a greater number 
and variety of prosocial comforting responses to a variety of targets (e.g., Burleson, 1982; 
Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon, Troyer, & Switzer, 1994; Larrieu & Mussen, 1986), this 
finding is much less consistent in studies examining samples of very young children or 
samples inclusive of children across a narrow age range beginning in early childhood, 
with many finding no gender or age related differences at all (e.g., Eisenberg-Berg & 
Hand, 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Neal, 1979; Yarrow et. al, 1976) or contradictory findings 
(e.g., see Blandon & Scrimgeour, 2015, for evidence that 36-month-old girls expressed 
more concern towards a distressed peer than boys at the same age; and Rehberg & 
Richman, 1989, for evidence that preschool aged boys were more comforting than 
preschool aged girls).  
It may be that as children grow older and become increasingly aware of gender 
roles, their adherence to these roles predicts comforting behavior. Girls, who are often 
socialized to value caregiving over independence, may internalize these beliefs as they 
age and extend them to interactions with others (e.g., Hastings, McShane, Parker, & 
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Ladha, 2007). This notion is consistent with recent evidence indicating that first grade 
females in Hong Kong who played with stereotypically feminine toys (as well as boys 
who played with gender-neutral toys) generated more comforting strategies during an 
infant cry paradigm than boys who played with masculine toys or girls who played with 
gender-neutral toys (although, importantly, girls scored higher on the comforting task 
overall; Li & Wong, 2016). The hypothesis that the relation between prosocial 
comforting and gender may emerge later in development has received additional support 
in a study examining the longitudinal course of prosocial behavior (defined as helping 
someone who has been hurt, comforting a child who is crying or upset, and helping other 
children who are feeling sick) between 29 and 41 months of age. Baillergeon and 
colleagues (2011) found no gender differences in the expression of prosocial behavior at 
either age, but that girls were more likely to begin exhibiting and boys were more likely 
to cease exhibiting prosocial behavior in this timeframe. The authors argued that this was 
evidence for a universal, rather than gender-related, course of prosocial development in 
early childhood that differentiates as children age. Similarly, Hay (1994; see also Hay & 
Cook, 2007) proposed that stable individual differences in prosocial comforting 
responses are likely to emerge during and just after the preschool years as children begin 
to internalize the rules governing social and moral conduct, including who to comfort and 
in which circumstances. This is in line with my own findings, as boys and girls expressed 
similar amounts of prosocial behavior to both distressed individuals, regardless of age. It 
is likely that I may have detected gender differences had I recruited children with a wider 
range of ages, and particular, with including older children.  
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Race. The finding that there were no main effects of race in preschoolers’ 
expression of prosocial responses and distress towards distressed others provides 
preliminary evidence that there may not be early racial differences in the development of 
prosocial comforting behavior. Currently, the literature regarding race related differences 
in children’s responses to distressed others is extremely limited. Although there is some 
evidence that ratings of prosociality and certain facets of prosociality (e.g., helping) may 
differ by race, with African American children rated as less prosocial by teachers 
(Jackson et al., 2006) but showing more helping behavior towards peers (Richman, Berry, 
Bittle, & Himan, 1988), only two studies to my knowledge have specifically examined 
racial differences in preschoolers’ prosocial comforting. Both studies, examining samples 
comprised of 50% African American children and 50% White children, found no 
differences that could be explained by race alone (Rehberg & Richman, 1989; Richman 
et al., 1988). The story may be that, similar to gender, children’s early prosocial 
comforting emerges due to factors unrelated to race. The dearth of evidence in African 
American and diverse samples, however, points to a clear need to examine the 
development of prosocial comforting in a wider range of populations.  
The number and presence of siblings. That number of siblings was unrelated to 
prosocial behavior is perhaps unsurprising, given sparse literature on the subject. 
Although some have theorized that sibling relationships give children a chance to practice 
prosocial comforting, and indeed, evidence has shown that children do attempt to do so 
(Dunn & Munn, 1986), there is little evidence indicating that this in turn relates to the 
expression of prosocial comforting in other contexts or the ability to regulate one’s own 
distress when faced with another’s. It is likely that individual differences in sibling 
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relationships, as well as family units as a whole, play differential roles in the 
development of prosocial comforting. For instance, in some families, parents are able to 
fully take on the responsibility of soothing upset children and maintaining family 
harmony. In these homes, children may learn about what happens when someone is upset, 
as well what to do to make someone feel better, but they themselves do not have to take 
on a caregiving role. In other families, however, parents may not be able to consistently 
provide a safe haven for children for many reasons (e.g., there is only one parent, there is 
high parental conflict, etc.). In these families, children may provide comfort for each 
other, but it may be unregulated, ineffective, or insensitive comforting. Thus, it may be 
more accurate to theorize that the presence of siblings matters less than the familial unit 
as a whole and the emotion socialization practices of the family. Future research would 
benefit from studies aimed at examining individual differences in family dynamics, 
including distribution of caregiving roles and the role of comforting in sibling 
relationships, and how those dynamics contribute to the development of prosocial 
comforting abilities. 
In addition, the other two findings regarding the presence of older and younger 
siblings indicates that it is not simply the presence of siblings that influences prosocial 
comforting; rather, it is specific dynamics of particular sibling relationships. For instance, 
the finding that children with at least one younger sibling were more comforting and less 
distressed in the baby cry task is perhaps unsurprising. Though no literature has examined 
this association specifically, it makes intuitive sense that children who had been around 
crying infants and seen them soothed would be better equipped to deal with a crying 
infant (and would be less distressed by it) than those children with limited experience in 
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this arena. Future studies might examine whether this ability extends to prosocial 
comforting toward other persons in the child’s life, such as same-age peers, or whether it 
is associated with other capabilities, such as enhanced emotion regulation or empathy. 
The finding that children with at least one older sibling were less comforting in 
the drawing task meshes with previous literature that found that children with older 
siblings were more likely to respond negatively to peer distress than children without an 
older sibling (Demetriou & Hay, 2004). The authors of that study propose that this 
finding may reflect young children imitating the ways their older siblings respond to their 
own distress. More work in this area is needed before any conclusions can be drawn, 
however, given the dearth of evidence available. Naturalistic observations in the home 
could elucidate the link between one’s own experiences of being comforted (or not) by 
older siblings and prosocial comforting responses to others. It is interesting that this 
effect was found only in the drawing task and not the phone task, a phenomenon that will 
be discussed in a later section.  
Future Directions. 
 The results of the current investigation indicate that priming felt social support in 
preschool aged children had no effect on prosocial comforting behaviors or personal 
distress reactions to distressed others, as assessed with the methods used. This finding 
raises a number of interesting questions that can be addressed by continued investigation.  
 First, it raises the question of whether priming can be used as an effective method 
for tapping into young children’s mental representations of such social constructs as 
social support and attachment. It may be that when children are young and still entirely 
dependent on others for care, such representations are still developing and too weak to be 
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activated by something as passive as a picture. Although the current investigation seems 
to suggest that this may be the case, there are many possible alternative explanations for 
the null findings that have already been discussed. Given the promise priming holds in 
allowing experimental investigations of a range of developmental phenomena, more 
research is clearly needed before abandoning this intriguing method. A reasonable first 
step in this endeavor would be to replicate the effects reported by Over and Carpenter 
(2009a) in 18-month-old infants. Given the size of their reported effect (ϕ = .38), it seems 
unlikely that the effect was due to chance, but ruling this possibility out through 
replication would lend credence to priming as a viable methodology to activate social 
representations in younger populations. In addition, researchers should test a variety of 
methods for prime delivery, as some may be stronger than others. For example, perhaps 
pairing primes with a cognitive task only works in older populations with better working 
memories or who are better able to divide their attention. Understand which primes work 
and with whom could provide a valuable tool for developmental researchers interested in 
experimental studies of social cognition. 
 Second, the current results bring into question the idea that felt social support 
fosters the ability to respond sensitively to another person’s emotional needs, particularly 
in childhood. Although experimental evidence in adults overwhelming supports this 
supposition (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2001; Mikulincer et al., 2003; Mikulincer et al., 2005; 
Mikulincer et al., 2013), quasi-experimental evidence in young children has been mixed 
(Appendix D). Importantly, no one has examined the effects of felt social support more 
broadly on prosocial comforting in young children, instead focusing on parental support 
(i.e., attachment) almost exclusively. Future research should attempt to bridge this gap in 
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the literature by employing other experimental designs to determine the effects of felt 
social support on prosocial comforting in young children. For instance, manipulating 
actual social support (i.e., having a supportive but unavailable experimenter versus an 
uninterested and unavailable experimenter in the room during a distress event) may be a 
stronger design capable of illuminating the nature of this link. In addition, and given that 
this link appears to exist in adulthood, beginning this investigation in older children and 
working backward may also help to elucidate the developmental course of the link 
between felt social support and prosocial comforting. 
 A further question raised by the results of the current investigation concerns the 
relation between felt social support and the ability to regulate emotions in the face of 
distressing events. Again, there is ample evidence for this link in adulthood (e.g., Coan et 
al., 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2007), but the relation is less well-established in childhood 
outside of attachment research. Future investigations should attempt to examine the self-
regulatory benefits gleaned through social support more broadly, particularly in young 
children and across multiple settings. For example, are parents and other attachment 
figures the only ones who can provide this kind of support in childhood? Or could any 
person perceived to be older and wiser be able to serve this role? Could peers provide a 
self-regulatory boost in certain circumstances or as children age? The field is ripe for 
investigations of questions like these, and the findings may have important implications 
for the home, as well as for childcare and classroom settings. 
 The results of this study clearly illustrate a need to study the development of 
prosocial comforting behavior in more diverse populations. Although it is interesting that 
I found an effect of race in the neutral control condition only, there was little literature 
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with which to frame this finding. Future studies should attempt to examine the roles that 
race and cultural expectations play in prosocial comforting and personal distress reactions 
to another’s distress by conducting studies such as this one in more diverse populations.  
 Finally, the results of this study highlight the need to consider context when 
investigating influences on and the development of prosocial comforting behavior and the 
ability to regulate oneself in the face of another’s distress. Although the two adult tasks 
were highly correlated, the associations I found in the drawing task did not appear in the 
phone task. This may indicate that the two tasks were fundamentally different in some 
way and that children were handling the two situations in qualitatively differently 
manners. Future investigations into the development of prosocial comforting should 
attempt to elucidate contextual factors described above that may account for individual 
differences in these abilities through tightly controlled study parameters, meticulous 
measurement, and the use of common tasks that allow for cross-study comparison. In 
addition, considering personal factors, such as the roles of personal experience and family 
composition and functioning, may help to tease apart why some children comfort or 
become distressed whereas others do not. 
Conclusions 
The aim of the current investigation was to experimentally induce a sense of felt 
social support in preschool aged children and to examine the effects of supportive social 
interaction priming (relative to neutral and happy priming) on both prosocial comforting 
behavior and the expression of personal distress in response to the distress of another. 
Although my hypotheses were not supported, this study represents an important step in 
determining the viability of priming as a method for tapping social representations in 
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children, calling into question its utility as research tool with younger populations. Future 
research with similar aims can add to this growing body of literature, determining what 
works and with whom. In addition, these results contribute to the evidence that gender 
may only play a role in the development of prosocial comforting behavior at later ages, 
and underscore the importance of examining its development in racially diverse 
populations. Understanding the determinants of prosocial behavior is a worthy goal for 
developmental scientists, as the ability to sensitively care for another’s wellbeing is 
linked with a multitude of positive outcomes in both childhood and adulthood. Fostering 
this ability in young children fosters positive social development, and ultimately, the 
development of a kinder, more compassionate world. 
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Thanks for your interest in our study of mothers and children! This research is being conducted by Dr. Jude Cassidy at
the University of Maryland, College Park. In this part of the study, we’ll ask you to answer some questionnaires about
your personality and how you think and feel. The questionnaires will take less than 10 minutes to complete.
There are no big risks for you or your child. There may be some questions that you do not want to answer. You can skip
any question that you do not want to answer.  Also, you can exit the survey at any time.
There are no direct benefits to you for completing the surveys, but we hope the information will help us understand how
moms of young children think and feel.
Your responses will be confidential, and your name will not be linked to what you say. We will assign a number code to
identify your materials. The questionnaires will be stored on a password-protected computer (if you choose to complete
them by mail, they will be stored in a locked filing cabinet).
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary, and you can decide not to participate or to stop participating
at any time.
If you have questions and would like to talk to someone before participating, please contact Bonnie Brett, M. S., Graduate
Researcher, at: Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, 301-405-0009,
bbrett@umd.edu, or the investigator, Dr. Jude Cassidy at jcassidy@umd.edu, 301-405-4973.
By clicking “yes” below, you indicate that:
(1) you are 18 years of age or older;
(2) you have read and understood the information above; and
(3) you agree to participate in the online survey
IRI
Qualtrics Survey Software https://umdsurvey.umd.edu/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=Get...
1 of 8 5/22/16, 9:32 PM
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Social Interactions in Preschool- and Kindergarten-age Children 





This research is being conducted by Dr. Jude Cassidy at the University 
of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you and your child to 
participate in this research project because you have a child who is of 
kindergarten age.  The purpose of this research project is to explore the 





The procedures will take place in three parts.   
 
Part 1: We sent you a few brief questionnaires to complete before we came 
here. You have already completed these. 
 
Part 2: Today we are visiting you in your home.  You and your child will 
play together and then will separately complete stories; your child’s stories 
will involve using dolls. In addition, you will complete one questionnaire 
about your behavior as a parent and your child will play a brief word and 
picture game with a research assistant (for example, your child will be 
shown several pictures and asked to point to the toaster).  Today’s visit will 
not last more than an hour. 
 
Part 3: The playroom visit will take place at the Maryland Child and 
Family Development Lab in the Department of Psychology in the next week 
or two, at a time that is convenient to you.  First, you and your child will be 
together as your child gets used to our playroom and to the female 
research assistant.  Next, you will be taken to a separate room while your 
child draws some pictures and plays some games with the research 
assistant. You will be asked to complete some questionnaires about your 
thoughts and feelings about being a parent. Then, we will record your 
breathing and heart rate by attaching two small Velcro straps to two of 
your fingers and fitting an elastic band around your chest. You should not 
experience any physical discomfort during the recording. You will also 
watch some short videos and answer questions about them. Finally, you 
will be asked some interview questions about your daily experiences with 
your child.  The entire visit will not last more than 90 minutes. You will be 
paid $25 at the end of this visit. 
 
Recording: You and your child will be videotaped during the home visit 
and playroom visit. The videos and audio recordings are being made so we 
can watch them later.  Only the research staff will see or hear these 
recordings unless you give separate written permission at the end of each 
visit for your recordings to be used for educational purposes. 
 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
In this study, there are no big risks for you or your child. Like all research 
projects, there is the risk that someone who should not see the things you 
tell us might see them. This will probably not happen. We have many ways 
to make sure this does not happen. See the Confidentiality section below to 
see how we will keep the things you tell us private. 
 
Some questions you will answer are about personal things that have 
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Page 2 of 3                  Initials _______ Date ______ 
 
 
happened to you or your moods and feelings. Sometimes, thinking or 
talking about personal things causes people to feel sad or angry. If you are 
feeling this way, you can skip any question that you do not want to answer. 
You can also choose to end any part of the study at any time. 
 
The tasks and games that will be done with your child have been done by 
researchers many times before with no serious risks. These activities are 
meant to be fun for children, like playing with toys and drawing pictures. 
However, your child will be away from you for part of the time. This 
sometimes causes children to become upset. If your child is upset during 
the visit, you can ask us to stop any activity. We will also try to make sure 
your child leaves the playroom in a good mood. 
  
Potential Benefits  This research is not designed to help you or your child personally, but the 
results will help the investigator learn more about child development.  We 
hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data, 
including questionnaires, heart rate recordings, audio, and video in a 
locked office on password-protected computers and/or locked filing 
cabinets.  Your names will never be used, and any identifying information 
will be removed from the interview transcripts.  We will assign a number 
code to identify the research data of you and your child. 
 
If we write a report about this research project, your identity will be 
protected to the maximum extent possible.  Your information may be 
shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are 




The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, hospitalization, 
or other insurance for participants in this research study, nor will the 
University of Maryland provide any medical treatment or compensation for 
any injury sustained as a result of participation in this research study, 
except as required by law. 
 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 
research, please contact Bonnie Brett, Graduate Researcher, at: 
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 
20742, 301-405-0009, bbrett@umd.edu, or the investigator, Jude Cassidy 
at jcassidy@umd.edu, 301-405-4973. 
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Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
 
Consent for Future 
Contact 
We request permission to contact you in the future.  We may contact you 
about other research studies. 
 
_____ I agree to be contacted in the future 
 
_____ I do not agree to be contacted in the future. 
 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction; and you voluntarily agree to 
participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed 
consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 



























Educational Video and Information Consent Form 
  
 Thank you for being part of our research study. You agreed to let us use what you told us 
for research. You also agreed to let us use the videos of you and your child. These materials will 
help us learn a lot about how children grow.  
 
 Sometimes researchers find it helpful to share what they learn from studies like this one. 
It can help other parents and teachers learn more about how children grow. It can also help 
researchers and students. We now want to ask if we can share your and your child's materials 
with others.  We would use it in places where it can help people learn about children. Some of 
these places are at meetings, workshops, and classes with researchers, students, teachers, and 
parents. Of course, your name and your child's name will never be used.  If you do not agree to let 
us share your materials with others, that is ok.  
 
 If you do not sign this form, your and your child's materials will not be shared with 
others. This includes what you told us on the questionnaires and the videos of you and your child 
taken in the playroom and at the home visit. 
 
 I have read this form. I have had the chance to ask questions about it.  I understand that I 
am now being asked to let all videos and materials of myself and my child be shared with others. 
This means that they may be used in places where it can help others learn about children.    
 
 
_________I agree for the videos and materials of me and my child to be used in places where it 
can help others learn about children. 
 
 
_________I do not agree for the videos and materials of me and my child to be used in places 
where it can help others learn about children. 
 
 
Child’s name:      Your signature: 
 
 
________________________________  ____________________________________ 
 
Your name [please print]:    Date: 
 
 
________________________________  ____________________________________ 
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Appendix C: All Study Measures and Procedures 
 
Pre-survey (completed prior to Visit 1) 
Questionnaires 
- Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) 
- Experiences in Close Relationships Scale - Revised (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 
2000) 









































Child and Mother Together 
Intake and study overview 
- Experimenter warm-up with child (playing with age appropriate toys) 
- MomExp goes over consent form with mother 
 
5 minute free play (child and mother alone in room) 
 
Experimenter re-enters and plays game with child for 3 minutes 
 
MomExp enters and takes mother to another room 
 
Child and Mother Separate 
Child Tasks (Forward Order) Mother Tasks 
Warm-up (I Spy game) 
 
Set up for Drawing Task (drawing) 
 
Priming game #1 
 
Ruined Drawing Task 
 
Set up for Phone Task (books and puzzles)  
 
Priming game #2 
 
Broken Phone Task 
 
Transition to sand table and set up for 
Infant Cry Task 
  
Priming game #3 
 
Infant Cry Task 
 
Pacifier task (Panfile & Laible, 2011, 
instrumental helping task) 
 
Priming game #4 
 
Dictator Game (sharing task) 
 
Begin physiological recording – 
electrodermal activity and heart rate 
 
 
Modified Parent Development Interview – 
Revised (Slade et al., 2003; counterbalanced 
with Leerkes infant cry procedure) 
 
Leerkes infant cry procedure (e.g., Leerkes et 
al., 2011; counterbalanced with parent 
interview)  
 
End physiological recording 
Child and Mother Together 
4 minute Reunion 
 




Child and Mother Together 
Intake and study overview 
- Experimenter warm-up with child (playing with age appropriate toys) 
- MomExp reviews study procedures with mother 
 
MomExp enters and takes mother to another room 
 
Child and Mother Separate 
Child Tasks (Forward Order) Mother Tasks 
 
Modified Bryant Empathy Index (Bryant, 
1982) 
 
Attachment Story Completion Task 
(Bretherton, Ridgeway, & Cassidy, 1990) 
 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & 
Dunn, 2007) 
 
Caregiving Story Completion Task (created 
for the present study) 
 
Clipboard set up and task 
 
 
Secure Base Script Word Prompt Procedure 
(Waters & Waters, 2006) 
 
Questionnaires 
- Coping with Children’s Negative 
Emotions Scale (Fabes, Eisenberg, & 
Bernzweig, 1990) 
- Spanking my Child (created for this 
study) 
- Demographics 
- Shipley Living Institute Scale 
(Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1986) 
- Social Touch Questionnaire 
(Willhelm, Kochar, Roth, & Gross, 
2001) 
- My Child questionnaire (Kochanska et 
al., 1994) 
- CBCL; aggression subscale 
(Achenbach, 1991) 
- Emotion Regulation Checklist 
(Shields & Ciccheti, 1997) 
 
Child and Mother Together 
5 minute reunion 
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Does Secure Attachment Foster the Development of Empathy and Prosocial Comforting 
in Childhood? A Review of the Literature 
 The ability to sensitively care for others’ wellbeing develops early in 
ontogeny (Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
Wagner, & Chapman, 1992) and is an important developmental milestone for healthy 
social, emotional, and moral development. Theoretical and empirical work on the 
motivation and capacity to care for others has identified prosocial behavior and empathy 
as two particularly important components of this socially complex behavior. Prosocial 
behavior, defined as a voluntary behavior benefitting another person (Grusec, Hastings, 
& Almas, 2011), is often delineated into three categories: helping, sharing, and 
comforting. It is thought that helping and sharing are appropriate responses to 
instrumental and material needs, respectively.  Prosocial comforting, the focus of this 
review, is the prosocial response to emotional distress (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). 
Prosocial comforting may be motivated by positive emotions, such as empathy, or 
negative emotions such as personal distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Staub, 1978). 
Empathy is defined as a vicarious emotional response to another’s plight that is more 
aligned with the other person’s plight than the emoter’s own situation (Hoffman, 1978), 
and has both cognitive (e.g., emotion recognition and understanding) and affective (e.g., 
emotion contagion) components.  
In the early days of developmental science, researchers showed little theoretical or 
empirical interest in children’s capacity to care for others. Accepted developmental 
theory at the time asserted that children below school-age were largely egocentric and 
socially inept, with responsiveness to others’ needs not evident until middle childhood 
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(Piaget & Inhelder, 1962; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). This effectively shifted the focus of 
inquiry on empathy to its characteristics in older children for many years (e.g., Feshbach 
& Roe, 1968).  However, a major shift in the way emotions were conceptualized (i.e. as 
intra- and inter-personal motivators and regulators; see Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 
1989, for a discussion of the socioemotional perspective), led to interest in the inner lives 
of children and interest in early empathy and prosocial behavior burgeoned. Hoffman 
(1978) advanced the first developmental theory of empathy, in which he described four 
stages of empathy, beginning in infancy. Accordingly, researchers soon uncovered 
primitive precursors to empathy in even newborn infants (termed emotional contagion, 
e.g., Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). However, as children begin to evince increasingly complex 
social skills (e.g., self-other differentiation, emotion understanding) and motor skills, they 
show rapid changes in their ability to care for others. The current view is that empathy 
emerges in the second half of the first year of life, though there is some variability due to 
normal individual differences in development (see Hoffman, 2000; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, 
Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008). 
Prosocial comforting also emerges in this timeframe due to the advanced 
capabilities necessary for enacting comforting behavior. Specifically, the advent of 
prosocial comforting coincides with the advancement of infants’ cognitive and self-
regulatory abilities (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). In 
particular, emotion regulation, or  
the process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the 
occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related 
physiological, attentional processes, motivational states, and/or the behavioral 
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concomitants of emotion in the service of accomplishing affect-related biological 
or social adaptation or achieving individual goals (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004, p. 
338) 
seems to play a key role in the development of infants’ and children’s prosocial 
comforting behavior. Facing the distress of another person is in itself a distressing event, 
and children must be able to regulate their own negative emotions to focus on the needs 
of the other person and respond empathically. If they are unable to do so effectively, their 
principle concern becomes relieving their own, rather than the other person’s, distress 
(Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, 
Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983).  Consistent with this and beginning in toddlerhood, some 
children respond to the distress of others with concerned attention and prosocial 
overtures, whereas others respond with hostility, physical or emotional distancing, or 
personal distress.  These individual differences in the ability to respond to another’s 
distress are linked with important developmental outcomes such as peer acceptance and 
friendship quality (Clark & Ladd, 2000), underscoring the importance of determining 
predictive factors of the ability to care for others. 
 Given that empathy and prosocial comforting behavior are both inherently 
relational constructs, researchers soon began to examine early relationships as a 
foundation of the development of care for others.  The quality of attachment relationships 
emerged as a theoretically sound predictor of children’s empathy and prosocial 
comforting, and empirical investigations soon followed. To my knowledge, there has 
been no systematic review of the link between attachment quality and empathy and 
prosocial comforting. Thus, the goals of this review are to (a) provide a thorough review 
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of the literature on links between early attachment quality and two specific components 
of caring for others: empathy and prosocial comforting and (b) identify possible future 
directions for moving this literature forward.   
Overview. 
First, I will lay out the theoretical foundations of link between attachment quality 
and empathy and prosocial comforting. Then, I will briefly discuss issues related to the 
measurement of empathy and prosocial comforting, and will provide parameters for the 
literature included in this review. Next, I will provide a systematic review of the 
empirical work examining this link, beginning in infancy and ending in adolescence. I 
will end by discussing logical future directions for moving the field forward. 
Theoretical foundations of the link between attachment quality and empathy and 
prosocial comforting behavior 
 Attachment theory posits that all children are evolutionarily endowed with an 
attachment system that compels them to seek proximity to one or more specific 
individuals in times of distress. This serves the biological function of obtaining protection 
in times of trouble, and increases the chance of surviving to reproductive age (Bowlby, 
1969 /1982). Attachment figures, most often parents, are thought to serve as a secure base 
from which the child can explore the world, and as a safe haven for him/her to return to 
when needed (e.g., when distressed or in danger). Some parents serve both of these roles 
effectively, supporting exploration and being consistently available when needed, 
whereas other struggle, stifling exploration or discouraging attachment behavior. These 
differences in parental responses to attachment-related needs are linked with the quality 
of the attachment relationship. In turn, attachment quality in early childhood has been 
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linked with a large number of social and emotional competencies throughout life (see 
Thompson, 2008, for a review).  
There are multiple pathways through which early attachment quality may be 
linked with later empathy and prosocial comforting behavior.  In the following sections, I 
will describe the role of attachment in the formation of emotion regulation strategies, 
mental representations of attachment relationships, and caregiving scripts, and how these, 
in turn, theoretically contribute to the development of empathy and prosocial comforting. 
Attachment and emotion regulation. First, as was mentioned, a key component 
of effectively caring for others is the ability to control one’s own emotions (Batson et al., 
1983). It has long been held that early attachment relationships may be the context in 
which children first learn to effectively regulate their emotions (Cassidy, 1994; Kopp, 
1989; Sroufe, 1979, 1996; Thompson, 1990, 1994). Infants, wholly unequipped to deal 
with powerful emotions themselves, turn to caregivers in times of distress for help 
regulating feelings like fear, sadness, and anger.  Through repeated experiences of co-
regulation and recovery, infants are able to learn effective strategies for reducing 
emotional arousal, laying the foundation for later self-regulation (e.g., Thompson, 1991; 
Tronick, 1989).   
Importantly, the types of strategies learned depend in part on the quality of the 
attachment relationships within which they are learned (Calkins & Leerkes, 2011; 
Cassidy, 1994). Secure children, who are able to use their attachment figures as both a 
secure base and a safe haven, and who have had the experience of being sensitively 
responded to in times of distress, likely learn that negative emotions are an acceptable 
form of communication for expressing needs and that they serve to elicit care from 
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concerned caregivers (Bretherton, 1990). Moreover, through repeated, sensitive care, 
secure children likely learn that emotions are not overwhelming, and should be able to 
develop strategies to effectively regulate their own negative emotions (Calkins & 
Leerkes, 2011; Cassidy, 1994).  
Insecure children, on the other hand, have parents who struggle with either 
providing a secure base or a safe haven and learn entirely different strategies for dealing 
with negative emotions. Avoidant children, whose parents tend to reject and devalue 
negative emotions or to respond to them harshly, are likely to learn that negative 
emotions are unacceptable and should be terminated quickly, or not expressed at all.  
Consequently, they learn to suppress, rather than regulate negative emotions (Cassidy, 
1994). For example, in the Strange Situation Procedure (SSP; Ainsworth, Blehar, Water, 
& Wall, 1978), a procedure designed to elicit stress in infants through a series of 
separations and reunions with their caregivers, avoidant infants may appear less stressed 
than other infants and are unlikely to seek out their parents at reunion. Despite this, 
research has shown that avoidant infants do evince cardiac acceleration during 
separations of the SSP, belying their apparent calm (Sroufe & Waters, 1977).   
Insecure-resistant children, on the other hand, whose parents are only 
inconsistently responsive to their attachment needs, likely learn that only large, dramatic 
emotions are sufficient to elicit a response. As Main and Soloman (1986) noted, “in its 
heightened display of emotionality and dependence upon the attachment figure, this 
infant successfully draws the attention of the parent” (p.112). Consequently, insecure-
resistant children may learn to hyperactive, rather than regulate, negative emotions in the 
service of keeping caregivers close by (Cassidy, 1994; Cassidy & Berlin, 1994). 
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Empirical research supports this notion, and has consistently shown that 
individual differences in attachment quality lead to theoretically expected individual 
differences in emotion regulation (see Calkins & Leerkes, 2011, for a review; see also 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008). In turn, these learned emotion regulatory capacities ought to 
be linked with the sensitive, other-focused care children are willing and able to provide. 
Secure children, when faced with the distress of another, should be able to regulate their 
own negative affect and focus on the plight of the other person in a sensitive manner.  
Insecure children, who may not have learned effective emotion regulation strategies, may 
employ different strategies.  Insecure avoidant children may be expected to protect 
themselves from their own distress by devaluing the needs of the other person, by 
escaping or ignoring the situation, or when this is not possible, reacting in an angry or 
defensive manner. Insecure-resistant children, on the other hand, might be expected to 
hyperactivate the distress they feel in response to another’s distress, and to become 
overwhelmed and dysregulated. This may lead them to engage in self-focused responding 
with the goal of alleviating their own, rather than the other person’s, distress. 
 Attachment and mental representations. A second means by which early 
attachment quality may predict later expressed empathy and prosocial comforting 
behavior is through the formation of attachment-related representations. Theories in 
multiple psychological fields (e.g. social psychology, developmental psychopathology) 
have underscored the importance of social relationships in the formation of individual 
differences in social information processing (see Crick & Dodge, 1994, for a review; see 
also Bowlby, 1973; Cassidy & Shaver, 2008). Children’s earliest social experiences occur 
largely in the context of the parent-child relationship, and it is through these early 
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repeated relational experiences that children form representations, or internal working 
models of themselves, of relationships, and of other people (Bowlby, 1969/1982; 
Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). The structure of these 
internal working models leads to specific, predictable patterns of expectations and 
interpretations of the world and the people in it (Dykas & Cassidy, 2011) and are 
adaptive in helping children to interpret the world around them by providing a quick, 
efficient means for understanding and interpreting social information (Bowlby, 1973; 
Bretherton & Munholland, 2008).  By using internal working models as a perceptual 
filter, children are able to quickly assign meaning to a range of social cues on a moment-
to-moment basis. 
 With respect to care for other people, secure children, who have had the 
experience of being cared for in times of distress, have an internal working model of 
themselves as capable of eliciting care, of others as being kind and worthy of care, and of 
the world as a place where distressed persons are cared for.  Insecure children, however, 
who have been responded to harshly, inconsistently, or not at all, form internal working 
models of themselves as incapable of eliciting or unworthy of care. Further, they may 
come to view others as unkind and untrustworthy, and of the world as a place where 
distress is not deserving of a response (Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). In fact, research 
has shown that beliefs about the appropriateness of negative emotions significantly 
influence sympathy and helping behavior in children (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 
2013). Given that insecure children learn that negative emotions are often inappropriate, 
they should be less willing to sympathize and help others in distress. Theoretically, the 
internal working models formed in early relationships are carried with the child 
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throughout development, and serve to guide behavior and expectations in new 
relationships and in new situations. Thus, when faced with the distress of another, secure 
children have the expectation that someone will help in a sensitive manner, whereas 
insecure children do not. These expectations should have predictable consequences on 
both empathic concern for and prosocial behavior directed toward the distressed person. 
 Attachment and caregiving scripts. The third avenue by which early attachment 
relationships may form the basis of empathy and prosocial comforting behavior is 
through attachment-related scripts. Scripts are enduring cognitive representations of an 
expected sequence of events given a particular situation (e.g., visiting a restaurant; Shank 
& Ableson, 1977) that serve to inform expectations of events and guide and organize 
ongoing behavior (e.g., Shank & Ableson, 1977). Scripts are an important component of 
internal working models (Waters & Waters, 2006) and help to organize behavior and 
patterns of interaction with attachment partners. One type of script in particular, formed 
through a person’s history of secure base experiences (i.e., situations when support was 
needed and sought and their resolution) is termed a secure base script. When accessed 
(e.g., when the attachment system is activated), a secure base script for a specific 
attachment figure will guide expectations and behavior with that person, even if he or she 
does not always behave according to the script (Waters & Waters, 2006). Additionally, 
these specific script-like representations are carried forward into new relationships and 
can guide expectations about and behavior with new people (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). 
 Accordingly, children’s behavior in attachment-relevant situations should reflect 
the expectations and emotions contained in their secure base script. Secure children, who 
have had consistent and reliable support when needed, theoretically have a complete, 
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coherent, and readily accessible script that includes successful support seeking, problem 
resolution, affect regulation, and return to play (or exploration, interaction, etc; Waters & 
Waters, 2006). One study examined this notion by presenting 12- to 16-month old infants 
with animations of two circles meant to portray a child (small circle) and either a 
sensitive caregiver, who returns to the small circle when it pulses and cries, or an 
insensitive caregiver, who continues away from the small circle. Secure infants looked 
reliably longer at the animation of the insensitive caregiver, indicating that this violated 
their expectations of typical caregiving behavior.  In contrast, insecure infants, whose 
secure base script likely reflects a history of harsh or inconsistent responses to attachment 
needs, looked longer at the animation of the sensitive caregiver (Johnson, Dweck, & 
Chen, 2007). 
Importantly, children theoretically learn both sides of this relationship (i.e., 
support-seeking and support-provision) and are motivated to recreate it, even if roles are 
switched and new behavior is required (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986).  Thus, when secure 
children find themselves in a position to provide care to another, they should have a 
coherent, sensitive script to follow and be motivated to follow it. Insecure children, 
however, likely do not have a coherent, readily accessible script to follow and may 
become defensive or overwhelmed. 
 In sum, there are numerous pathways by which early attachment relationships 
may influence how children provide care to distressed others and how secure attachment 
specifically fosters the development of both empathy and prosocial comforting responses.  
In the following section, I will review the literature examining these links from infancy 
through adolescence.  
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Review of the Literature 
Study Selection 
 As previously defined, empathy refers to the internal, felt, component of caring 
for others, whereas prosocial comforting behavior refers to observable, quantifiable 
behavior. Yet given the complexity of measuring cognitions and affect, particularly in 
children who are unable to self-report, many researchers interested in the capacity to care 
for others have used prosocial behavior as a proxy for empathy. Although empathy may 
motivate prosocial behavior, this is not always the case. Some situations may be too 
complex or too stimulating for young children to respond to, regardless of their internal 
feelings related to the situation.  Similarly, prosocial behavior can follow from empathy, 
but often, it may be motivated by other influences, such as personal distress, compliance, 
and cooperation (Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007).  Thus, conflating empathy and 
prosocial comforting behavior may be problematic and lead to false conclusions 
regarding one construct or the other. Other researchers have effectively separated the two, 
measuring empathy through such visible indices as concerned attention and affect 
mirroring and classifying all attempts to comfort as prosocial behavior (e.g., Zahn-
Waxler et al., 1992). For the purposes of this review, I intend to report on the constructs 
as they have been defined by the researchers studying them, but urge readers to bear these 
considerations in mind. 
 Additionally, research lines examining the constructs of attachment, empathy, and 
prosocial comforting have employed many different techniques to assess each.  For the 
purposes of this review, I will include studies of typically developing populations that (a) 
claim to measure attachment and do so with a validated measure, and (b) claim to 
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measure empathy, prosocial behavior, or comforting behavior and have a measure 
reflecting responses to distress in particular.  This is particularly important to note, as 
many of the studies described here employ the use of behavioral composites comprised of 
many different behaviors (e.g., helping, sharing, and comforting). Although this review is 
not concerned with helping or sharing specifically, I will include such studies if they 
contain a component of responding to another’s distress. In the following sections, I 
review this literature, beginning in infancy and toddlerhood and ending in adolescence. 
Attachment and Care for Others Infancy and Toddlerhood   
Because of the difficulty of measuring affective and emotional constructs in very 
young children and the complex set of skills required for prosocial action, research 
addressing the link between secure attachment and empathy and prosocial comforting in 
infancy and toddlerhood is sparse. The three extant studies provide preliminary, though 
weak, evidence for the theorized link.  For instance, in one study, secure infants 
(measured at 12 months using the Strange Situation Procedure; SSP; Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters, & Wall, 1978) were more likely than insecure infants to be compliant, 
cooperative, and to “rescue” a baby from a nearby dog at 21 months after being told, 
“Don’t let the doggie bite the baby!” Although none of these outcomes directly measures 
empathy or prosocial comforting, these results illustrate that, in this sample, secure 
infants were more generally prosocial and willing to act on the behalf of another 
(effectively “caring” for the baby) than insecure infants (Londerville & Main, 1981).   
 Two other studies examining empathy and prosocial comforting in infancy found 
only partial support for the proposed link.  For instance, van der Mark and colleagues 
(2002) found that security (assessed with the SSP at both 16 and 22 months) was 
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concurrently associated with empathic concern for a stranger’s displays of pain and 
sadness, but not for participants’ own mothers in a sample of young girls. Interestingly, 
empathic concern for stranger decreased from 16 to 22 months, whereas empathic 
concern for mothers increased (van der Mark, van Ijzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 
2002). 
 In another study, attachment was assessed at 12 months using the SSP. Infants 
were assigned continuous scores for proximity-seeking, contact-maintenance, avoidance, 
and resistance and were assigned to one of the four classic attachment classifications (and 
subclassifications, if applicable; Carter, Little, Briggs-Gowan, & Kogan, 1999).  Parents 
completed The Infant-Toddler Social and Emotional Assessment (ITSEA; Carter & 
Briggs-Gowan, 1993), which yielded scores for empathy. The ITSEA also has a prosocial 
peer interaction subscale, but its items do not refer to comforting behavior specifically 
and will not be considered here. Interestingly, neither continuous nor categorical scores 
of attachment quality were significantly related to maternal reports of child empathy.  
However, a series of three-way (secure, avoidant, and resistant) ANOVAs across the 
subscales of the ITSEA revealed marginal significance for group differences in mother-
reported empathy. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that both avoidant and 
resistant infants were rated as less empathic by their mothers than were the secure infants.   
 Summary of research on attachment and care for others in infancy. Overall, 
these three studies illustrate that, even early in development, children appear to be 
evincing individual differences in both empathy and prosocial comforting toward 
unknown others, and that these differences are at least partially driven by individual 
difference in attachment quality. The evidence, however, is weak at best.  Of the three 
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studies presented, only one showed evidence of a clear link between secure attachment 
and prosociality, and it employed a measure of prosocial behavior that may be 
questionable.  Rather than allowing the infants to respond naturally to their environment, 
the researchers gave the infants a specific command. Thus, infants’ responses may have 
reflected compliance rather than prosocial intentions. Of the other two studies, one found 
only weak evidence (i.e., a marginally significant statistical model) linking attachment to 
maternal reports of child empathy.  It is possible that mothers who have secure infants are 
also slightly more likely to notice and report on positive behaviors in their children. The 
third study found that attachment was related to empathy for a stranger, but not a 
caregiver. It may be that demonstrating empathy and prosocial responses to an 
attachment figure is less arousing than caring for a stranger, and it is particularly in the 
latter circumstance that children must draw on past relationships to guide behavior.  
It is also possible that in the first two years of life, the link between attachment 
and care for others is not yet fully realized, due to the limited cognitive abilities and 
behavioral repertoires of such young children.  In fact, although precursors to empathy 
are evident even in newborns (e.g., Sagi & Hoffman, 1976), many theorists have 
proposed that it is not until the second year of life that higher-order emotions requiring 
perspective taking (e.g., empathy, guilt, and shame) truly emerge (e.g., Campos, Barrett, 
Lamb, Goldsmith, & Sternberg, 1983). It may simply be that in young infants, individual 
differences in care for others is based more on individual differences in socio-emotional 
development than on individual differences in attachment quality. 
Attachment and Care for Others in Preschool and Middle Childhood.   
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There are 17 studies examining the link between attachment quality and care for 
others in preschool and middle school aged children. First, I will first present empirical 
evidence in support of this hypothesized link. Then, I will present findings indicating 
mixed evidence. Third, I will present studies in which examinations revealed a null 
association between attachment quality and care for others. Keeping in mind the wide 
variety of methods used to assess the constructs of interest, and in an effort to organize 
the literature in a coherent way, within each section, I will present studies in groups 
according the measure used to assess attachment. I will begin each section with studies 
that used the SSP to assess attachment. Then, I will present studies that employed the 
Attachment Q-Sort (AQS; Waters & Deanne, 1985).  Then, I will present studies 
employing measures designed to tap into attachment scripts, and then finally, those using 
self-report measures.   
 Studies providing empirical support for the link between secure attachment 
and care for others. Eight studies provide evidence for the link between early 
attachment quality and empathy and prosocial comforting.  Three, conducted by Sroufe 
and colleagues, examined this link in preschool aged children and found that secure 
attachment was associated with greater empathy and prosocial comforting.  For instance, 
in one study, research examined the proposed link longitudinally and found that 
attachment (assessed with a procedure similar to the SSP) at 15 months was positively 
associated with sympathy toward peers’ distress at 3.5 years, assessed using a Q-sort 
measure (sorted by two independent observers across 5 weeks in a classroom setting; see 
Bronson, 1975 for a description of the measure; Waters, Wippman, & Sroufe, 1979).  
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 The other two studies by Sroufe and colleagues used samples collected for the 
Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children. In one, Sroufe (1983) found that 
attachment, assessed using the SSP, was related to teacher ratings of empathy using the 
California Child Q-Sort (Block & Block, 1969). Empathy was “characteristic” of secure 
children but “uncharacteristic” of avoidant children, and resistant children fell between 
these two extremes (Sroufe, 1983).  Similarly, but using observational data in a 
naturalistic preschool setting, Kestenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe (1989) found that children 
who had been classified as secure at 12 and 18 months in the SSP displayed significantly 
more empathic overtures (measured on a 7-point-scale, with a 1 being “In the vicinity but 
no apparent concern” and a 7 being “Intense, clear-cut affective involvement with an 
attempt at helping, comforting, distracting the person… nurturing, or going to get the 
teacher;” Kestenbaum et al., 1989, p. 57) to distressed peers than did children who had 
been classified as avoidant.  Empathy scores for the resistant group, although not 
statistically different from either of the other groups, fell in between those of the secure 
and avoidant groups.  In addition, although the authors did not statistically examine group 
differences in anti-empathic responses (measured on a 3-point-scale, with a 3 being 
“Clear attempt to aggravate situation; ongoing physical or verbal abuse; or continued 
aggravation of situation even when the victim requests child to stop;” Kestenbaum et al., 
1989, p. 57), they noted that of the twelve instances of anti-empathic responses observed 
across children, nine came from children with avoidant histories and two came from 
children with resistant histories.  Further, of the six incidents in which children’s 
responses reflected confusion about who was distressed (the distressed child or the 
responder), four of them were produced by children with resistant attachment histories.  
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In another study examining the association between attachment quality and care 
for others in 36-month-olds, security, assessed using the mother-sorted Attachment Q-
Sort (AQS; Waters & Deanne, 1985), was positively associated with children’s mother-
reported emotion regulation and mother-reported empathy. Although attachment was not 
directly linked with prosocial comforting (measured behaviorally through the child’s 
attempts to help the experimenter find a bottle to soothe a crying baby), empathy was 
(Panfile & Laible, 2012). Path analyses revealed that emotion regulation mediated the 
association between secure attachment and empathy, such that secure children were better 
able to regulate their own emotions, which in turn predicted greater empathy.  
Additionally, greater mother-reported child empathy also positively predicted children’s 
observed prosocial behavior (Panfile & Laible, 2012). A second study by the same 
authors examined the link between mother-sorted attachment security on the AQS and 
children’s empathic concern, but employed a longitudinal design (Murphy & Laible, 
2013). Mother-child dyads visited the lab when the children were 42- and 48-months old. 
There, mothers rated their children’s attachment security on the AQS and engaged in a 
video-recorded free play session with their children. Eight minutes into the session, a 
baby cry sounded from outside the room. Trained coders rated the infants’ facial 
expressions on a 4-point scale from 1 (no concern or change in expression resulting from 
the baby cry) to 4 (strong facial concern, including brow furrowing for and downward 
turned mouth for at least 8 seconds) reflecting empathic concern. Results indicated that 
attachment security at 42 months significantly predicted for empathic concern at 48 
months, controlling for empathic concern at 42 months.  They also tested the inverse of 
this model, and found that attachment security, but not empathic concern, at 42 months 
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significantly predicted attachment security at 48 months, indiciating that the link between 
attachment quality and empathic concern is not bidirectional.  
Denham (1994) also examined the link between mother-sorted AQS 
classifications and observed emotional (i.e., concerned / empathic, distressed, or non-
optimal) and behavioral (prosocial or avoidant) responses to maternal simulations of 
anger and sadness in 3- to 4-year-old children (M = 44 months).  She found that children 
who displayed sympathy and responded prosocially to their mothers were also rated as 
more securely attached by their mothers.  In addition, children who showed non-
prosocial, distressed, and defensive reactions were rated as less securely attached by their 
mothers (Denham, 1994). Finally, Teti and Ablard (1989) found that, when left in a 
strange room together, older siblings (M age = 4.02) who were rated as more secure on 
the mother-sorted AQS were more likely to soothe and comfort (i.e., offer verbal 
reassurance, hold, kiss, caress, and redirect attention) a distressed younger sibling than 
children who were rated as less secure, and that this effect increased with age (Teti & 
Ablard, 1989). 
Only one study examining this link in school-age children found support for it, 
but it extended the literature in important ways. Futh and colleagues (2008) assessed 
attachment quality in an ethnically diverse at-risk sample of 5.5-year-old children using 
the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task (MCAST; Green, Goldwyn, & Stanley, 
2000), a story stem battery meant to elicit attachment representations in school-age 
children. Children were assigned to one of four attachment groups (i.e., secure, insecure-
avoidant, insecure-ambivalent, and insecure-disorganized) and received scores reflecting 
engagement (i.e., the child’s engagement and arousal during the story procedure), 
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positive content (i.e., how much the child’s story contained evidence of mentalizing and a 
secure base script), coherence (i.e., the narrative cohesion and completeness of the story) 
and disorganization (i.e., the amount of atypical or bizarre content) based on the content 
of their narratives. Additionally, prosocial behavior was assessed using the 5-item 
prosocial behavior subscale of the 25-item Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire 
(SDQ; Goodman, 1999). Of the five items, only one refers to comforting in response to 
distress (“Helpful if someone is hurt”).  Results indicated that all four attachment indices 
were associated with teacher-reported prosocial behavior in theoretically expected 
directions (i.e., higher scores on engagement, positive content, and coherence were 
positively associated and higher scores on disorganization were negatively associated 
with teacher reported prosocial behavior), but only coherence was positively associated 
with mother-reported prosocial behavior, controlling for demographic risk factors and 
verbal IQ (Futh, O’Connor, Matias, Green, & Scott, 2008). In addition, only 
disorganization (and not organized attachment) was a significant and negative predictor 
of prosocial behavior. The study provided both evidence that attachment-related scripts 
may be linked with prosocial behavior and the first study of this link in an ethnically 
diverse, at-risk sample. 
Studies providing mixed evidence for the link between secure attachment and 
care for others. The following six studies provide only moderate evidence for a link 
between attachment quality and empathy and prosocial comforting.  
Only one study, using a longitudinal design, assessed attachment using the SSP at 
2 years of age (Iannotti, Cummings, Pierrehumbert, Milano, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992).  
Then, at age 5, children were observed interacting with a peer. Prosocial behaviors (i.e., 
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helping, sharing, comforting, cooperating, and affection) were coded from the video 
taped interactions. In addition, researchers assessed children’s affective responses to and 
understanding of photographs depicting various emotion matched and non-matched 
situations. Children were rated on how their self-reported emotions matched the 
situational and affective cues.  Results indicated that secure attachment at age 2 was 
related to prosocial behavior (but not prosocial comforting, specifically) at age 5.  There 
were no significant links between early attachment and later indices of empathy.   
Two studies conducted by Laible (2004, 2006) assessed preschoolers’ (ages 3 – 5) 
attachment using the mother-sorted AQS. In both, mothers reported on their children’s 
prosocial behavior using the 7-item prosocial subscale of the Child’s Behavior Scale 
(Ladd & Profilet, 1996). Although this measures is intended to tap into prosocial 
behavior in general, it contains two items that refer specifically to responses to distress 
(i.e., “Seems concerned when classmates are distressed” and “Offers help or comfort 
when classmates are distressed”). In one study, secure attachment had no direct link with 
maternal reports of children’s prosocial behavior. However, secure attachment was 
associated with children’s effortful control, which, in turn was associated with children’s 
prosocial behavior. In the second study, Laible (2006) used a similar procedure with 
nearly identical measures and found that mother-sorted secure attachment on the AQS 
was positively associated with maternal reports of children’s prosocial behavior.  In both 
studies, empathy expressed in a shorted version of the MacArther Story Stem Battery 
(MSSB; see Oppenhiem, Nir, Warren, & Emde, 1997) was considered as part of a 
composite score reflecting positive or prosocial representations of relationships. 
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Attachment security on the AQS was unrelated to these representations (Laible, 2004, 
2006). 
In older children, a new pattern of findings begins to emerge. For example, one 
longitudinal study assessed attachment at age 5 using an adapted version of the 
Attachment Story Completion Task (see Verschueren, Marcoen, & Schoefs, 1996), which 
yielded categorical attachment classifications similar to those assigned to young children 
(i.e, secure, avoidant, and  bizarre-ambivalent). One year later, the children’s teachers 
completed the Social Competence Inventory (SCI; Rydell et al., 1997), which includes a 
17-item prosocial orientation subscale (but one item was removed because it concerned 
behavior toward adults). The subscale includes one item that pertains to prosocial 
comforting (“Tries to comfort a peer who is upset, not feeling well, or has been hurt”) 
and two that pertain to empathy (“Is able to interpret (‘decode’) another child’s feelings” 
and “Is able to sympathize with peers”). Results indicated that children who had been 
classified as secure one year earlier were rated as more prosocially oriented than children 
who had been classified as avoidant, but were no different than children who had been 
classified as bizarre-ambivalent (Rydell, Bohlin, & Thorell, 2005).  In a similar study 
with older children and nearly identical results, children who were classified as secure in 
the SSP at 15 months were rated 8 years later by both mothers and teachers (in a 
combined score) as significantly more prosocially oriented on the SCI than children who 
were classified as avoidant in infancy (Bohlin, Hagekull, & Rydel, 2000).  In a followup 
analyses, the authors examined the two items thought to relate specifically to empathy 
and found the same pattern of association.  Children who were secure as infant were rated 
higher than those who had been avoidant, but not ambivalent.  It is also notable that in 
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this study, attachment was also assessed at 8.5 years using the Seattle Separation Anxiety 
Test (SAT; Slough, Goyette, & Greenberg, 1988; Slough & Greenberg, 1990), but the 
resultant security scores were unrelated to prosocial orientation (Bohlin et al., 2000), 
indicating that it may early attachment relationships in particular that affect the 
development of care for others. 
A final study assessed attachment in a Belgian sample of 4- to 6-year-olds and 
their mothers and fathers using the Security Scale (Kerns, Klepac, & Cole, 1996; Dutch 
translation: Verscheuren & Marcoen, 2002), a self-report measure designed to tap 
children’s perceptions of: the degree to which a particular attachment figure is available 
and responsive, the child’s self-reported tendency to turn to a particular attachment figure 
in times of trouble, and the child’s communicatory patterns with the attachment figure on 
a 4-point scale (Michiels, Grietens, Onghena, & Kuppens, 2010). In addition, researchers 
combined children’s prosocial behavior subscale scores from the mother-, father-, and 
teacher- reported SDQ (described above; Goodman, 1997; Dutch translation: Van 
Widenfelt, Goedhart, Treffers, & Goodman, 2003) to create a combined prosocial 
behavior score.  Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that the link between self-
reported attachment and mother-, father-, and teacher-reported prosocial behavior 
differed for boys and girls.  Specifically, 4.4 percent of the variance in girls’ prosocial 
behavior was significantly predicted by a model including both maternal attachment and 
maternal positive regard. Further, the addition of father attachment and father’s positive 
regard explained an additional 3.4% of the variance, over and above that explained by 
maternal variables. However, father’s positive affection was the only significant 
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individual predictor. In contrast, there were no significant predictors of boys’ prosocial 
behavior (Michiels et al, 2010). 
Null findings regarding the link between secure attachment and care for 
others. Five studies have no found no evidence for the associations between attachment 
and empathy and prosocial comforting.  The first assessed older sibling attachment to 
both mothers and fathers using the SSP at 12 and 13 months, respectively. Then five 
years later, children’s interactions with their siblings were assessed and coded for 
instances of conflict, shared affect, and prosocial behavior, which included any instances 
in which one sibling helped, shared, taught, or comforted the other, as well as friendly 
invitations to play. Results revealed that attachment to mothers and fathers at 12 months 
was unrelated to prosocial interactions with siblings at 6 years of age (Volling & Belsky, 
1992). In a similar study, again older sibling attachment was assessed to both mothers 
and fathers using the SSP at 12 and 13 months, respectively. Three years later, both older 
(M age = 4 years) and younger (M age = 21 months) were left alone in a strange room for 
a short interval. Soon after, older siblings left the room with an experimenter and then 
returned. Sibling interactions were coded for instances of distress in each sibling and 
emotion regulation strategies employed by the older sibling during distress episodes of 
the younger sibling (i.e., ignoring, watching, seeking help, verbal comforting, physical 
comforting, personal distress, and punishment). In addition, dyads were coded for levels 
of comfort seeking, hostility, and positive affect. Results revealed that were no 
differences in comforting behavior based on attachment to mothers or fathers; however, 
older siblings with resistant attachment histories were 9 times more likely to be hostile 
and engage in conflicts with their siblings than children with secure histories, and 29 
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times more likely to seek comfort from their younger sibling than children with secure 
histories (Volling, 2001).  In another study, attachment was assessed at 6 years using the 
coding guidelines described by Main and Cassidy (1988) for assessment in older 
children. At child age 8, prosocial behavior was assessed using the teacher-reported 
Social Behavior Questionniare (SBQ; Tremblay, Vitaro, Gagnon, Piché, & Royer, 1992), 
which includes ten items taken from the Prosocial Behavior Questionnaire (PBQ; Weir & 
Duveen, 1981), some which refer to comforting another person who is in distress.  
Attachment at age 6 was unrelated to teacher reports of prosocial behavior at age 8 
(Bureau & Moss, 2010). 
A third study examining this link in preschoolers used both the mother- and the 
father-sorted AQS to assess attachment and the teacher-reported PBQ to assess prosocial 
behavior in the preschool classroom, but found no association between mother- or father-
reported security and teacher-reported prosocial behavior (LaFreniere, Provost, & 
Dubeau, 1992).  In another, observer-sorted maternal AQS scores for preschoolers (mean 
age = 45 months) were unrelated to naturalistic observations of reactions to emotional 
displays by peers in the classroom (computed by subtracting negative reactions from 
positive reactions; Mitchell-Copeland, Denham, & DeMulder, 1997). 
Summary of research on attachment and care for others in preschool and 
middle childhood. Of the 19 studies presented here, eight found support for the link 
between attachment quality and care for others. However, six studies provided mixed 
evidence, and five found no association between attachment and care for others.  Given 
the myriad ways attachment was assessed, I will frame the results by the measure used to 
assess attachment. 
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Studies using the Strange Situation Procedure. Evidence from three studies 
supported the notions that attachment security assessed using the SSP was associated 
with greater sympathy towards peers’ distress, teacher ratings of empathy, and more 
empathic overtures to distressed peers (which combined elements of empathy and 
prosocial comforting; Kestenbaum et al., 1989; Sroufe, 1983; Waters et al., 1979).  
It notable is that the SSP relies on automatic, unconscious behavior during 
separations and reunions to assess attachment quality (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Similarly, 
many of these studies used naturalistic or structured observations of child behavior rather 
than maternal reports. Thus, results cannot be explained by reporter bias, as parents are 
not reporting on their own perceptions of the relationship and then reporting on child 
behavior.  
Even so, two studies provided mixed results. One found that secure attachment 
was not associated with empathy, but was positively associated with prosocial behavior 
directed toward a peer, (Iannotti et al., 1992). However, it is interesting to note that this 
study was also the only study to use photographs to assess empathy. A review of the 
association between empathy and prosocial behavior found that the only measures of 
empathy unrelated to prosocial behavior were those employing photographs (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). This implies that measures of empathy using photographs are qualitatively 
different than observational or reporting measures, and may not have the same pattern of 
associations.  
In addition, in one study in older children, secure children were rated as more 
prosocial than avoidant, but not ambivalent, children. Follow-up analyses were 
performed on two items pertaining to empathy in particular, and the same pattern of 
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results was found (Bohlin et al., 2000). Importantly, only five studies in this section 
examined the link between attachment and care for others in children above the age of 5; 
one (using a scripts measure) found a pattern of results similar to this (Rydell et al., 
2005), the other three (using the SSP and self-report measures), did not (although they 
assessed children in much wider age ranges). This indicates that the relation between 
attachment and care for others may evolve as children age; however, more studies are 
needed to determine whether this is the case. 
Three studies found null results. Two found that attachment to mothers and 
fathers at 12 months did not predict prosocial or comforting interactions with siblings at 4 
or 6 years of age (Volling, 2001; Volling & Belsky, 1992). It may be that interactions 
with siblings are subject to different influences than interactions with peers. This makes 
theoretical sense, as peer relationships are much less established than sibling 
relationships, and children may have to rely more on internal schemas and expectations to 
guide behavior in such relationships. Conversely, sibling relationships have an entire 
history of interaction from which children can draw on, meaning that behavior may be 
based more on internal working models of that particular relationship, rather than 
attachment relationships in general.  
The other study to find a null relationship between attachment to parents and 
prosocial behavior found that attachment assessed at age 6 did not predict teacher ratings 
of prosocial behavior at age 8 (Bureau & Moss, 2010). It is possible that assessing 
attachment at such an advanced age provides a different metric than assessing it in 
infancy. This may be the case, as a large component of responding prosocially to 
another’s distress is the ability to regulate one’s own negative emotions – a capacity that 
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is formed in early childhood. Given that attachment has been found to have only low to 
moderate stability across childhood (e.g., Groh et al., 2014), it is plausible that 
attachment classifications assessed at 6 years of age do not entirely map onto 
classifications in infancy, and may not reflect early internal working models or learned 
patterns of emotion regulation. 
 Overall, studies using the SSP, the gold standard measure of attachment in young 
children, offer moderate evidence that there may be a link between attachment quality 
and dimensions of care for others as early as preschool. Interestingly, results supporting 
the links of interest only assessed attachment at very early ages and assessed empathy and 
prosocial behavior directed toward peers; whereas one of the three studies that did not 
find support for this link assessed attachment at a much later age and the other two 
assessed prosocial behavior directed at siblings. It may early attachment as measured by 
the SSP holds the key to influencing later peer-directed prosocial behavior, and that 
sibling relationships are so unlike peer relationships that this link does not hold with 
siblings.  
Studies using the Attachment Q-Sort. Studies using the mother-reported AQS 
found that mother-reported emotion regulation mediated the relation between secure 
attachment and mother-reported empathy, which in turn predicted greater observed 
prosocial comforting, that secure attachment at 42 months predicted mother-reported 
empathy at 48 months, but that the inverse relation did not hold, and that children who 
responded to maternal displays of emotion with sympathy and prosocial overtures were 
more likely to be rated as securely attached (Denham, 1994; Murphy & Laible, 2013; 
Panfile & Laible, 2012). Additionally, some studies found an association between 
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attachment security and maternal reports of prosocial behavior, or attachment security 
and maternal reports of effortful control, which was, in turn, related to mother-reported 
prosocial behavior (Laible, 2004, 2006). One study also found an association between 
attachment security and comforting behavior with a younger sibling (Teti & Ablard, 
1989).  Although these studies are compelling, they must be interpreted with caution as a 
large number of these associations are between mother-reported variables and may reflect 
shared method variance and spurious associations. However, these studies have some 
strengths as well.  For instance, three of the studies employed observational outcome 
data, which may reduce bias, and one employed a longitudinal design to effectively 
demonstrate the likely direction of effects.  
Interestingly, in 2 of the studies mentioned above, the author failed to provide 
evidence that attachment was related to prosocial representations of relationships (Laible 
2004, 2006). However, one study examining the association of the security scores on the 
AQS and attachment classifications derived from the MacArthur Strange Situation 
(MAC; Cassidy, Marvin, & the MacArthur Attachment Working Group, 1992) found that 
there was no association between the two (Posada, 2006). This indicates that the AQS is 
likely tapping a different dimension of security than the Strange Situation, and thus, may 
not tap into representations of relationships.  
In addition, two studies that did not find a link between attachment and care for 
others employed the AQS. Specifically, one found that mother- and father-reported 
security scores were unrelated to teacher-reported prosocial behavior and the other found 
that observer-rated maternal security scores were unrelated to naturalistic observations of 
reactions to peer distress in the classroom (LaFreniere et al., 1992; Mitchell-Copeland et 
 137 
al., 1997). It may be that child behavior at home (where the AQS is completed) and the 
resultant security score does not necessarily reflect the child’s behavior in less familiar 
social situations. It is notable that all of the outcome measures supporting the link 
between AQS-rated attachment and care for others were either maternal reports of typical 
behavior (which would most likely be observed in the home) or observed behavior 
toward a caregiver, a sibling, or an infant.  It is possible that the SSP and the AQS are 
tapping into two different dimensions of security that are predictive of care for others in 
specific situations. This notion is bolstered by the fact that, of the three studies examining 
the link between attachment and care for siblings specifically, the one study using the 
AQS found support, whereas the two employing the SSP found null results. 
Studies using representational measures. Only one study found that attachment 
representations, measured through a script assessment (MCAST), were associated with 
teacher-reported prosocial behavior in theoretically meaningful ways. Results of the same 
study also indicated that disorganization (and not organized attachment) was a significant 
and negative predictor of prosocial behavior (Futh et al., 2008). The only other study that 
employed representational measures (the Attachment Story Completion Task) to measure 
attachment found that children who had been classified as secure (one year earlier) were 
rated as more prosocially oriented than children who had been classified as avoidant, but 
were no different than children who had been classified as bizarre-ambivalent (Rydell et 
al, 2005). As was mentioned previously, these results are not inconsistent with theory or 
with other studies examining this link in older children.  It may be that as children age 
and are more capable of self-regulation, ambivalent children become more proficient at 
responding to others in a sensitive manner. Additionally, it is important to note that the 
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two studies finding this pattern of results assessed prosocial behavior more generally, and 
not response to distress particularly. Theoretically, it should be particularly in times of 
distress that ambivalent children will be overwhelmed and distressed themselves, 
whereas being kind to others and helping may not be as challenging. Thus, it may also be 
that the measures employed to measure prosocial behavior were not specific enough to 
untangle to subtle differences in ambivalent children’s responding (i.e., to distress versus 
non-distress).   
 Studies using self-report measures. Only one study used a self-report measure to 
assess attachment (Michiels et al., 2010). The results of this study indicated that self-
reported parental attachment was related to parent- and teacher-reported prosocial 
behavior in 4- to 6-year-old girls, but not boys. It may simply be that girls are better at 
self-reporting than boys, particularly at younger ages, in part due to their advanced 
language skills. For instance, one study found that by 6 years of age, girls were more 
unique emotion terms in discourse with their parents than boys (Adams, Kuebli, Boyle, & 
Fivush, 1995). This may have implications for a self-report measure focused on 
relationships and emotions within relationships. Additionally, research consistently 
shows that girls are rated as more prosocial than boys (although none of the work 
reviewed here addressed this question specifically; e.g., Ladd & Profilet, 1996; Rys & 
Bear, 1997). Thus, it may be that a combination of higher self-reported attachment scores 
and higher teacher reports of prosocial behavior produced this effect. 
 General discussion of the link between attachment and care for others in 
preschool and middle childhood. Overall, the results presented provide modest evidence 
for a link between attachment quality and components of care for others. It also suggests 
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that this link appears to depend, in part, on the measures used to assess each construct. 
For instance, studies using the SSP in infancy to predict behavior with peers generally 
found support for this link, whereas studies using separation and reunion procedures in 
older children or assessing prosocial behavior in response to siblings did not. Similarly, 
studies employing the AQS typically found that parent attachment was related to empathy 
and prosocial responding to mothers and unknown infants, but not with peers.  Studies 
using scripts measures and self-reported attachment measures yielded mixed results.  It 
may be that the association between attachment and care for others really depends on the 
specific, regulatory and representational components born out of such relationships and 
that each measure of attachment only taps into particular aspects of the attachment 
relationship, some of which may not include the afore mentioned capacities. There may 
also be age-related changes in the pattern of association, as two of the three studies of 
older children found that secure children engaged in more prosocial responding than 
avoidant, but not ambivalent children. Following a review of the adolescent literature, I 
will explore these notions further and suggest future directions.  
Attachment and Care for Others in Adolescence 
 The literature regarding the link between attachment quality and care for others in 
older youth presents a far more consistent story. Six studies provide evidence in support 
of this link.  
 One set of studies measured attachment quality using the Inventory of Parent and 
Peer Attachment (IPPA; Armsden & Greenberg, 1987), a 53-item self-report measure, 
designed to tap into the affective and cognitive dimensions of attachment security, as well 
as trust in the availability and responsiveness of attachment figures. The IPPA results in 
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three subscales: trust, communication, and alienation. Half of the items refer to parents, 
and the other half to peers. Given that this review is about how attachment to parents 
shapes later prosocial behavior, I will focus only on results concerning parental 
attachment. 
 The first study, which used only the mother and father scales of the adolescent-
reported modified IPPA (Papini, Roggman, & Anderson, 1991), examined how maternal 
and paternal attachment were related to adolescent prosocial behavior measured with the 
mother-, father-, and teen-reported Adolescent Prosocial Behavior Inventory (specifically 
created for this study; ABPI; Eberly & Montemayor, 1998). The ABPI taps into two 
dimensions of prosocial behavior – helping (such as helping around the house) and 
affection.  The affection subscale covers such behaviors as prosocial comforting, praise, 
and consideration (e.g., saying “I love you”).  Results indicated that attachment to 
mothers and fathers was positively associated with the affection dimension of the ABPI, 
regardless of who was reporting, supporting the notion that attachment to parents may be 
related to prosocial comforting. In contrast, only child-reported helpfulness in boys was 
associated with attachment (Eberly & Montemayor, 1998). A second study in a sample 
16-year-olds, and using a shortened version of the IPPA (with only 12 items each for the 
peer and parent subscales), measured empathic concern and perspective-taking using two 
subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 7 items each; Davis, 1983). These 
two subscales were summed and averaged to create a sympathy score. Results indicated 
that those participants with the highest scores on parent (and peer) attachment also 
reported the greatest levels of sympathy. Additionally, those with the lowest attachment 
score also reported the lowest levels of sympathy (Laible, Carlo, & Raffaelli, 2000). 
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Laible (2007) also assessed attachment using the IPPA and empathy using the empathic 
concern and perspective taking subscales of the IRI, but also included a self-report 
measure of prosocial behavior (The Prosocial Tendancies Measure; Carlo & Randall, 
2002), which included items about helping others in distress (e.g., “I tend to help others 
particularly when they are emotionally distressed”). Results indicated that adolescent 
attachment to peers and parents was related to both empathy and prosocial behavior, but 
that peer attachment was a stronger predictor overall. Finally, using the parent scale of a 
revised version of the IPPA (IPPA-R; Gullone & Robinson, 2005), Thompson and 
Gullone (2008) examined how secure attachment related to self-reported empathy and 
self-reported prosocial behavior in a sample of 12- to 18- year old Australians. Empathy 
was measured using the Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents (IECA; Bryant, 
1982) and prosocial behavior was measured with the prosocial subscale of the SDQ, 
which has been described previously. Attachment was positively associated with both 
empathy and prosocial behavior, and a regression model with attachment and empathy as 
predictors explained over a quarter of the variance in prosocial behavior (Thompson & 
Gullone, 2008). 
 The link between attachment and care for others in adolescent was also examined 
in a study of 9th and 10th graders (and a few 7th and 8th graders) that used an adapted 
version of the Relationship Questionnaire (RQ; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) to 
assess attachments to mothers, fathers, and peers. Participants rated how much each of 
four paragraphs describing secure, dismissing, preoccupied, and fearful styles of 
attachment (see Crowell, Fraley, & Shaver, 2008, for a description of these attachment 
styles) was like them. Only ratings on the “security” paragraph were used as indices of 
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participants’ attachment security with mothers, fathers, and peers. Participants also 
completed a 5-item prosocial behavior scale, taken from the Feelings and Behavior 
Questionnaire of the National Longitudinal Survey of Children (Statistics Canada, 1995). 
The scale contained two items relating specifically to empathy (i.e., ‘‘I show sympathy to 
(feel sorry for) someone who has made a mistake’’ and ‘‘I comfort a person (friend, 
brother or sister) who is crying or upset.’’). Attachment security with mothers and peers 
(but not fathers) was positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior (Markiewicz, 
Doyle, & Brendgen, 2001). 
 Only one study used observational data during a mother-adolescent discussion to 
measure empathy. Diamond, Fagundes, and Butterworth (2012) used the Adolescent 
Attachment Scale (AAS; Miller & Hoicowitz, 2004), to measure adolescents’ anxiety 
(i.e., preoccupation with relationships and fear of abandonment) and avoidance (i.e., 
discomfort with closeness) in attachment relationships. Lower scores on both are 
indicative of attachment security. In addition, each participant and their mother had a ten-
minute conversation during which they first discussed a positive event and then discussed 
something they had both rated as a contentious subject in the relationship. Afterward, 
mothers and teens separately watched the interaction twice, first coding how they felt at 
regular intervals, and then coding how they believed their discussion partner felt. 
Empathy sensitivity was coded as the match between one person’s estimation of how the 
other felt and how the other person actually reported feeling. Perceived concordance was 
coded as the match between one person’s estimate of the other’s affect and that person’s 
own self-reported affect. In addition, indices of physiological arousal reflecting affect 
regulation were assessed. Results indicate that adolescent avoidance was associated with 
 143 
less empathic sensitivity to positive maternal affect. In addition, adolescent anxiety was 
associated with less empathic sensitivity to negative maternal affect and greater perceived 
concordance with maternal emotion states. Moreover, the highest levels of empathic 
sensitivity were demonstrated by those adolescents with low attachment anxiety and high 
vagal tone (i.e., an indication of psychophysiological health and competent emotion 
regulation; Diamond et al., 2012).  
 Summary of research on attachment and care for others in adolescence. 
Overall, the literature on attachment and care for others in adolescence supports the 
notion that attachment security should be related to higher levels of empathy and 
prosocial behavior.  However, there are a few important considerations to keep in mind 
when interpreting these results.  First, this literature relies almost exclusively on self-
report measures to assess both attachment and care for others. This could indicate that 
shared method variance has a role in these associations (i.e., adolescents who report using 
their parents as a secure base also report engaging in more prosocial and empathic 
behavior), and they must be considered with caution. Additionally, the only observational 
method employed to assess empathy (Diamond et al., 2012) could be considered 
somewhat questionable. Specifically, the measure of empathic sensitivity employed 
involved watching tapes of personal interactions and rating how another person felt. 
Empathic sensitivity reflected the degree to which this rating matched what the person 
actually felt, which seems an indication of emotion recognition, and important 
component of empathy, rather than empathy itself. Thus, although there is a remarkable 
consistency to the literature thus far, additional investigations are needed to draw any 
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firm conclusions. In the next section, I will briefly discuss this body of literature as a 
whole and will suggest future directions. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Overall, there is only moderate support for the link between attachment and 
empathy and for the link between attachment and prosocial comforting in children and 
adolescents. The lack of consensus among the literature may in part be due to the wide 
variety of measures used to assess attachment, empathy, and prosocial comforting 
behavior. Each was assessed using observational measures, parent reports, observer 
reports, and self-reports. Each of these measures may capture slightly different facets of 
the overall constructs they are intending to measure with more or less specificity, and 
may lead to inflated or decreased effect sizes or type I or type II errors. Researchers 
interested in these constructs should begin a dialogue in an attempt to standardize the 
definitions and measures used to examine them, so a comprehensive, integrated literature 
can be constructed. 
 To begin, future studies examining the links between attachment and empathy and 
prosocial comforting could strive to use gold-standard measures of attachment, empathy, 
and prosocial comforting, when available. Additionally, within studies, researchers could 
attempt to use multiple methods for examining each of these variables. For instance, a 
self-report measures of empathy could be supplemented with physiological measures 
intended to tap unconscious markers of empathy. In addition, studies using questionnaires 
could endeavor to assess constructs from the perspectives of multiple reporters. Parents, 
teachers, and peers (of older children) could be utilized to capture a more complete view 
of typical child behavior across a variety of situations. 
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Importantly, the measures employed to assess prosocial behavior in this review 
were particularly varied. Even more concerning, the research covered in this review often 
selected measures that collapsed different components of care for others (i.e., helping, 
sharing, and comforting) into one composite score, despite research indicating that these 
types of prosocial behavior may require different skill sets and may not develop in 
parallel (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). As such, the relation between attachment quality 
and a particular type of prosocial behavior, such as prosocial comforting, cannot be 
determined from the available data. In fact, given attachment’s theorized role in the 
development of emotion regulation (Cassidy, 1994; Calkins & Leerkes, 2011) and the 
crucial role of emotion regulation in promoting empathy and prosocial comforting 
(Batson et al., 1983), it seems likely that it is particularly these two components of care 
for others wherein attachment’s influence may lie. Future investigations should endeavor 
to piece apart the distinct predicators and correlates of specific types of prosocial 
behavior by examining them in separate lines of investigation. 
  Another substantial limitation of the literature examining the link between 
attachment quality and care for others in childhood is the exclusive reliance on 
correlational or predictive investigations. It is only through experimental methods that 
one can make causal conclusions about the effect of one construct on another. In the adult 
attachment literature, researchers have been quite successful in using a variety of priming 
techniques to experimentally manipulate adults’ secure attachment representations. In 
doing so, researchers have been able to causally link attachment security with a number 
of social and emotional outcomes, including empathy and prosocial behavior (e.g., 
Mikulincer et al., 2001). Given that priming has been successfully employed with 
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children in a number of psychological domains, including attachment research (Stupica, 
Brett, & Cassidy, 2015; and see Stupica & Cassidy, 2011 for a review), this seems like a 
particularly promising avenue for future research. 
 In sum, the body of literature presented provides moderate evidence for the link 
between attachment quality with parents and care for others. This evidence is bolstered 
by the fact that this link was found in a number of studies employing myriad measures 
and reporters, but more work is needed to form firm conclusions. Future researchers 
should endeavor to standardize the ways these constructs are defined and measured, 
should strive to utilize multiple methods and reporters, and should attempt to examine 
these links experimentally. 
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Appendix E: Study Script; Child Portion 
MomExp (the experimenter working with the mother) brings family in. 
 
MomExp: “Before I open the door, I want to let you know that there is a mom visiting us 
today with her baby so we need to be a little bit quiet as we walk in. You’ll just walk in 
and go straight to the first room.” 
 
MomExp opens door and motions for family to enter. 
 
As family is entering lab: 
 
E2 (RA operating camera and playing the part of “mom”) is positioned next to a car seat 
covered by a blanket by the back door. A lifelike babydoll’s hand is peeking out from 
under the blanket and E2 is gently stroking it. As mom and child comes in, E2 makes eye 
contact with the child, smiles, raises finger to lips, and says in a loud whisper: 
 
E2: “Shhhhh. The baby is sleeping!” 
 
Mom and child enter playroom. 
 
During consenting (led by MomExp), E and child play with age appropriate playsets. 
Once mom is consented, E and MomExp leave room for 5 minutes.  
 
At the end of 5 minutes, E re-enters and engages with child for 3 minutes using a picture 
search game with a bell. After 3 minutes, MomExp comes and takes mom into another 
room. 
 
Child Portion; FORWARD ORDER 
 
After mom leaves, E continues to play with child for 3 min. and then suggests another 
activity. 
 
As she is cleaning up game: 
 
E: Thanks for coming to play with me today! You’re helping scientists learn about how 4 
year olds think and play! So when we’re all done here, I’ll give you a special certificate 
that says you’re an official Junior Scientist! I also want to tell you that every Junior 
Scientist that comes here plays 4 computer games. So in a little bit, we’ll hear a beeping 
sound from my watch, and that means it’s time to play a computer game! While we’re 
waiting for the computer to get ready, we can just play some games together!  
 
BLOCK 1 (counterbalanced with BLOCK 2) 
 
Drawing Task Setup 
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E: Now I want to show you something! 
 
E goes to the shelf to gather pre-made drawing of a flower, a person, and football and 
holds it up for child to see. 
 
E: This is a drawing I've been working on for a long, long time and it's ALMOST 
finished, so I want to finish it now. I'm really proud of it, I think it's really pretty! And 
when I’m all done with it, I’m going to give it to my very best friend! 
 
E walks over to cabinet where she has left a folder with a piece of paper hidden 
underneath. E points to the folder. 
 
E: And here, I some more paper for you! I keep it in this folder.  
 
E opens the folder. 
 
E: Oh no! There’s none left! I guess I ran out! 
 
E lifts folder slightly revealing paper underneath. 
 
E: Oh! It looks like there is one piece left! Phew! Great. Here’s a piece of paper for you! 
 
E give child paper. 
 
E: So here’s your piece. And check it out – we have so many colors to choose from!  
 
E gets markers and lays them out on the table. 
 
E: Every junior scientist who comes to visit the playroom draws us a picture of him / 
herself! So on here, you can draw you 
 
E colors and converses with child; at about 5 min into the task: 
 
E: You know what? I'm kind of thirsty. I'm going to get some water. Would you like 
some water? 
E pours some bottled water into a cup for herself (and some for child if child wanted 
some). Be sure to pour just enough water to take a few sips and have enough left to 
ruin the drawing but not to make a pool of water. This is typically 1/3 to ½ full. E sets 
water cups on the table (be sure to drink some!). Be sure to place child's near the wall so 
child doesn't knock their own over. 
 
Once approximately 10 min has passed: 
 
There is a quiet beep. 
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E: Oh! Did you hear that? That means it’s time to play one of the computer games I told 




E1 brings child to computer and has them sit facing the screen. 
 
E1: “Every game you’ll play today is about different kinds of animals. In each game, 
you’ll see pictures of different animals and answer one question about them.  In this first 
game, the question is “Does it live in the water?” When the game starts, you’ll see a 
picture of shapes or people. You don’t have to do anything then; that’s just the computer 
figuring out which animal to show next. Then you’ll see a picture of an animal. When 
you see the animal, as fast as you can, you’ll answer the question “Does it live in the 
water?” You’ll answer by pressing one of these buttons. The green button means YES! If 
you push the green button, that means YES this animal lives in the water! The red button 
means NO! If you push the red button, that means NO this animal does not live in the 
water. 
 
Now let me make sure you understand. When you see an animal, what question will you 
ask about it? 
 
If correct: That’s right, you’ll ask: Does it live in the water? 
 
If incorrect: No, remember, in this game, we ask “Does it live in the water?” Let me ask 
you again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times]. 
 
Ok, and if the answer to “Does it live in the water?” is YES, which button should you 
push? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the green button if the answer is YES it lives in the 
water. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the green button if the answer is YES it lives in the water.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the green button]. 
 
E1: And which button should you push if the answer to “Does is live in the water?” is 
NO? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t live in 
the water. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t live in the water.  
I’ll ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the 
third time, physically guide the child to point to the red button]. 
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E1: Ok! We’re ready to play! Let’s do a practice round together and then you can do it all 
by yourself.  Remember, first there will be a picture of either shapes or people. That 
means the computer is thinking about which animal to show you, so get ready! Then you 
will see the animal picture and as fast as you can, push this button if the animal lives in 
the water, and this button if the animal doesn’t live in the water. 
 
E pushes ~ and the first sequence of pictures comes up. 
 
E talks along with the pictures: 
 
E: Oh the computer’s thinking… and there is the animal! Which button should you push? 
 
If child does it correctly: “Great! The answer to the question “Does it live in the water?” 
was YES, so you pushed the green button!  Now you’re ready to play all by yourself! I’ll 
be right here if you need anything.  I’ll push the button to start the game!” 
 
If the child does not do it correctly: “Hmmm. I see you pushed the red button. That 
means NO this animal does not live in the water. But does this animal live in the water? 
Yes, that means you push the other button. The green button means YES this animal lives 
in the water. 
 




E: Awesome! Now let’s hang up our drawings! 
 
Once the child has reached their drawing, E looks around room swinging tape and 
accidentally hits the water cup, which is directly in front of her own drawing, spilling 
water all over it (she may converse with the child to distract them) 
  
Once the water is spilled, say, “Oh no!” and stand cup back up. Set child’s drawing away 
from the water but where the child can still draw on it, and move E’s drawing out of the 
puddle and to the far side of the table. Keep the placement of the drawing consistent 
across all children.  
 
E: Ohhh! My drawing! 
 
For 30 sec: Looking at drawing, looking sad, sighing, wiping water off pitifully with 
hands (BUT ACTUALLY spreading it all over the drawing!). Be obviously sad, not 
something the child can easily ignore. Turn up the sad volume!! Can say things like, 
"awww...." or "oh no.....", as long as they don't specify what the problem is. SAY ONE 




For 30 sec (prompts can be variable – just need to make sure to say THREE in ea 30 
second period): "I'm so sad about my drawing". Continue doing same as above. "Now my 
drawing is ruined...." No eye contact. "There's water all over my drawing...". 
 
For 30 sec: Look at child and say, "I'm so sad that my drawing is ruined". Keep doing 
same as above, periodically looking at child. "Oh no, what am I going to do?" "I worked 
so hard on this". 
 
For 30 sec: Look at child and say, "Is there anything you can do to make me feel better?" 
Continue to do same, looking at child for a response. And "I'm really sad that my drawing 
is messed up now. "E: "Can you think of anything you can do?"  
 
After 2 minutes have passed, say: "I guess it's ok. I can make another one later, and it'll 
be just as pretty. Maybe I’ll even make a better one!" If child comforted, also say "thank 
you". 
 
Put ruined drawing in the trash and wipe the rest of the water off the table.  
 
BLOCK 2 (Counterblanced with BLOCK 1) 
 
Phone Task Setup 
 
E hangs child’s drawing. 
 
E: Now we get to play with books and puzzles! I love books and puzzles! 
 
E brings books and puzzles and sets them on the table. E and child read books and do 
puzzles for 10 minutes until they hear the beep. 
 




E1 brings child to computer and has them sit facing the screen. 
 
E1: “Oooo this game about animals asks the question “Is it bigger than me?”.  When the 
game starts, first you’ll see the picture of shapes or people. You don’t have to do 
anything then; that’s just the computer figuring out which animal to show next. Then 
you’ll see a picture of an animal. When you see the animal, as fast as you can, you’ll 
answer the question “Is it bigger than me?” You’ll answer by pressing one of these 
buttons. The green button means YES! If you push the green button, that means YES this 
animal is bigger than me! The red button means NO! If you push the red button, that 
means NO this animal is not bigger than me. 
 
Now let me make sure you understand. When you see an animal, what question will you 
ask about it? 
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If correct: That’s right, you’ll ask: Is it bigger than me? 
 
If incorrect: No, remember, in this game, we ask “Is it bigger than me?” Let me ask you 
again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times]. 
 
Ok, and if the answer to “Is it bigger than me?” is YES, which button should you push? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the green button if the answer is YES it is bigger 
than me. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the green button if the answer is YES it is bigger than me.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the green button]. 
 
E1: And which button should you push if the answer to “Is it bigger than me?” is NO? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the red button if the answer is NO it isn’t bigger than 
me. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the red button if the answer is NO it isn’t bigger than me.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the red button]. 
 
E1: Ok! We’re ready to play! Let’s do a practice round together and then you can do it all 
by yourself.  Remember, first there will be a picture of either shapes or people. That 
means the computer is thinking about which animal to show you, so get ready! Then you 
will see the animal picture and as fast as you can, push this button if the animal is bigger 
than you, and this button if the animal isn’t bigger than you. 
 
E pushes ~ and the first sequence of pictures comes up. 
 
E talks along with the pictures: 
 
E: Oh the computer’s thinking… and there is the animal! Which button should you push? 
 
If child does it correctly: “Great! The answer to the question “Is it bigger than me?” was 
YES, so you pushed the green button!  Now you’re ready to play all by yourself! I’ll be 
right here if you need anything.  I’ll push the button to start the game!” 
 
If the child does not do it correctly: “Hmmm. I see you pushed the red button. That 
means NO this animal is not bigger than you. But is that animal bigger than you? Yes, 
that means you push the other button. The green button means YES this animal is bigger 
than me. 
 





E: Alright, that was a fun game! Have a seat… I’ll be right back, I’m gonna send a quick 
text message. My phone’s just over here! 
 
E walks over to cabinet and picks up cell phone (on top of the cabinet). E pretends like 
she is sending a text message with her back to child, but turns to face child while 
“texting”. Suddenly she fumbles and drops the phone on the floor. 
 
E: Oh, my phone! (after picking it up) The screen broke! (face screen toward child so 
he/she can see the cracked screen; leave enough time that the child can register the 
cracked screen). 
 
For 30 sec: PUT PHONE ON COUCH. Sit down in chair, staring at phone, trying to turn 
it on and looking sad, sighing. No eye contact. Can say things like "oh no..." "darn", as 
long as it doesn't  specify the problem. SAY ONE OF THESE WORDS 3 TIMES 
DURING THE 30 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
For 30 sec: "I can't believe I broke my phone..." continue doing same as above. "ohh 
noo....I'm so upset about my phone...." No eye contact. E: "this is really bad, I broke it!" 
 
For 30 sec: Look at child and say, "I'm sad that the screen is broken". Continue doing 
same as above, periodically looking at child. E: "this is really bad". E: "Oh my poor 
phone, I'm so sad." 
 
For 30 sec: Look at child and say, "Is there anything you can do to make me feel better?" 
Continue to do same, looking at child for a response. E: "Can you think of anything you 
can do?" E: "I'm really sad I broke it...". 
 
After 2 minutes have passed, say: "You know what? I just remembered that my cousin 
knows how to fix broken phones. So I can just take it to his house and he’ll fix it! Yea! 
It'll be ok!" If child comforted, also say "thank you". 
 
BLOCK 3 (always last) 
 
Crying Baby Setup 
 
E: Now I have something REALLY cool to tell you. I have a secret. Do you want to 
know what my secret is? It’s that this table is cooler than a regular table! 
 
E opens sand table: 
 
E: It’s a sand table! And here are some toys we can play with! There is only one rule for 
the sand table – the sand stays in the table. Not on the edges, not on the floor. Where does 
the sand stay? That’s right; in the table. 
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E moves child’s chair, then E and child play for 3 min. 
 
E: I’m kind of hot, I’m gonna open the door. 
 
This is E2’s signal to exit the video recording room, turn on the baby babbles and 
baby monitor, and knock on the door. 
 
30 seconds later, there is a knock at the door! 
 
E1: “Come in!”  
 
E2 enters, carrying baby monitor. 
 
E2:  “Hi Bonnie! <<to child>> Oh hi, I saw you earlier! I’m the mom who had the 
sleeping baby in the other room! <<PAUSE>>  
 
E1: Oh hey! I’m glad you came in! I found your baby’s pacifier. <<holds up pacifier and 
turns to look at child>> What do you call these things at your house? 
 
<<Wait for child to respond>> 
 
E2: <<takes pacifier and puts it in pocket>> That’s what we call it too! Cool! I came to 
ask if you two would mind watching the baby… the baby’s about to fall asleep and I 
want to go get some water!” 
 
Wait for E1 to consent (ok).  The following portion should be directed to E1 and child. 
 
E2: “Great!  Let me show you how this works.” 
 
E1 beckons child to come closer and see the demonstration. 
 
E2: “There are two important buttons and each one does something different.  This button 
turns the monitor on and off (points to button).  Let’s turn it on now!” (pushes button) 
 
Monitor turns on, baby babbling quietly. 
 
E2: “Why don’t you turn it off and then on again!” 
 
E1 does so and says: Off! On! Wow! Now we can hear the baby!! Now you try!” 
 
Prompt child to turn off monitor. Once it is off, E1 says “Off!” and then prompts them to 
turn it back on.  Once it is on, she says “On!”. 
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E2: “Great! Now we can hear the baby again! This next button is the button you push to 
talk to the baby, that’s why there is a picture of a mouth beside it!  I’ll try it, and then you 
guys can give it a try!”  
 
IF THE CHILD WANTS TO TRY RIGHT AWAY: This is ok, let him / her. After, 
still make sure both E1 and E2 have modeled talking to the baby; then, have him / 
her try again.  
 
E2: (Presses button and says) “Hi baby, it’s sleepy time, shhhhhh shhhhh goodnight 
baby!” (to E1) “Now you try!”  
 
E1: Ok! (Presses button) “Hi baby, sleepy time!” “Hey, that was easy! Now you try!” 
 
Prompt child to try speaking to the baby.   
 
If s/he doesn’t want to, that’s alright, E1 just asks, “Ok, which button would you push if 
you wanted to talk to the baby? That’s right, the one with a mouth beside it.” 
 
E2: Hearing a voice really helps the baby fall asleep. Alright great, so remember: If the 
baby cries, you have a choice. If you want to help the baby fall back asleep, you can push 
this button and talk. If you don’t want to hear the crying, you can push this button to turn 




E1 Looks to monitor: “Hey, I don’t hear anything, I guess the baby is asleep.  Can you 
remind me how to use this monitor just in case the baby wakes up?”  E1 prompts child to 
go through each button and say what it does, while demonstrating.  If child does not show 
understanding, go over the instructions exactly as before.  “Thank you, now I 
understand.” 
 
E1 and child play until they hear a soft beep. 
 




E1 brings child to computer and has them sit facing the screen. 
 
E1: “In this game, our new question is “Does it walk on four legs?” When the game 
starts, you’ll see a picture of shapes or people. You don’t have to do anything then; that’s 
just the computer figuring out which animal to show next. Then you’ll see a picture of an 
animal. When you see the animal, as fast as you can, you’ll answer the question “Does it 
walk on four legs?” You’ll answer by pressing one of these buttons. The green button 
means YES! If you push the green button, that means YES this animal walks on four 
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legs! The red button means NO! If you push the red button, that means NO this animal 
does not walk on four legs. 
 
Now let me make sure you understand. When you see an animal, what question will you 
ask about it? 
 
If correct: That’s right, you’ll ask: Does it walk on four legs? 
 
If incorrect: No, remember, in this game, we ask “Does it walk on four legs?” Let me ask 
you again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times]. 
 
Ok, and if the answer to “Does it walk on four legs?” is YES, which button should you 
push? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the green button if the answer is YES it walks on 
four legs. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the green button if the answer is YES it walks on four legs.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the green button]. 
 
E1: And which button should you push if the answer to “Does is walk on four legs?” is 
NO? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t walk on 
four legs. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t walk on four legs.  
I’ll ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the 
third time, physically guide the child to point to the red button]. 
 
E1: Ok! We’re ready to play! Let’s do a practice round together and then you can do it all 
by yourself.  Remember, first there will be a picture of either shapes or people. That 
means the computer is thinking about which animal to show you, so get ready! Then you 
will see the animal picture and as fast as you can, push this button if the animal walks on 
four legs, and this button if the animal doesn’t walk on four legs. 
 
E pushes ~ and the first sequence of pictures comes up. 
 
E talks along with the pictures: 
 
E: Oh the computer’s thinking… and there is the animal! Which button should you push? 
 
If child does it correctly: “Great! The answer to the question “Does it walk on four legs?” 
was YES, so you pushed the green button!  Now you’re ready to play all by yourself! I’ll 
be right here if you need anything.  I’ll push the button to start the game!” 
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If the child does not do it correctly: “Hmmm. I see you pushed the red button. That 
means NO this animal does not walk on four legs. But does this animal walk on four 
legs? Yes, that means you push the other button. The green button means YES this 
animal walks on four legs. 
 
Once the game is finished: 
 
Baby Cry Task 
 
E1: Ok great, you’re all done, so come on back over! You know, I just realized 
something. One of my favorite toys is missing, so I’m going to go see if I can find it 
down the hall. I’ll be right back. You need to stay in this room until I get back.  Let’s 
leave the baby monitor on so you can hear.  Remember, if the baby cries, you have a 
choice. You can push and hold this button to turn the monitor off if you don’t want to 
hear the crying, but you can push this button to talk to the baby to help the baby fall 
asleep. Ok, I’ll be right back. 
 
If child seems reticent to be left alone, E can assure child she will be back quickly. 
 
E1 leaves.   
 
This is E2’s signal to exit the video recording room. E1 will be holding the door 
shut. E2 quickly turns on the baby cries and takes E1’s place holding the door shut.  
 
Baby cry comes over the monitor and lasts for 1 minute. 
 




E2 knocks and then comes in and looks around.  
 
E2: <<somewhat frantic>> My baby is crying and I can’t find the pacifier! <<pause>> I 
think I dropped it in here! 
 
She looks for the pacifier for 60 seconds according to a script of ever increasing cues: 
 
0 -20 seconds – just looks while moving around the room, occasionally saying 
“hmmmm” 
 
20 – 40 seconds – continues to look, stating the problem three times (e.g., “I can’t find 
it”) without looking at the child 
 
40 – 60 seconds – continues to look, stating the problem three times (e.g., “Where could 
it be?”) while looking at the child 
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After 1 minute, if the child has not helped, E2 will ask “Do you think you could please 
help me look for it?” and will continue searching for 30 seconds. If the child is already 
looking she will omit this prompt but still continue to look for 30 seconds.   
 
After 1 min, 30 seconds, E2 brushes her hand over her pocket, pulls out the pacifier, and 
says: 
 
“Silly me! It was in my pocket the whole time!”  If the child has helped, she thanks him. 
 
E2 leaves as E1 is coming back in.  
 
Baby Debrief / Dictator Game setup 
 
E1: What happened while I was gone?   
 
If the child says the baby cried but does not elaborate, E1 can prompt for more 
information (e.g., “what did you do?”).  If the child does not mention the baby, E can 
move on. 
 
Once this is complete, there is a quiet beep. 
 




E1 brings child to computer and has them sit facing the screen. 
 
E1: “Remember, every game you’ll play today is about different kinds of animals. But 
this time, the question is different! This time, the question is “Does it fly in the sky?” 
When the game starts, you’ll see a picture of shapes or people. Remember, you don’t 
have to do anything then; that’s just the computer figuring out which animal to show 
next. Then you’ll see a picture of an animal. When you see the animal, as fast as you can, 
you’ll answer the question “Does it fly in the sky?” You’ll answer by pressing one of 
these buttons. The green button means YES! If you push the green button, that means 
YES this animal flies in the sky! The red button means NO! If you push the red button, 
that means NO this animal does not fly in the sky. 
 
Now let me make sure you understand. When you see an animal, what question will you 
ask about it? 
 
If correct: That’s right, you’ll ask: Does it fly in the sky? 
 
If incorrect: No, remember, in this game, we ask “Does it fly in the sky?” Let me ask you 
again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times]. 
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Ok, and if the answer to “Does it fly in the sky?” is YES, which button should you push? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the green button if the answer is YES it flies in the 
sky. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the green button if the answer is YES it flies in the sky.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the green button]. 
 
E1: And which button should you push if the answer to “Does is fly in the sky?” is NO? 
 
If correct: Yes that’s right, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t fly in 
the sky. 
 
If incorrect: No, you push the red button if the answer is NO it doesn’t fly in the sky.  I’ll 
ask again. [ask again, following same prompts for responses; ask three times, on the third 
time, physically guide the child to point to the red button]. 
 
E1: Ok! We’re ready to play! Let’s do a practice round together and then you can do it all 
by yourself.  Remember, first there will be a picture of either shapes or people. That 
means the computer is thinking about which animal to show you, so get ready! Then you 
will see the animal picture and as fast as you can, push this button if the animal flies in 
the sky, and this button if the animal doesn’t fly in the sky. 
 
E pushes ~ and the first sequence of pictures comes up. 
 
E talks along with the pictures: 
 
E: Oh the computer’s thinking… and there is the animal! Which button should you push? 
 
If child does it correctly: “Great! The answer to the question “Does it fly in the sky?” was 
YES, so you pushed the green button!  Now you’re ready to play all by yourself! I’ll be 
right here if you need anything.  I’ll push the button to start the game!” 
 
If the child does not do it correctly: “Hmmm. I see you pushed the red button. That 
means NO this animal does not fly in the sky. But does this animal fly in the sky? Yes, 
that means you push the other button. The green button means YES this animal flies in 
the sky. 
 




E: Oh! You know what? If you poke around in the sand, there’s something special 
buried! Let’s look for it! Here, take this stick and poke at the sand like this [insert 
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chopstick several inches deep into sand]. You'll know you've found it when the stick hits 
something.  
 
Give chopstick to child and encourage them to poke around different places in the sand. 
When they find it, let child mostly uncover it, but then make sure you 're the one who 
removes it fully so you have possession of it.  
 
E: Wow! Look what you found! It's a treasure chest! Let’s sit over here so we can see 
what’s inside! 
 
E positions child on floor in front of sand tavle. 
 
E: OK here’s how it works. Sometimes there’s something in here, but sometimes there 
isn’t. If there's anything in here, it belongs to you.  Let's open it up and see what's inside! 
(open the treasure chest, and let child take the box out). Go ahead, take it out. Why don't 
you open it and dump out whatever is inside so we can see! Wow, they're nickels! That’s 
a lot of nickels! Those nickels are all for you and you get to take them home! 
 
(Take small box away from child and put it away/inside of pocket/out of the game).  
(Make sure the Nickels are spread out and don’t appear to already be in small groups.) 
 
E: But there’s something else I need to tell you. There’s another boy/girl coming later 
today and we don’t have anymore nickels.  So it’s up to you to decide if he gets any 
nickels. If you want to give him any nickels, you can put them in this box (place box near 
child).This is his / her box. If you want to keep any of these nickels to take home, you put 
them in this box (place box equidistant to child). This is YOUR box.  
 
So before you start, I want to make sure you understand. Right now, who do these belong 
to? (correct if necessary). If you want to give some to the other little boy, where would 
they go? (correct if necessary) And where will you put the ones you’re going to take 
home with you (correct if necessary)?  That's right! So now, I’m going to turn around and 
do some work. When you’re all finished, I want you to put the lids back on and I won’t 
peek inside. It’ll be a secret! Ok, let me know when you’re finished. 
 
***be sure to take the original box from the floor and put it on the shelf. 
 
While child is distributing coins, E keeps her back to the child, doesn’t look at child, and 
keeps busy. If child is not done after 2 minutes, ask if done. Once child is finished… 
 
E: Ok great!  Which one was for you? (correct if necessart) Ok let’s put that one over by 
the computer so you remember to take it home.  
 
Put other child’s box on shelf. 
 
Slip finished sign under door. 
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E1 plays with the child until the MomExp removes the sign from under the door. She 
then excuses herself and lets the mother know she can enter. 
 
[4 min reunion] 
 
-- Recording end -- 
 
After 4 minutes have passed, E re-enters room, gives child certificate, let’s child know 
that there are enough nickels for the other little boy/girl, and puts all 20 nickels in an 
envelope for child to take home. 
 
MomExp walks family out. 
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Appendix F: Demographics Form 
 Male  Female










This form asks you for information about you and your family. Please tell us:




Number of brothers and sisters
child has:
Brothers’ and sisters’ ages:




Your highest level of completed education:
Your occupation:
Total estimated yearly household income:
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Appendix G: Priming Game Stimuli 
The first picture in each set is the example picture. All others were randomly presented. 
Does it live in the water? 
 
Is it brown? 
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Is it bigger than me? 
 
Does it fly in the sky? 
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General Coding Notes 
 
This manual codes the variety of behaviors shown by preschool children in a series of 3 
tasks measuring children's comforting and/or negative behavior toward an adult 
experimenter's emotional distress (Phone, Clipboard, and Drawing). 
 
Before you begin coding, please understand that capturing children's nuanced behavior 
from videotape is difficult to do with a series of strict rules. We have developed these 
coding rules to help capture the "spirit" of the children's intentions and attitudes, but there 
will always be cases that aren't covered by the existing rules. Sometimes, we will need to 
make exceptions to the rules or create NEW rules that more accurately reflect reality. As 
a coder, part of your job is to recognize when the existing rules need to be changed 
or added to in order to better reflect reality. These rules are no substitute for human 
reason. Therefore, always keep in mind the spirit of WHAT exactly you are coding and 
the underlying reasons for WHY. Always be alert and ask yourself what you think is 
really happening in the task, and whether the codes you enter are accurate reflections of 
reality. In other words, take into consideration both the "spirit" and the "letter" of the law. 
 
Throughout this manual, we have included explanations for what the code is and why you 
are coding it, but if you ever feel like you don't fully understand the codes or their 
reasons, please ask a coding supervisor. It is important that you are fully informed about 
the construct you are coding. 
 
Sometimes, the manual will specify how many times to watch a task. If, however, you 
need to watch a task or a portion of a task more times to fully understand what is 
happening or to hear something more clearly, please watch it as MANY TIMES AS 
NEEDED. Never guess at what you see or hear. Take the time to replay the segment or 
task until you fully understand. It is better to be accurate than quick. 
It also may seem as though you are watching the task too many times, and it's becoming 
repetitive and boring, especially when it comes to coding the comforting tasks. However, 
the more you watch the task, the better you "get to know" the child and coding becomes 
easier. It is also very easy to miss some subtle behavior, especially if you don't watch it as 
many times as the manual specifies! 
 
If a child says part of a sentence and then stops, code whatever information you have 
from what was said. We cannot guess at what the child WOULD HAVE said, but we can 
go ahead and code what was said. In addition, we cannot give a child credit for something 
they say they WILL do (but never follow through with), or with what we are certain they 
WOULD HAVE done (but never actually did). 
 
Never code with another coder in the room. It is very important that your actions not 
influence any other coder. This includes you both coding silently but together. Only 
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during group meetings may you share any information about coding (other than asking 
for help with understanding a child's utterances). 
 
Basic Coding Rules for Comforting Tasks 
 
Instructions are the same for Phone, Clipboard, and Drawing tasks.   
Code all of one type of task first, then all of the second type, then all of the third type. Do 
not code all tasks for a single child in a row, because scores from one task should not 
unknowingly influence scores from another task. 
 
When coding, don't only pay attention to what is said, but also to actions. Nonverbal 
behavior and body language are also codeable responses. 
 
Watch the video as many times as needed to determine what was said/what is happening. 
If you can't understand the child, keep watching as many times as needed. Do not guess 
at what the child said! If you still cannot understand what is happening or what was said, 
then do the following (in this order): 
 
1) Check the transcript. 
 
2) Open the file in VLC media player and turn up the volume all the way. 
Wear headphones, as this may also make it louder and clearer-sounding. 
 
3) Ask other people in the lab to come in and listen. Ask other RAs and 
graduate students, whoever is around. 
 
4) If no one can understand, then put a large star at the top of the coding 
sheet, with a note about which interval you could not understand. Bring it to 
the next coding meeting and we will all listen. 
 
5) If no one can understand at the meeting, the starred interval will remain 
on the coding sheet. Code that interval as though the child said nothing at all 
- this means the child may get all 0's, or you may be able to code non-verbal 
behaviors, such as concerned attention  or proximity. 
 
Code each 10-second timeslice as a stand-alone segment. Meaning, for example, if a 
response begins in the first timeslice and continues into the second timeslice, both 
timeslices would receive a code of 1 for that type of response. Even if only 1 second of a 
response extends into a certain timeslice, that timeslice would get a code of 1 for that 
type of response. Anything less than 1 second does not count. If it's a full word, it counts, 
even if less than 1 second. 
 
• When coding timeslices, watch out for behavior and/or verbal statements that 
carry over into the next timeslice, or began in the previous timeslice. It's very easy 
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to miss the codeable response that only occurred for a second in a particular 
timeslice - this is especially true of behavior! 
 
• You may have to watch an timeslice before or after the one you are coding in 
order to determine whether something is part of a supportive/negative/personal 
distress response or not. Context is important. 
 
• When in doubt of the subjective meaning or intent behind a child's response, then 
go with the literal wording. We cannot guess at child's intent when it is unclear. 
 
• Each task is divided into 4 segments (if it did not end early). See the description 
of the tasks above for more details. While watching the task for the very first 
time, try to notice the 4 different segments. You will need to identify in which 
segment many responses occurred, so be familiar with what each segment looks 
like.  
 
• As a general rule, never have any blank spaces on your coding sheet. If a certain 
blank space on the coding sheet is not applicable, then mark it with an X or NA. 
 
• Intervals that are less than 8 seconds long are not included in your total response 
count. Instead, it will be included as part of the preceding interval. For example, if 
the last interval is 3 seconds long, it will be added to the previous 10-second 
interval, to create a 13-second final interval. Code both intervals separately, but 
then collapse the numbers across both intervals (i.e., if one or both intervals 
contain a certain behavior, then the 13-second combined interval will get a "1" for 
that behavior. Only if both do NOT contain the behavior will the 13-second 
interval get a "0" for that behavior). The only exception to this rule is if the child 
physically COMFORTS (not just touches) and E ends the task early, resulting in a 
single, short interval containing this important comforting action. We want 1 and 
only 1 interval to capture the physical comforting response, so keep the interval, 
even if it is less than 8 seconds long. Code other response types for what ever you 
can.   If the child physically TOUCHES (non-comforting) or if E didn't end the 
task early, then code the intervals using the regular rules (above). 
Description of Tasks 
 
Phone: In this comforting task the experimenter (E) drops her phone and says, "oh my 
phone! The screen broke...look, it's all cracked!" Then E acts very sad, moaning and 
sighing for duration of the task. The maximum duration of this task is 2 minutes (task 
ended if and when child physically soothed). In the first 30 seconds (approximately), E 
says nothing (SEGMENT 1). In the second 30 seconds, E states the problem three times 
(e.g., "I'm so sad my phone is broken", "my phone won't even turn on now") but does not 
look at the child (SEGMENT 2). In the third 30 seconds, E states the problem three times 
while looking at the child periodically (SEGMENT 3). In the final 30 seconds, E first 
asks the child, "Is there anything you can do to make me feel better?", states the problem 
once more, and then asks, "Can you think of anything else you can do?" (SEGMENT 4). 
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She then resolves the problem – “Oh, I just remembered, my cousin knows how to fix 
phones… it’ll be alright.”  
 
Clipboard: In this comforting task the experimenter (E) clips his finger with a clipboard 
and says, "oh, my finger!" Then E acts very hurt, moaning for duration of the task. The 
maximum duration of this task is 2 minutes (task ended if and when child physically 
soothed). In the first 30 seconds (approximately), E says nothing (SEGMENT 1). In the 
second 30 seconds, E states the problem three times (e.g., "my thumb hurts so much", "I 
clipped my finger really hard!") but does not look at the child (SEGMENT 2). In the third 
30 seconds, E states the problem three times while looking at the child (SEGMENT 3). In 
the final 30 seconds, E first asks the child, "Is there anything you can do to make me feel 
better?", states the problem once more, and then asks, "Can you think of anything else 
you can do?" (SEGMENT 4). She then resolves the problem – “Maybe if I stretch a 
little… oh that feels better.” 
 
Drawing: In this comforting task the experimenter (E) accidentally spills water on her 
own drawing and says, "oh my drawing!" Then E acts very sad, moaning and sighing for 
duration of the task. The maximum duration of this task is 2 minutes (task ended if and 
when child physically soothed). In the first 30 seconds (approximately), E says nothing 
(SEGMENT 1). In the second 30 seconds, E states the problem three times (e.g., "I'm so 
sad my drawing is ruined", "I worked so hard on this and now it's ruined") but does not 
look at the child (SEGMENT 2). In the third 30 seconds, E states the problem three times 
while looking at the child (SEGMENT 3). In the final 30 seconds, E first asks the child, 
"Is there anything you can do to make me feel better?", states the problem once more, and 
then asks, "Can you think of anything else you can do?" (SEGMENT 4). She then 
resolves the problem – “You know, I can just make another one tomorrow. Yea I’ll do 
that!” 
 
Recognizing "segments" within each 2-minute task 
 
It is important before you begin coding that you understand how and why each task is 
divided into segments. We are interested in the difference between SPONTANEOUS 
prosocial behavior and REQUESTED prosocial behavior. Some kids will be prosocial, 
but only after someone asks them to be. Other kids will automatically and spontaneously 
help a person without any requests or cues. Therefore, we divided every task up into 
segments, in which the requests for help become more and more obvious. Prosocial 
behavior exhibited during the first segment will be considered "more spontaneous" than 
the same behaviors exhibited during later segments. Each segment is ABOUT 30 seconds 
long.  
 
The first segment is the most subtle, and therefore, any prosocial behavior occurring here 
will be the most spontaneous on the part of the child. It involves E simply drawing the 
child's attention to the situation (with a verbal statement), and then not saying anything 
more about the problem, and not even LOOKING at the child, since looking at someone 
while in need may be perceived as an implicit request for help. 
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The second segment is a bit more obvious. It involves E putting the problem into words 3 
different ways. In case the child didn't understand the nature of the problem based on 
non-verbal cues, he/she will understand it now during this segment. That makes acting 
prosocially a little less spontaneous. However, E still does not look at the child, so as not 
to imply she is "requesting" help implicitly. 
 
In the third segment, E again states the problem in 3 different ways AND periodically 
glances at the child. This segment makes prosocial behavior more likely. 
In the final segment, E directly asks the child, "Is there anything you can do to make me 
feel better?" She then states the problem once more. She then asks the question again. 
Throughout this segment, E is periodically looking at the child.  
 
Use the information below as a guide while coding: 
 
Segment 1 = E doesn't say any sentences (only things like, "oh no") and doesn't 
look at the child at all. The only exception is that E will say something when the 
event first happens (e.g., “oh no, my phone broke! The screen is cracked!”). But 
after this initial comment, E will not say anything else about the nature of the 
problem or look at the child. E may answer the child's direct questions (because 
not doing so would be awkward). BEGINS: At the beginning of the initial 
comment about what happened. ENDS: When E first begins to say something 
(unless it was a response to the child's direct question, and occurred sooner than 
30 seconds). 
 
Segment 2=E states the problem (e.g., "I hurt my finger!", "I'm very sad about my 
drawing"), but still does not look at the child at all. You’ll know this segment has 
begun when E first states the problem (and it’s been about 30 seconds). BEGINS: 
When child first begins to say something for the first time (after about 30 seconds 
have passed). ENDS: When E first looks at child. 
 
Segment 3=E states the problem AND looks periodically at the child. You’ll 
know this segment has begun when E looks directly at the child and states the 
problem again (and it’s been about 30 seconds from the start of the previous 
segment). Out of these two facotrs, the most important one is E looking at the 
child. BEGINS: When E first looks at child. ENDS: When E first begins to ask, 
"is there anything..."? 
  
Segment 4=Begins as soon as E asks, "Is there anything you can do to help me 
feel better?" This  will be the final 30 seconds or so of the task. BEGINS: 
When E first begins to ask, "is there  anything..."? ENDS: When E first begins to 
say something that will resolve the situation. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT SEGMENTS: Sometimes, E made an error while moving 
through these segments. For example, E accidentally looks at the child at the transition 
into segment 2, thinking it was segment 3, or if a segment is > 45 seconds. If this 
happens, code behaviors as if E did not make a mistake, and simply mark on the 
coding sheet that there was an error, and what the error was. If, however, the error 
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was extreme, or makes it difficult to know how to code certain things, (such as E 
completely skips a segment or makes eye contact multiple times during segment 2), then 
flag it, do not code, let a coding supervisor know ASAP, and bring it to the meeting.  
 
 It is an error if a segment is more than 45 seconds long, or less than 20 seconds long. 
Types of Responses 
 
There are a variety of ways that someone can respond when another person is in need of 
comfort. The goal of coding these tasks is to capture the diversity of responses that a 
child can display, as well as to capture the frequency and duration of responses. To do 
this, we have divided all possible responses into 6 categories: (1) supportive responses 
(with two subtypes: emotion-focused and problem-focused), (2) negative responses, (3) 
personal distress, (4) concerned attention, (5) proximity increasing/maintaining, and (6) 
ignoring E's distress.  
 
EVERY MOMENT of a comforting task can be classified into ONE AND ONLY ONE 
of these categories. The only exception is that proximity increasing/maintaining can 
co-occur with supportive responses or concerned attention. Some responses may 
seem to fit into more than one category or none of them at all. To determine which 
category a response is, you will use a decision hierarchy.  
 
• First, consider whether the response is supportive OR negative OR 
personal distress. It can only be one of these. (If it is supportive then it 
may also be proximity increasing/maintaining). 
 
• If it is none of these 3, then consider whether the response is concerned 
attention. (It may also be proximity increasing/maintaining). 
 
• If it not concerned attention either, and it is also not proximity 
increasing/maintaining, then it will be coded as ignoring E's distress (by 
default).  
 
• Also, any activity that is being done before the tasks begins is not coded as 
anything. If the C has their fingers in their mouth before Segment 1, then 
this would be considered as nothing. Verses if this happens after segment 
1, which would be distress.  
  
Use the following guidelines to decide which category a response fits into: 
 
1. Supportive responses: In general, these responses are intended to make the other 
person feel better. There are two types of supportive responses: emotion-focused (i.e., 
any response oriented towards feelings/emotions/mood and with the goal of improving 
these things) and problem-focused (i.e., any response oriented towards solving or taking 
action to fix the underlying problem.) Use the following examples as a guide to classify 
the response in question: 
Emotion-focused responses 
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Physical Soothing (e.g., hugging, patting, rubbing, leaning against E, 
handshaking).  Note: If the physical comforting happens during the Clipboard task, it 
may be coded as PF, not EF, because touching E would be in the service of fixing the 
"problem", while touching in every other task would typically only be to make E feel 
better. 
 
Verbal Soothing  (e.g., "it's ok", "it happens sometimes", “It’s not your fault”) 
• If child says, "I/it/she/he/they will make you feel better," this is EF 
because the focus is on E and/or E's feelings. If child says, "I/it/etc will 
make IT feel better," this is probably PF because the focus is on the 
Phone/Clipboard/Drawing (and thus on the problem). 
  
 Reframing the situation as though it's not so bad, in order to make E feel better 
(e.g., "don't be sad - it's not so bad", "it's not even that wet"). The child’s suggestions can 
also be oriented towards the future (e.g. “It will get better”), this does not fix or address 
the problem in an active manner (PF if this is the case), but it reframes the situation to 
make it seem better because it won’t be so bad in the future.  Don't mistake this for 
negatively rejecting E's distress (e.g., "you shouldn't cry like a baby") 
• Also anything that is considered to be passive solutions are considered to 
be reframing the situation as well. The way to identify these comments is 
to see if the child is suggesting that they or the experimenter should do 
anything to address the problem (which would be PF). “the world will heal 
you” is considered EF because the child is not suggesting to put any effort 
into fixing the problem. Instead, the problem will resolve itself in the 
future and therefore is reframing the situation to make it seem better 
because it will solve itself.  
  
 Mirroring E's sadness, in a way that is not personal distress ("awwwwww", "I feel 
bad", "I'm sad too"). Usually these statements have a similar emotional tone to E's 
distress, or sound sympathetic. They don't have to be exaggerated emotional expressions, 
however. A quiet child may look concerned and say, "oh no." The child clearly has to 
relate their pain to E’s current situation.  
  
 Reflection of personal experience with this same problem in which the personal 
experience ended positively (e.g., "my daddy dropped his phone, and it was ok"). If the 
reflection of personal experience ended neutrally, negatively, or did not end, then see the 
concerned attention section (concerned attention requirements would still apply). 
However, if the reflection is directly related to the experimenter at any point (e.g. “that is 
like what happened to you”) would be considered EF, no matter how the story ended.   
  
 Compensation (i.e., physically giving OR offering to give/share an object to E in 
order to help E feel better). Examples of compensation include: getting a book off the 
shelf and bringing it over to E, sharing the child's own nickels with E, saying, "I could 
buy you a racecar", saying, "do you want a cookie?".  
• NOTE: It's only considered compensation if the material object offered 
isn't a "problem-fixer" but rather is an "emotion-helper". That is, consider 
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whether the object offered is instrumental in "fixing" the problem at hand 
(e.g., like giving a bandaid when E hurts her Finger, giving own drawing 
when E ruins hers) or, instead, is something irrelevant to the problem 
whose only purpose is to improve E's mood (e.g., like giving a teddy bear 
or an ice cream cone when E hurts her Finger). If the object offered is an 
"emotion-helper", it is compensation, because it targets the EMOTION of 
E, helping her to feel better. If the object offered is a "problem-fixer", it is 
NOT compensation, and instead is a problem-focused solution, because it 
targets the PROBLEM of E, helping her to solve it. 
  
 Attempts to distract E from her distress by introducing a new toy or activity to E 
with the intention of cheering her up. This is different from compensation because the 
child doesn't actually give or offer to give it to E, but just mentions it or holds it up to 
show E. This could include attempts to bring E back to play.  
• Don't confuse attempts to distract with ignoring E's distress. Attempts to 
distract must include overt efforts to include E in the play, such as 
showing her a book or handing her a toy, and cannot be simply comments 
that the child is directing toward E (e.g., "look at this castle I made!"). 
Attempts to distract are always Experimenter-focused, and not child-
focused. A way to tell if it is Experimenter focused is if the child tries to 
get the E’s attention. 
  
 Friendly invitations to play (e.g., looking at E, smiling, switching to a new toy, 
phrasing the invitation as a suggestion for what E could do like “you can still…”). The 
key component here is that the child is trying to be nice to E while suggesting new play 
activities. If the child stops showing same friendliness or keeps suggestions the same 
thing over and over after E clearly says she doesn’t want to, then it is no longer a friendly 
invitation to play.  
• A good way to tell if this happened or not is to see if the child waited for E 
to response to their suggestions.  
 
Problem-focused responses 
Verbal instrumental helping. This category includes all suggestions for fixing the 
problem (e.g., "I'll buy you another one", "I'll get my mommy to help you", "when I get 
hurt, I do xx", "you could try to clean it up", "you can go to the doctor or get some 
medicine "). It also includes suggestions meant to be helpful, or advice (e.g., "you should 
watch out next time", "be more careful"). It does not include statements about how the 
child did it correctly (e.g., "I pushed my chair back", "I didn't spill my water", "my phone 
is still ok").  
• Anything intended to be helpful toward making the problem or broken item itself 
better/go away, even if it's not reasonable or logical for the situation. For 
example, saying, “we can put some sand on it." While this might seem like 
nonsense because sand cannot help a phone or hurt finger, if the child is oriented 
to the situation and trying to help,  then it would be counted as PF. We are not 
coding how much sense a child makes but whether they are trying to solve the 
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problem or not. E.g., a child offers to fix the phone in order to help the finger. 
This is PF. 
 
Physical instrumental helping. These are physical ACTIONS the child takes to 
remedy the problem, and may or may not be accompanied by verbal instrumental helping 
(e.g., trying to clean up mess or fix the phone, wiping the drawing with hand, shaking the 
phone). 
• The child must be doing something ACTIVE to the object to be 
considered PF and not simply curiosity or CA.  
• e.g., MUST BE OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO CLEAN/REPAIR/MEND. 
USE THE WORDS OF THE CHILD BEFORE AND DURING AND 
AFTER THE ACTION TO HELP DECIDE THE PURPOSE OF THESE 
ACTIONS (e.g., "let me get this for you" is a clue that the action that 
follows is PF). 
• Active things include: shaking the phone (rather than just picking it up and 
looking at it), holding up the drawing and shaking it (rather than just 
holding it up to look at it), balling up the drawing in order to throw it away 
or use it to clean off the table, or folding it deliberately to tidy it up (rather 
than just folding it over to look at the back of it). Moving a single finger 
across the drawing does not count as PF, as this is just playing with it (not 
CA, Neg, or PF). But wiping the water off with a hand is PF.  
• But above all, use child's words to help decide if the action is meant to 
be helpful or is FOR the experimenter's benefit. That may clarify some 
of these ambiguous actions. 
  
 If the child says something about how his/her mom, other family member or they 
could help, or ANY OTHER person could help, including the child him or herself, 
without specifying what the "help" would be, we will code these as problem-focused. If 
the child is more specific about what the help would entail, code it accordingly (e.g., "my 
mom could give you a teddy bear" is emotion-focused).   
  
 Asking where another person is, without giving more info, is too vague to be 
considered PF (e.g., "where the other lady at?", "where's my mom?"). This would be 
considered CA. 
  
 If the child asks a question (e.g. “why don’t you get a band aid” or “You have 
band aids at home”). Even though this is a question, the child has a solution in mind and 
directly relates it to the experimenter (uses a you). If there is a you in a question and a 
solution as well, then it is PF.  
  
 Future and Present suggestions (e.g., “You should be more careful”) are also 
considered PF. This is because they are trying to fix the problem in the future. Using 
what happened as an example to change the behavior in the future.  
Note: Consider the child's tone of voice, facial expression, and context when 
deciding if a suggestion or statement is actually supportive, or if it was meant to 
be callous, demanding, or controlling. For example, the phrase "you should be 
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more careful" could be considered a negative response if it's taunting, callous, or 
if the child is ordering E. It could also be considered supportive if delivered in the 
right way. A statement like "you hit your finger" could be taunting and 
judgmental, or it could be sympathetic.  
 
***If you see a response that you think is supportive and is not included on this list, 
please tell a coding supervisor and it may be added to the manual.*** 
 
What to do when a response could be classified as both emotion- AND problem-focused: 
 
By their nature, problem-focused responses are often intended to both fix the problem at 
hand AND to improve the emotions of E. However, we cannot guess at the intentions of 
the child and can only use what we see and hear from the child. Therefore, responses 
intended to fix the problem will only be coded as problem-focused. If, on the other hand, 
the child explicitly mentions feelings/emotions or says something that shows he/she is 
thinking about the internal state of E (e.g., "I'm sorry", "it'll be ok", "don't worry", "don't 
be sad", "are you alright?", “Make you feel better”), then we can code for the presence of 
an emotion-focused response as well. Therefore, some statements can be double-coded as 
both problem- and emotion- focused WITHIN THE SAME SENTENCE, as long as both 
elements are present. For example, if a child says, "it's ok, I can buy you another one", 
then "it's ok" will be coded as emotion-focused, and "I can buy you another one" will be 
coded as problem-focused. Another example of both in one sentence is “You can go to 
the doctor and you will feel better!”.  The part about going to the doctor is PF, but the 
"feeling better" part is EF because the child is addressing E’s distress and/or feelings. 
**** If the action is definitely meant to comfort E but there is no way to know if the 
action was EF or PF, always default to PF. 
 
2. Negative responses: In general, these responses would typically make the 
Experimenter feel worse about her situation. Examples include: 
• Laughing at E. (If you're not sure whether it's a laugh or not, then code it as 
though it were not) 
• Teasing/taunting/mocking (e.g., while smiling, "you hurt yourself again!"). This is 
not to be confused for sympathetically restating the problem. 
• Callous statements (e.g., "that's what you get", "you suck") 
• Statements or "suggestions" that seem controlling or demanding (e.g., "don't spill 
it anymore!!!") This is not to be confused with helpfully giving advice. 
• Scolding (e.g., "Why did you do that, you shouldn't do that"). 
• Any ambiguous sentence (could be interpreted as nice or mean, such as "you 
should be more careful") that is said in a negative way, such as yelled or 
screamed. 
• Any sentence that brings all the focus away from E and onto the child, especially 
if said in a negative tone of voice. 
• Intentionally making the situation worse (e.g. ripping or ruining E’s paper, 
dropping the phone). Note: this does not include accidentally ripping the drawing 
while taking off the stickers on E’s paper. 
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• Also includes intentionally holding back a way to help because of E’s emotional 
state 
• Any past tense suggestion (e.g. “You should have been more careful”) with 
another negative response listed above (laughing, mocking, etc.)  
• Smiling can also be considered negative if it is followed by or just after yelling, 
scolding, teasing, etc. Smiling is considered negative if it occurs in the interval 
before or after the negative event.  
 
Consider the child's tone of voice, facial expression, and context when deciding if 
a suggestion is helpful, or if it was meant to be callous, demanding, or negative. 
There should be no doubt when coding negativity. The phrase "you should be 
more careful" could be considered a negative response if it's taunting, callous, or 
if the child is ordering E. It could also be considered supportive if delivered in the 
right way. CONTEXT IS KEY. 
 
***If you see a response that you think is negative and is not included on this list, please 
tell a coding supervisor and it may be added to the manual.*** 
 
3. Distress / arousal: Sometimes, a child becomes upset when another person is upset. 
This is always self-focused.  Examples of personal distress include: 
• Crying, whining, or whimpering because child is distressed. If there are other cues 
that point to a different motivation (e.g. child can’t reach across the table, child is 
being impatient), these would not be coded as personal distress 
• Very obvious facial distress (e.g., face falls and looks like about to cry). This does 
not include anything that could be confused with concerned attention; it must be 
clearly distress. This expression can also be instantaneous as well.  
• Physical self-soothing (e.g., thumb-sucking, hand wringing, touching eyes/face) 
for at least three second 
• Verbal statements of personal distress (e.g., "I wanna go home", "I don't like 
this").  
• Speaking in a strained, upset-sounding way. 
• Upset about own thing they messed up 
• Defensiveness (e.g. “It’s not MY fault”).  
• Active disengagement is distress. The child does everything in their power to not 
pay attention to E’s problem or pai 
***If you see a response that you think shows personal distress and is not included on 
this list, please tell a coding supervisor and it may be added to the manual.*** 
 
4. Concerned attention (CA): Only if a response cannot be classified as any of the three 
categories above, then it may be considered for concerned attention. Please understand 
what CA is before attempting to code it. This is because often, you will just have to use 
your best intuitive judgment in deciding whether the child is showing CA "in spirit". We 
think of CA as an outward sign that the child is concerned about E: the child's thoughts 
are tuned into E's distress and the child has entered E's mental world. The child is 
allowing him/herself to enter E's "zone of distress" by acknowledging the situation. The 
child could express this concern in two ways: overtly or through non-verbal means.  
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What is NOT considered CA? 
• NODDING HEAD OR SAYING YES IN RESPONSE TO E'S QUESTION IN 
SEGMENT. 
• If the child is in the midst of an EF or PF solution, child cannot also get credit for 
CA. Be sure to watch out for non-verbal EF or PF (e.g., child goes to cabinet to 
get a book for E, brings book back, and is holding it up for E to see, child is 
holding out her drawing for E to take), because that whole block of time cannot be 
considered CA. 
• If the sentence child says qualifies for overt CA (below) but is also part of the EF 
or PF solution, then it is not CA (because it's already considered part of the 
comforting solution). 
• ANY CARRYOVER 
 
Overt (verbal) CA: If a child says something that does not qualify as comforting, yet 
shows that he/she is acknowledging the situation or that something bad happened, then 
it's CA. This could include something showing that they are thinking about E's plight, but 
without explicitly offering a solution or comfort.  
 
It is overt (verbal) CA if: Child says or does any of the bullet points listed below (for 
any length of time, even a second or two), AND does one of the following: 
 - shows reduced/minimal play for at least 3 seconds during or very near to the 
time the statement was made 
 - or shows very obvious facial concern for any length of time (i.e., is not simply 
acknowledging the situation, but is CONCERNED about the situation) 
 
• "I can't help you," if said in a tone that suggests the child is sympathetic. 
• "I have bandaids at home." Again, consider tone of voice and facial expression. 
This is not problem focused because the child does not related the suggestion to 
the Experimenter.  
• Seeking more information about the situation (e.g., "what happened?", "are you 
hurt?", "does it hurt?") 
• Reflecting on a personal experience similar to E's problem, in which the ending 
was neutral, negative, or doesn't have an end (e.g., "I went to the phone store 
when I broke it, and it cost a lot of dollars"). Basically, this includes any ending 
that is not positive, because a positive ending implies that it will also turn out OK 
for E (in which case, this is EF comforting). 
• Sympathetic restatement of what happened (e.g., "you hurt your finger??", "your 
drawing!") Consider the child's tone of voice, facial expression, and other cues of 
sympathy to determine if the statement is truly concerned. We include these types 
of statements into CA because it is a way of connecting sympathetically with E's 
plight, entering her zone of distress, and acknowledging that something bad has 
happened to her, but it does not qualify as comforting. 
• But, getting more information about E’s emotional state is considered 
emotional focused response. And example of this would be “are you sad 
right now?” or “you okay?” 
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 “Let me see…” (or showing other obvious signs of "thinking" about what to do 
for at least 3 sec, such as looking up and tapping chin or saying, "hmmmmmm", or 
looking around the room for something).  
  
 If you’re not sure what child says, but child is clearly oriented to the situation 
(and you can't give them credit for any other code), then code as CA (see nonverbal CA 
section below).  
  
 Anything that is a past tense suggestion (e.g. “You should have been more 
careful”). Unless paired with any negativity (e.g. smiling, laughing or a scolding tone). 
  
 Any miscellaneous stories or thoughts THAT RELATE even in the slightest TO 
THE CURRENT PROBLEM but do not end well are also considered Overt Ca.  
 Child is thinking about the problem.  
 
Non-verbal CA: Even though the child is not saying or doing anything, we can tell that 
he/she is concerned about the situation or about E. We can tell because the child becomes 
focused on the scene, often stops playing and talking, and stares at E with a concerned 
expression.  Sometimes, the child shows momentary gaze aversions from E (1 second or 
less), because the situation is hard to look at, and so the child quickly glances away and 
looks back again.  
 
To be coded as concerned attention, the child must be doing the following things 
simultaneously for at least 3 continuous seconds: 
• MUST be oriented toward the scene, which includes looking at E or the object 
(i.e., turned toward her and paying attention to what is happening with her). If, 
during this time, the child momentarily looks away from E (i.e., 1 second or less) 
and then looks back again, that is ok. This is simply a gaze aversion, and can 
happen during CA. 
• MUST have a neutral/concerned face (i.e., not smiling or crying or very obviously 
distressed) 
• MUST be playing/doing an activity less than he/she was moments before the task 
began (e.g., reduced energy in play, stopped swinging legs or arms as much, 
stopped play altogether).  This is because reduced play indicates that the child is 
"tuned into" E's pain and is paying more attention to E's situation than to previous 
play. If the child wasn't playing at all before the scene began, then reduced play 
will simply be not playing at all. It is, however, possible for the child to be 
walking or moving closer to E while showing concerned attention. 
• Cannot overlap with words or actions that have already been classified as 
comforting, negative, or personal distress. 
• The child could be listening to something E is saying or listening to E respond to 
him/her as part of an ongoing conversation. If the child is having a conversation 
with E, they MAY get codes for CA only while listening to E, as long as they 






5. Proximity increasing/maintaining: This code is for any physical movement towards 
E. This only includes steps, so leaning forward does not count. The ONLY exceptions 
are: 
• Child is on a mission to reach another location in the room and just passes by E, 
and does not stop. If child stops for any reason, and looks at E or the situation (for 
at least 2 seconds), then it’s proximity. 
• Child must clear the table in order to get proximity for (drawing and phone task). 
They must go at least around the bend in order for the movement to be considered 
a new destination.  
• Once at their destination, if child turns around and looks at E/situation (for at least 
2 seconds), this is proximity (IF the destination is closer/as close to E than the 
child’s original position, such as by the box of sand toys). If the destination is 
farther than original position (such as the cabinet or the nickels by the door), 
turning around to look at E/situation is NOT proximity.  
• Once at the destination, any movement toward E is proximity and is subject to the 
same rules that applied to movement toward E from the original position (behind 
the sandtable).  
• What if the child moves to ANOTHER destination (i.e., has a goal/place in mind 
and doesn't stop): see the first bullet point. Once at this new destination, see the 
second bullet point. In this case, "original position" refers to child's FIRST 
position (when the task started; not the previous destination). 
• Side to side stepping does not count if the child stays behind the sand table. Child 
must come out around the table (if seated) to get proximity (or be on her way out 
from behind sand table plus on her way directly over to E).  
• If the only proximity in a given interval is carry-over from the previous interval, 
child must hold that position for at least one whole second to count as proximity 
in that interval. 
If the child is wandering around the room, pacing, or appears to have no particular 
destination or goal in mind, you cannot use the "destination" rule stated above. If this 
happens, the child is increasing/maintaining proximity whenever he/she is CLOSER to E 
than when child first started to wander. 
 
6. Ignoring E's Distress: This code will capture any response that cannot be coded into 
any of the above 5 categories. As a result, this code will not reflect the child ignoring E or 
the entire situation, but rather it should reflect the child ignoring SPECIFICALLY E's 
distress. Examples include: 
• Keeping attention focused on activity 
• Smiling at E (i.e., not concerned attention because not neutral/concerned) 
• Making irrelevant conversation (e.g., "my birthday is tomorrow") 
• Staring at the floor 
• Statements about the child's own property not being damaged (e.g., "MY phone 
isn't broken", "MY drawing isn't wet") 
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• Statements about the child's play or activity that he/she has been occupied with 
(e.g., "look, I finished the puzzle!")  
• Statements about a toy/activity that aren't meant to cheer E up (e.g., "I wanna 
keep playing dinosaurs with you.") 
• When E asks, "is there anything you can do to help me feel better?", if the child 
simply says, "yes" or nods head (or says "no" or shakes head), without actually 
saying or doing anything in addition to this, this will mostly likely be coded as 
Ignoring E's distress. That is because it is not supportive, negative, personal 
distress, or CA.  
• Any response that cannot be classified 
 
Coding setup 
1. Open the INTERACT program (you will need to close and reopen between every task). 
 
2. Select "Open existing data file" and select the template of the child/task you are 
coding. Each task has its own file, but you want to always code the tasks in the order 
they were presented to the child. Some children will start with Phone, and others will 
start with Drawing. Clipboard will always be last (unless there are unusual circumstances, 
such as child did not cooperate and a task had to be skipped, fire drill, etc).  Start with the 
task that happened first, then code the second task, then the last task. 
 
3. Double click "Set 1" on the lefthand side of the screen, and several green pencils 
should appear below it. These are the 10-second timeslices. 
 
4. Click on the small manila folder at the top left corner of the small Control Panel 
window. Select the correct video to open. The video should appear in a separate window. 
 
5. To jump straight to the task, double click on the white space to the left of the first 
green pencil. If you want to view the task from beginning to end without breaks, use the 
Control Panel (press the righthand green arrow to play it through). If you want to view 
the task with the 10-second breaks, use the green pencils (double click the white space 
next to the timeslice you want to view). 
 
6. Open the transcript (if available). It will be located on the U: drive. Use this to help 
you understand speech when you're not 100% certain of what the child is saying. Always 
have it open in the background. 
 
7. Get the correct post lab notes from the Wave 1 or Wave 2 outcome drawer (located in 
the very back of the cabinet). 
 
8. Get a blank paper coding sheet of the correct task, and fill in the basic information at 
the top. USE THE START AND STOP TIMES SPECIFIED IN INTERACT (the first 
and last times, located next to Set 1). 
 
9. Now that you have everything in front of you, BE VERY SURE YOU ARE CODING 
THE CORRECT CHILD. Play the video from the very beginning until the white board 
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reveals the subject (e.g., S1) and participant number (e.g., 4011). Verify that it matches 
the INTERACT template you have open, the video you opened, the transcript you have 
open, and the post lab notes in front of you.  
 
10. If they all match, then write the participant number at the top of EVERY PAGE OF 
your paper coding sheet. Now you are ready to follow the coding procedure below. 
 
11. You may also want to have a blank sheet of paper or Word document open to jot 
down any questions/comments for the group that arise during coding that you can bring 




1. Make general notes on your paper coding sheet. Before you begin, take out the post-
lab notes sheet for this participant and read the Prosocial Notes section for any relevant 
details about this task. First, write the physical description of the child, and verify that it 
matches the child in the video you have open. Then, write all relevant notes in the 
"Notes" section of your coding sheet. This could include notes specifically about this 
particular task (phone, Clipboard, or drawing) OR about comforting tasks in general OR 
about the entire lab visit (whatever is relevant to this task). If there is nothing, write 
"None". Keep these notes in mind while coding. 
 
2. Watch the entire 2 minute task all the way through. Again verify that you are 
coding the correct child by making sure the physical description matches what you 
see. While watching, get a feel for this child's behavior and become familiar with the 
task. Also take note of when you think the Experimenter moved from one segment 
to the next. Then code the following items:   
• If phone task: Did E say "the screen is broken! It's all cracked!", or something 
similar? If clipboard task: Did E say, "Oh my finger!", or something similar? If 
drawing task, did E say, "oh no, my drawing", or something similar?  (1=yes, 0=no). 
IF NO, WHAT DID E SAY? Write it verbatim. IF YES, MARK AN X.   
• Also, the prompt can happen anytime after the initial 15 seconds. If 15 
seconds have past since the start and there has not been a prompt, list 
what E said, and indicate there was a segment error. 
 Did E make any errors with regard to segments? This could include (but is not 
limited to): stating the problem or looking at the child during segment 1 (other than 
the initial prompt or in response to a direct question from child), looking at the child 
during segment 2, NOT looking at the child during segment 3, NOT stating the 
problem during segment 2, asking "is there anything you can do...?" during segment 
3, NOT asking 2 questions during segment 4, NOT looking at the child during 
segment 4. It can also happen if one segment is > 45 seconds or <20 seconds (if a 
segment is =45 or 20 seconds, then there is no error.)  (circle Y or N) 
 During which segment(s) did the errors occur? As an example, if E accidentally 
looked at the child at the very beginning of segment 2 (the transition INTO segment 
2), mark the error as occurring in segment 2. Circle all that apply (1, 2, 3, or 4). IF 
YES, DESCRIBE THE ERROR.  
 192 
 During which segment of the task did the child first physically comfort E? (1= 
before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated problem but has not yet 
looked at the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has not yet asked if there's 
anything he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's anything child can do 
to help, but task has not yet ended, 0=child did not physically comfort).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the first moment of physical 
contact was made to soothe E.  
Physical comforting includes: any touching that was made as the result of 
a PF or EF comforting strategy (e.g., hugging, placing a hand on E, 
putting a pretend bandaid on E's finger). It does not include touches 
that happened as the result of some other, non-comforting goal, or 
accidental touch, or cases in which E touched the child and not the 
other way around. 
• During which segment of the task did the child first physically TOUCH E in a NON-
comforting way? (1= before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated problem 
but has not yet looked at the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has not yet 
asked if there's anything he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's 
anything child can do to help, but task has not yet ended, 0=child did not physically 
touch in a non-comforting way).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the first moment of physical 
contact was made. Examples include: Incidental touch, like brushing 
against E's arm while doing something else, pulling E toward the door 
because child wants to play outside, bumping into E.  
Physical touch includes incidental or accidental touches or those in 
service of a non-comforting goal. It does not includes touches that the 
experimenter initiated. If there is any ambiguous situation where a 
touch might have happen, then look at the lab notes. If the 
experimenter mentioned a touch then there is a touch. If not, then 
always side with no physical touch.  
 
3. Now, you will break the task up into 10-second intervals ("timeslices") in order to 
see how frequently the child shows each of the five types of response (i.e., 
supportive, negative, personal distress, concerned attention, and proximity 
increasing/maintaining). Because all comforting tasks were approximately 2 minutes 
long, each task will have approximately 12 timeslices, but the number may vary as 
individual tasks may have lasted slightly longer or shorter than 2 minutes.  ADD 
THE TOTAL FREQUENCY OF EACH RESPONSE ON YOUR CODING SHEET, 
BUT DO NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL INTERVAL IF IT IS LESS THAN 8 
SECONDS LONG. You do not even need to code final intervals that are less than 8 
seconds. The only exception is when E stops the task due to physical comforting. In 
this case, we want 1 and only 1 interval to capture that comforting behavior. Do not 
throw it out, even if it's less than 8 seconds long. The entire interval will be coded 
and included in the totals for all codes in this case. If the child physically comforts 
and E does not stop the task, or if the child physically TOUCHES (i.e., would not get 
an EF score), then stick to the regular rules. 
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Step 1. COMFORTING: Watch each 10-second timeslice (one at a time) to code for the 
presence of an emotion-focused and/or problem-focused supportive response in that 
timeslice.  
• Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any portion of an emotion-
focused response that is at least 1-second long OR that contains at least 1 full 
word? (1=yes, 0=no) 
• Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any portion of a problem-focused 
response that is at least 1-second long OR that contains at least 1 full word? 
(1=yes, 0=no).  
 
Step 2. NEGATIVE RESPONSES: Watch each 10-second timeslice (one at a time) to 
code for the presence of a negative response OR personal distress in that timeslice.  
• Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any portion of a negative response 
that is at least 1-second long OR that contains at least 1 full word? (1=yes, 0=no).  
• Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any personal distress that is at 
least 1-second long OR that contains at least 1 full word? (1=yes, 0=no). 
 
Step 3. CONCERNED ATTENTION: Watch each 10-second timeslice (one at a time) to 
code for the presence of concerned attention in that timeslice. 
Does any portion of the given timeslice contain overt CA or AT LEAST 3 FULL 
SECONDS of non-verbal CA? (1=yes, 0=no). Please remember that concerned attention 
cannot occur AT THE SAME MOMENTS as any of the above 3 types of response. 
However, a given 10-second timeslice may contain codes for supportive response AND 
concerned attention (or negative and concerned attention, or personal distress and 
concerned attention), but these codes must have happened at different moments within 
that timeslice (e.g., supportive response ended within the first 3 seconds, and concerned 
attention began immediately after it). CA can’t carry over. 
NOTE TO CODERS: If it's non-verbal CA, a timeslice must contain within it a full 
continuous 3 seconds as a stand-alone interval to be coded as having concerned 
attention.  
  
Step 4. PROXIMITY: Watch each 10-second timeslice one more time (one at a time) in 
order to code for the child increasing OR maintaining proximity to E.  
At any point during the given timeslice, did the child exhibit proximity 
increasing/maintaining for at least 2 seconds? (1=yes, 0=no). 
  
Step 5. IGNORING: After you have coded all 5 types of response in all 10-second 
timeslices, code for the lack of any response in each timeslice (i.e., ignoring E's distress). 
You don't need to watch the timeslices again to do this. 
For each timeslice: Were there NO types of response coded for in this timeslice? (1=yes, 
there were no coded responses, 0=no, there was at least one coded response). 
  
Step 6: Enter the number of intervals that were calculated in your total. This won't 
include rows with 999 (missing data), or intervals of less than 8 seconds long (unless 
child physically comforted and E ended the task early because of this - then you WILL 
include that interval in the total).  
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Note for if the pre-made template gives you the wrong number of segments and does not 
end at the correct time: Calculate the number of seconds in the "real" final interval to the 
best of your ability. If it's close to the cut-off point (7 or 8 seconds), then consider it being 
only 7 seconds. 
 
4. After coding the timeslices, answer the following questions on your coding sheet. 
Go back to view the video as many times as needed:   
• During which segment of the task did the child first begin an EMOTION-FOCUSED 
supportive response? (1= before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated 
problem but has not yet looked at the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has 
not yet asked if there's anything he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's 
anything child can do to help, but task has not yet ended, 0=child did not display an 
emotion-focused supportive response).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the child first begins to say or do the 
emotion-focused supportive response.  
• During which segment of the task did the child first begin a PROBLEM-FOCUSED 
supportive response? (1= before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated 
problem but has not yet looked at the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has 
not yet asked if there's anything he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's 
anything child can do to help, but task has not yet ended, 0=child did not display a 
problem-focused supportive response).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the child first begins to say or do the 
problem-focused supportive response.  
• During which segment of the task did the child first begin a negative response? (1= 
before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated problem but has not yet looked at 
the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has not yet asked if there's anything 
he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's anything child can do to help, but 
task has not yet ended, 0=child did not display a negative response).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the child first begins to say or do the 
negative response. 
• During which segment of the task did the child first begin to show personal distress? (1= 
before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated problem but has not yet looked at 
the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has not yet asked if there's anything 
he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's anything child can do to help, but 
task has not yet ended, 0=child did not display a negative response).  
Note: Code this as the segment within which the child first begins to show the 
personal distress. 
• During which segment of the task did the child first begin to increase proximity to E? 
 (1= before E has stated the problem, 2=E has already stated problem but has not yet 
looked at the child, 3=E has already looked at the child but has not yet asked if there's 
anything he/she can do to help, 4=E has already asked if there's anything child can do to 
help, but task has not yet ended, 0=child did not increase proximity).  
• Did the child mention his/her/anyone's mom/dad/grandparent for any reason? 
Also mark on the coding sheet the timestamp for when the mention BEGAN, as well as 
copy verbatim what the child said. 
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5. Global Score - Watch the task 1 more time from beginning to end. Mark quick bullet 
point notes about the types of things the child said or did during the task. Rate each bullet 
point in terms of its quality of comforting. Count the total number of unique strategies.  
 
Use these bullet points to help you code the global score. 
 
What is your overall impression of how comforting this child was toward E? Note: 
this code should be done immediately after the other codes were entered, so the child is 
fresh in the coder's mind. 
 
All previous scores have only considered frequency and latency of the response, leaving 
us unable to differentiate between a child who gives away their own possessions from a 
child who simply gives advice. This global score will capture the diversity, quality, and 
activity of child's attempts to comfort. Consider the number of DISTINCT attempts, 
including the creativity seen in the diversity. A child who suggests the same thing over 
and over will not be treated the same as a child who suggests the same number of things 
but which are all distinct and creative.  Also consider the quality of attempts, especially 
sweet statements or offers, big gestures, and offers to give E the child's OWN possessions 
(e.g., nickels, balloon, drawing). Also, the quality of a persistent attempt will be higher 
than that of an attempt made just once. Also consider the activity of the child's attempts 
(e.g., a child who goes to the shelf to get something, or to the door to look for help, is not 
the same as a child who sits in her chair and continues playing while simply saying 
suggestions). You will also inevitably consider the frequency of comforting, amount of 
concerned attention, proximity, ignoring, attitude, general demeanor, negativity, etc. The 
amount of proximity is also the deciding factor if wavering between two scores.  
 
1 - Not at all comforting. To get this score, a child may: 
• Show no sign of being concerned about the experimenter's distress and make no 
effort to comfort her 
• Show concerned attention within the first 15 seconds of the task, but subsequently 
shows no concerned attention and no comforting behaviors 
• Make one or two brief and minimal efforts to comfort, with very little to no 
concerned attention 
• Make a few half-hearted attempts to comfort, but largely ignores or acts 
negatively toward E 
• Child is personally distressed for much of the time and unable to focus on E's 
needs 
 
2 - In between a 1 and 3.  (for ex: at least 70% CA but no attempts to comfort, not 






3 - Somewhat/moderately comforting. To get this score, a child may: 
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• Attempt at least 3 or 4 distinct mid-quality ways to comfort, with concerned 
attention for ≥ 33% 
• Attempt at least 2 distinct and mid- to high-quality ways to comfort with 
concerned attention for ≥ 50% 
• Display concerned attention for more than 75% of the task, with one mid-high or 
high-quality attempt to comfort. 
 
4 - In between a 3 and a 5. 
 
5 - Very comforting. To get this score, a child may: 
• show ANY large display of physical comfort (e.g., a hug) at any point 
• physically comfort with a handshake, rub, or pat within the first 30 sec, or in 
addition to trying at least 3 other comforting strategies 
• attempt to comfort for more than 75%  of the duration of the task, MOSTLY mid- 
to high-quality comforting; when child wasn't comforting there was CA or 
Proximity. 
• Attempt at least 7 distinct mid-quality ways to comfort. 
 
NOTE: If any CLEARLY negative responses or some OBVIOUS OR PERSISTANT 
physical distress (e.g. almost crying)(distress in 3 or more time slices)  responses are 
present, knock the global score down one point   
 
6. Once you've finished filling out the paper coding sheets for ALL 3 TASKS, open your 
SPSS document located in your folder on the U:drive. Carefully transfer the codes into 
the SPSS document, verifying that you're on the right row, and are starting at the correct 
column. REMEMBER that when you add up the timeslice totals, DO NOT INCLUDE 
THE FINAL TIMESLICE IF IT'S LESS THAN 8 SECONDS. 
 
7. Save your SPSS document twice, so that you always have 2 copies. Save in between 
every child. 
• Sometimes, you are unable to code an event or an entire situation. If this is the 
case, then input the number “999” into the excel sheet. The best example is when 
an entire video of a situation, like Clipboard, is missing. Before marking "999", 
be sure to code whatever you can based on the post-lab notes. 
 
8. After all 3 tasks have been coded and entered into SPSS, go back and double check 
that all codes were transferred correctly from paper to SPSS. 
 
9. Clip all 3 paper coding sheets together and file them in your folder. Store the folder on 
the wall behind the door and bring to every coding meeting. Put completed packets into 
your file folder in the cabinet. 
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Appendix L: Coding Sheets; Adult Tasks
 





1:ID  3 __ __ __      
 
Start time ________________     Stop Time___________________ 
 
3:CoderName___________________   4: Coder #: __________________  
 













B.  1st WATCH - ORIENTATION, CHECK FOR EXPERIMENTER ERRORS, TOUCHING 
                                                                    
Did the experimenter give the prompt at the beginning? 
28: Phone_Prompt   Yes=1        No=0  
 




Did the Experimenter make a segment error?     
29: Phone_SegError   Yes=1           No=0 
 
Circle all segments where error occurred    1        2        3        4        None 
 




During which segment did the child first provide physical comfort to E? (5=did not ever) 
 30: Phone_PhysComfort_seg     1     2     3     4 5                
 
During which segment did the child first touch E in a non-comforting way? (5=did not ever) 














ID  3 ___ ___ ___  
          
C. 2nd THROUGH 5th WATCHES - FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE TYPES 
 







Timeslice EF  PF Negativity Distress CAs Proximity Ignore 
 1        
 2        
 3        
 4        
 5        
 6        
 7        
 8        
 9        
 10        
 11        
 12        
 13        
 14        
 15        
 16        
 17        
TOTALS (not including 
timeslice of <8 seconds) 




34: Phone_EF    35: Phone_PF 36: Phone_Neg 37: Phone_Distress  38: Phone_CA   
  
 
         39: Phone_Proximity 
41: Number of timeslices included in totals count:____________     
         40: Phone_Ignore 
















ID  3 ___ ___ ___  
 
D. LATENCY OF RESPONSES (DERIVED FROM BOX C) - Watch segments again as needed 
 
 
During which segment did the child first show an emotion-focused response (circle 5 if never)? 
42: Phone_EF_Seg   1     2     3     4 5  
 
During which segment did the child first show a problem-focused response (circle 5 if never)? 
43: Phone_PF_Seg   1     2     3     4 5  
 
During which segment did the child first show a negative response (circle 5 if never)? 
44: Phone_Neg_Seg   1     2     3     4 5 
 
During which segment did the child first show a personal distress response (circle 5 if never)? 
45: Phone_Distress_Seg   1     2     3     4 5 
 
During which segment did the child first begin to increase proximity to E (circle 5 if never)? 





Was a "mom or mother", "dad or father", or grandparent mentioned?  
 
47: Phone_Caregiver   Yes=1  No=0   
 
Timestamp of start of phrase:________________   
 






E. FINAL WATCH - GLOBAL CODE 
 
What is your overall impression of how comforting this child was toward E? 
**Consider diversity, quality, and activity of child's attempts** 
 
48: Phone_Global  1 2 3 4 5 
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1:ID  3 __ __ __   
 
Start time ________________    Stop Time___________________ 
 
3:CoderName___________________   4: Coder #: ____________         5: DrawOrder:   1          2          
 













B.  1st WATCH - ORIENTATION, CHECK FOR EXPERIMENTER ERRORS, TOUCHING 
                                                                    
Did the experimenter give the prompt at the beginning? 
6: Draw_Prompt   Yes=1        No=0  
 




Did the Experimenter make a segment error?     
7: Draw_SegError   Yes=1           No=0 
 
Circle all segments where error occurred    1        2        3        4        None 
 





During which segment did the child first provide physical comfort to E? (5=did not ever) 
 8: Draw_PhysComfort_seg     1     2     3     4 5                
 
 
During which segment did the child first touch E in a non-comforting way? (5=did not ever) 












ID  3 ___ ___ ___  
          
C. 2nd THROUGH 5th WATCHES - FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE TYPES 
 







Timeslice EF  PF Negativity Distress CAs Proximity Ignore 
 1        
 2        
 3        
 4        
 5        
 6        
 7        
 8        
 9        
 10        
 11        
 12        
 13        
 14        
 15        
 16        
 17        
TOTALS (not including 
timeslice of <8 seconds) 




12: Draw_EF    13: Draw_PF 14: Draw_Neg 15: Draw_Distress  16: Draw_CA   
  
 
         17: Draw_Proximity 19: 
Number of timeslices included in totals count:____________     
         18: Draw_Ignore 
















ID  3 ___ ___ ___  
 
D. LATENCY OF RESPONSES (DERIVED FROM BOX C) - Watch segments again as needed 
 
 
During which segment did the child first show an emotion-focused response (circle 5 if never)? 
20: Draw_EF_Seg   1     2     3     4 5  
 
During which segment did the child first show a problem-focused response (circle 5 if never)? 
21: Draw_PF_Seg   1     2     3     4  5   
 
During which segment did the child first show a negative response (circle 5 if never)? 
22: Draw_Neg_Seg   1     2     3     4 5 
 
During which segment did the child first show a personal distress response (circle 5 if never)? 
23: Draw_Distress_Seg   1     2     3     4 5 
 
During which segment did the child first begin to increase proximity to E (circle 5 if never)? 





Was a "mom or mother", "dad or father", or grandparent mentioned?  
 
25: Draw_Caregiver   Yes=1  No=0   
 
Timestamp of start of phrase:________________   
 







E. FINAL WATCH - GLOBAL CODE 
 
What is your overall impression of how comforting this child was toward E? 
**Consider diversity, quality, and activity of child's attempts** 
 
26: Draw_Global  1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix M: Prosocial Comforting Coding Manual, Infant Cry Task 
 
 
Comforting Task Coding Manual – 





Developed by: Bonnie Brett, adapted from a manual developed in 
collaboration with Jackie Gross, Jonathan Beier, and Jude Cassidy 
The University of Maryland 
 






GENERAL CODING NOTES 
 
THIS MANUAL CODES THE VARIETY OF BEHAVIORS SHOWN BY PRESCHOOL 
CHILDREN IN RESPONSE TO A CRYING INFANT. 
 
BEFORE YOU BEGIN CODING, PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT CAPTURING CHILDREN'S 
NUANCED BEHAVIOR FROM VIDEOTAPE IS DIFFICULT TO DO WITH A SERIES OF 
STRICT RULES. WE HAVE DEVELOPED THESE CODING RULES TO HELP CAPTURE THE 
"SPIRIT" OF THE CHILDREN'S INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES, BUT THERE WILL 
ALWAYS BE CASES THAT AREN'T COVERED BY THE EXISTING RULES.  
 
SOMETIMES, WE WILL NEED TO MAKE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES OR CREATE NEW 
RULES THAT MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT REALITY. AS A CODER, PART OF YOUR 
JOB IS TO RECOGNIZE WHEN THE EXISTING RULES NEED TO BE CHANGED OR ADDED 
TO IN ORDER TO BETTER REFLECT REALITY. THESE RULES ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR 
HUMAN REASON. THEREFORE, ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THE SPIRIT OF WHAT 
EXACTLY YOU ARE CODING AND THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR WHY. ALWAYS BE 
ALERT AND ASK YOURSELF WHAT YOU THINK IS REALLY HAPPENING IN THE TASK, 
AND WHETHER THE CODES YOU ENTER ARE ACCURATE REFLECTIONS OF REALITY. 
IN OTHER WORDS, TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION BOTH THE "SPIRIT" AND THE 
"LETTER" OF THE LAW. 
 
THROUGHOUT THIS MANUAL, WE HAVE INCLUDED EXPLANATIONS FOR WHAT THE 
CODE IS AND WHY YOU ARE CODING IT, BUT IF YOU EVER FEEL LIKE YOU DON'T 
FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CODES OR THEIR REASONS, PLEASE ASK A CODING 
SUPERVISOR. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ARE FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE 
CONSTRUCT YOU ARE CODING. 
 
SOMETIMES, THE MANUAL WILL SPECIFY HOW MANY TIMES TO WATCH A TASK. IF, 
HOWEVER, YOU NEED TO WATCH A TASK OR A PORTION OF A TASK MORE TIMES TO 
FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING OR TO HEAR SOMETHING MORE CLEARLY, 
PLEASE WATCH IT AS MANY TIMES AS NEEDED. NEVER GUESS AT WHAT YOU 
SEE OR HEAR. TAKE THE TIME TO REPLAY THE SEGMENT OR TASK UNTIL YOU FULLY 
UNDERSTAND. IT IS BETTER TO BE ACCURATE THAN QUICK. 
 
IT ALSO MAY SEEM AS THOUGH YOU ARE WATCHING THE TASK TOO MANY TIMES, 
AND IT'S BECOMING REPETITIVE AND BORING, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT COMES TO 
CODING THE COMFORTING TASKS. HOWEVER, THE MORE YOU WATCH THE TASK, 
THE BETTER YOU "GET TO KNOW" THE CHILD AND CODING BECOMES EASIER. IT IS 
ALSO VERY EASY TO MISS SOME SUBTLE BEHAVIOR, ESPECIALLY IF YOU DON'T 
WATCH IT AS MANY TIMES AS THE MANUAL SPECIFIES! 
 
NEVER CODE WITH ANOTHER CODER IN THE ROOM. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT 
YOUR ACTIONS NOT INFLUENCE ANY OTHER CODER. THIS INCLUDES YOU BOTH 
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CODING SILENTLY BUT TOGETHER. ONLY DURING GROUP MEETINGS MAY YOU 
SHARE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT CODING (OTHER THAN ASKING FOR HELP WITH 
UNDERSTANDING A CHILD'S UTTERANCES). 
 
 
Basic Coding Rules for Comforting Tasks 
 
! Watch the video as many times as needed to determine what was what is happening. If 
you can't understand the child, keep watching as many times as needed. Do not guess at 
what the child said! If you still cannot understand what is happening or what was said, 
then do the following (in this order): 
 
1) Check the transcript. 
 
2) Open the file in VLC media player and turn up the volume all the way. Wear 
headphones, as this may also make it louder and clearer-sounding. 
 
3) Ask other people in the lab to come in and listen. Ask other RAs and graduate 
students, whoever is around. 
 
4) If no one can understand, then put a large star at the top of the coding sheet, with 
a note about which interval you could not understand. Bring it to the next coding 
meeting and we will all listen. 
 
5) If no one can understand at the meeting, the starred interval will remain on the 
coding sheet. Code that interval as though the child said nothing at all - this means 
the child may get all 0's, or you may be able to code non-verbal behaviors, such as 
concerned attention. 
 
6) THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS: If the child is CLEARLY being comforting 
– singing or speaking in a soothing, quiet, calm manner to the baby, we can assume 
this is a comforting response. 
 
! Code each 10-second timeslice as a stand-alone segment. Meaning, for example, if a 
response begins in the first timeslice and continues into the second timeslice, both 
timeslices would receive a code of 1 for that type of response. Even if only 1 second of a 
response extends into a certain timeslice, that timeslice would get a code of 1 for that 
type of response. Anything less than 1 second does not count. If it's a full word, it counts, 
even if less than 1 second. 
 
! When coding timeslices, watch out for behavior and/or verbal statements that carry over 
into the next timeslice, or began in the previous timeslice. It's very easy to miss the 
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codeable response that only occurred for a second in a particular timeslice - this is 
especially true of behavior! 
 
! You may have to watch an timeslice before or after the one you are coding in order to 
determine whether something is part of a supportive/negative/distress / arousal response 
or not. Context is important. 
 
! When in doubt of the subjective meaning or intent behind a child's response, then go with 
the literal wording. We cannot guess at child's intent when it is unclear. 
 
! As a general rule, never have any blank spaces on your coding sheet. If a certain blank 
space on the coding sheet is not applicable, then mark it with an X or NA. 
 
! Intervals that are less than 8 seconds long are not included in your total response count. 
Instead, it will be included as part of the preceding interval. For example, if the last 
interval is 3 seconds long, it will be added to the previous 10-second interval, to create a 
13-second final interval. Code both intervals separately, but then collapse the numbers 
across both intervals (i.e., if one or both intervals contain a certain behavior, then the 13-
second combined interval will get a "1" for that behavior.  
 
Description of Task 
 
In this task, children have been convinced that there is a baby in the lab and have been 
taught to use a baby monitor. They have been led to believe that we are “watching” the 
baby who is currently sleeping.  Soon after the training, the experimenter leaves the room 
to “retrieve a toy.”  
 
The task begins as soon as the infant cry comes over the monitor and lasts until an RA 
enters the room. In general, this will be about 1 minute long. 
During the one minute period in which the child is alone with the crying infant, we will 
record every interpretable behavior the child engages in in relation to the baby cry. 
Types of Responses 
 
There are a variety of ways that children can respond when someone (in this case, a baby) 
is in need of comfort. The goal of coding these tasks is to capture the diversity of 
responses that a child can display, as well as to capture the frequency and duration of 
responses. To do this, we have divided possible responses into 4 categories: (1) 
comforting responses, (2) negative responses, (3) distress or arousal, and (4) ignoring the 
cries. All other responses will be coded as “Other.” 
 
Every codeable moment of the baby cry task can be classified into ONE AND ONLY 
ONE of these categories. Some responses may seem to fit into more than one category or 
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none of them at all. To determine which category a response is, you will use a decision 
hierarchy.  
" First, consider whether the response is supportive OR negative OR distress / 
arousal. It can only be one of these.  
" Negativity trumps distress (i.e. a child is crying and screaming at the monitor – 
we would get a score of negativity for the screaming, even though he was 
simultaneously distressed and negative). Distress trumps comforting (i.e., a child 
is crying and tries to sing to the baby – he would get a score of distress, not 
comforting). 
" If it is not one of these, consider whether the child is ignoring the baby. If the 
monitor is off, in general the child is ignoring but see the description below to be 
certain. 
" If the behavior of the child does not fit into any of these categories, he or she will 
receive a mark in the “Other” category. This reflects that the child was doing 
something other than comforting, engaging in negative responding, becoming 
distressed, or ignoring. 
 
Use the following guidelines to decide which category a response fits into: 
1. Comforting responses: In general, these responses are intended to make the baby feel 
better or fall back to sleep.  
A child can get a comforting response score in each timeslice where they engage in 
comforting responding for at least 1 second. This means that if a child sings to the baby 
for 7 seconds, and that 7 seconds straddles two timeslices (e.g., 3 seconds in one, 4 
seconds in the other), they will get a score for BOTH timeslices. 
Supportive responses include things like: 
o Speaking to the baby in a soothing way. 
o  It is important to remember that 4-yr-olds don’t have the vocal control of 
an adult, and may not always SOUND particularly soothing. In these 
cases, use the child’s words to decide. For example, a child saying “It’s ok 
baby” would likely be coded as comforting, whereas a child saying “Shut 
up” or “Stop it” would likely be coded as negative – even if they both 
have similar intonations. Screaming or yelling are always negative. 
o Singing to the baby. 
o Saying “shhhhhhh” into the monitor. 
IN ALL CASES: even if the child is not using the monitor correctly (pressing the button 
on the side), we will assume that verbalizations directed toward the baby are meant for 
the baby. 
 
2. Negative responses: In general, these responses would typically make the baby feel 
worse or scare the baby.  
A child can get a negative response score in each timeslice where they engage in negative 
responding for at least 1 second. This means that if a child yells at the baby for 7 seconds, 
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and that 7 seconds straddles the time slices (e.g., 1 seconds in one, 6 seconds in the 
other), they will get a negative response score for BOTH timeslices. 
• Laughing at the baby (If you're not sure whether it's a laugh or not, then code it as though 
it were not) 
• Teasing/taunting/mocking  
• Callous statements (e.g., "shut up") 
• Scolding (e.g., "Stop making noise baby!"). 
• Throwing the monitor 
• Screaming into the monitor 
***If you see a response that you think is negative and is not included on this list, please 
tell a coding supervisor and it may be added to the manual.*** 
 
3. Distress / arousal: Sometimes, a child becomes upset when another person is upset. 
Examples of distress / arousal include: 
• Crying, whining, or whimpering because child is distressed. If there are other cues that 
point to a different motivation (e.g. child can’t reach across the table, child is being 
impatient), these would not be coded as distress / arousal 
• Very obvious facial distress (e.g., face falls and looks like about to cry). This does not 
include small frowns, blank faces, or surprise when the cry starts; it must be clearly 
distress. The expression can last for any length of time, even 1 second, to be counted.  
• Physical self-soothing (e.g., thumb-sucking, chewing on fingers, biting lip, chewing on 
inside of mouth, stroking selves, hand wringing or folding, touching eyes or mouth) for at 
least three seconds. We are considering this distress as these behaviors are generally 
reflective of the child trying to calm him or herself. 
• Verbal statements of distress / arousal (e.g., "I wanna go home", "I don't like this").  
• Speaking in a strained, upset-sounding way. 
• Defensiveness (e.g. “It’s not MY fault”).  
• Stopping play entirely. This is does not include momentary pauses, which often occur 
when the baby starts crying or periodically when the child is trying to ignore the crying. 
Stopping play due to distress is usually accompanied by facial distress or self-soothing 
behaviors.  
***If you see a response that you think shows distress / arousal and is not included on 
this list, please tell a coding supervisor and it may be added to the manual.*** 
 
4. Ignoring the Baby: This code will capture any response that clearly reflects the child 
ignoring the cry. By definition, if the child is engaging any of the above, he or she is not 
ignoring. 
• Keeping attention focused on activity without any apparent signs of distress  
• Smiling but not engaging with the monitor 
• A glance to the monitor or door now and then does not preclude this code. A child may 
become curious and briefly look toward the source of the sound, but if they return to play 
quickly (i.e., before three seconds have passed), this can still be coded as ignoring. 
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• If a child takes a moment (< 5 seconds) to respond to the cry, this is NOT necessarily 
ignoring or other. Some kids take a few moments to register the cry but will eventually 
go over to it. If, however, this initial pause lasts more than 5 seconds, it will be coded as 
ignoring if the child is playing and other if the child is looking at the monitor but not 
doing anything. 
 
5. Other: This is where we will record any other behavior that cannot be classified. Most often, 
this will be the child manipulating the monitor, but not saying anything. Since we cannot 
determine whether he or she was trying to turn it off or to “help” the baby, we will call it “other.”  
This may also include the child stopping and looking at the monitor (for more than 3 seconds) but 
not showing overt signs of distress or arousal. 
 
Children CAN receive this code in conjunction with other codes. For example, if a child was 
manipulating the monitor for an entire interval, but only spoke once (“shhh baby”), he or she 
could receive a code for both “Comforting” and “Other.” 
Coding setup 
 
1. Open the INTERACT program (you will need to close and reopen between every task). 
 
2. Select "Open existing data file" and select the template of the child you are coding.  
 
3. Double click "Set 1" on the lefthand side of the screen, and several green pencils 
should appear below it. These are the 10-second timeslices. 
 
4. To open the video: Click on the small manila folder at the top left corner of the small 
Control Panel window. Select the correct video to open. The video should appear in a 
separate window. 
 
5. To jump straight to the task, double click on the white space to the left of the first 
green pencil. If you want to view the task from beginning to end without breaks, use the 
Control Panel (press the righthand green arrow to play it through). If you want to view 
the task with the 10-second breaks, use the green pencils (double click the white space 
next to the timeslice you want to view). 
 
6. Open the transcript (if available). It will be located on the U: drive. Use this to help 
you understand speech when you're not 100% certain of what the child is saying. Always 
have it open in the background. 
 
7. Get the correct post lab notes from the purple binder. 
 
8. Get a blank paper coding sheet of the correct task, and fill in the basic information at 
the top. USE THE START AND STOP TIMES SPECIFIED IN INTERACT (the first 
and last times, located next to Set 1). 
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9. Now that you have everything in front of you, BE VERY SURE YOU ARE CODING 
THE CORRECT CHILD. Check the post-lab notes for a description of the child and 
ensure that (s)he matches. If there is ANY doubt: play the video from the very beginning 
until the white board reveals the participant number (e.g., 3011). Verify that it matches 
the INTERACT template you have open, the video you opened, the transcript you have 
open, and the post lab notes in front of you.  
 
10. If you are certain you are coding the correct child, write the participant number at the 
top of EVERY PAGE OF your paper coding sheet. Now you are ready to follow the 
coding procedure below. 
 
11. You may also want to have a blank sheet of paper or Word document open to jot 
down any questions/comments for the group that arise during coding that you can bring 




1. Make general notes on your paper coding sheet. Before you begin, take out the post-
lab notes sheet for this participant and read the Infant Cry section for any relevant details 
about this task. First, write the physical description of the child, and verify that it matches 
the child in the video you have open. If the post-lab notes reveal anything important 
about the child or the task (i.e., anything that would influence their behavior – the baby 
cry was too loud; they seemed to hear something before the cry started; etc.), write them 
in the Notes space below the physical description. Keep these notes in mind while 
coding. 
 
2. Watch the entire task all the way through. Again verify that you are coding the 
correct child by making sure the physical description matches what you see. While 
watching, get a feel for this child's behavior and become familiar with the task. 
Then code the following item:   
€ Was there a timing error? The task should be 60s (+/- 5s)?. If it is not, this is 
considered a timing error. 
o Be sure the INTERACT template begins right when the baby cry 
starts and ends right when the “mom” enters the room.  
# If it does, this is the length of the task. 
# If it doesn’t, please recreate the template. This way, you can 
see how long the task. is simply by looking at the template. 
o Determine if there is an error. If the template is less than 55 seconds 
or more than 65 seconds, there is an error.  
# Circle 0 for no, 1 for yes.  
# If there was an error, record the exact amount of seconds the 
task lasted.  
 
3. Now, you will break the task up into 10-second intervals ("timeslices") in order to 
see how frequently the child shows each of the four types of response (i.e., 
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comforting responses, negative responses, distress / arousal, and ignoring). Because 
the baby cry task is approximately 1 minute long, each task will have approximately 
6 timeslices, but the number may vary as individual tasks may have lasted slightly 
longer or shorter than 1 minute. If the final slice is less than eight seconds long, you 
will collapse it into the slice before it. For example, if the task was 63 seconds long, 
you will have seven slices. The seventh slice, which is three seconds long, will be 
coded as if it were part of the sixth slice, and you will record that the total number 
of slices is “6.” If it was 58 seconds long, you would code the final 8-second timeslice 
as its own slice, and would still record that there were 6 slices.  
  
Step 1. COMFORTING RESPONSES: Watch each 10-second timeslice (one at a time) to 
code for the presence of comforting responses in that timeslice.  
" Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any portion of a comforting 
response that is at least 1-second long (1=yes, 0=no)? 
 
Step 2. NEGATIVE / DISTRESS RESPONSES: Watch each 10-second timeslice (one at 
a time) to code for the presence of a negative response OR distress / arousal in that 
timeslice.  
" Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any portion of a negative response 
that is at least 1-second long? (1=yes, 0=no).  
 
" Does any portion of the given timeslice contain any distress / arousal that is at 
least 1-second long? (1=yes, 0=no). 
 
Step 3. IGNORING: After you have coded the other three types of responses in all 10-
second timeslices, code for the presence of ignoring in each timeslice. 
For each timeslice: Was the child actively ignoring the baby’s distress (1=yes, 0=no). 
 Throughout: Other Responses : If, in the course of your coding, you come across 
another response that does not fit into one of the above categories, mark it in the “other” 
column. Be sure to think through before marking it as “other”… does it really not fit into 
one of the other categories? 
 
For each timeslice: Was the child engaging gin a behavior that is not captured by the 
comforting, negative, distress / arousal, or ignoring categories? ((1 = yes, 0 = no). 
  
Step 4: Enter the number of intervals that were calculated in your total. This won't 
include rows with 999 (missing data), or intervals of less than 8 seconds long. 
 
4. After coding the timeslices, answer the following questions on your coding sheet. 
Go back to view the video as many times as needed:   
€ During which timeslice did the child first begin a comforting response? (Record the 
timeslice number in which the child first comforted.) 
 
€ During which timeslice did the child first begin a negative response? (Record the 
timeslice number in which the child first responded negatively.) 
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€ During which timeslice did the child show distress / arousal? (Record the timeslice 
number in which the child first showed distress / arousal.) 
 
€ Did the child call for help (1 = yes, 0 = no)? In which timeslice did they do so? 
(Record the timeslice number in which the child first called for help.) 
 
€ Did the child attempt to leave the room? (1 = yes, 0 = no)? In which timeslice did 
they do so? (Record the timeslice number in which the child first tried to leave the 
room.) 
 
5. Global Comforting Score - Watch the task 1 more time from beginning to end. Mark 
quick bullet point notes about the types of things the child said or did during the task. Use 
these bullet points to help you code the global score. 
 
What is your overall impression of how comforting this child was toward the baby?  
 
Note: this code should be done immediately after the other codes were entered, so the 
child is fresh in the coder's mind. 
 
All previous scores have only considered individual behaviors. We will now assign a 
score depicting how comforting the child was overall. Use the following bullet points to 
help you decide. 
 
1: Not at all comforting– child immediately turns off the monitor and/or ignores it for 
the duration of the task; or child is too distressed to continue the task; or child only 
speaks harshly to the baby. 
 
2: Child briefly attempts to speak to the baby (i.e., gets a “comforting” score in one or 
two timeslices) but then either turns it off or ignores it. 
 
3: Moderately comforting – Child attempts to speak to baby for about half the time (i.e., 
gets a “comforting” score in half the timeslices) in a comforting manner but then either 
turns it off or ignores it 
 
4:  Child speaks to the baby for more than half of the time in a comforting tone of voice 
(i.e., gets a “comforting” in 4 – 5 timeslices), but eventually turns it off or ignores it. 
 
5: Very comforting– Child speaks to the baby in a comforting tone of voice for most of 
the time (i.e., gets a score for “comforting” in every timeslice) the cry is playing.  
 
NOTE: If any CLEARLY negative responses are present, knock the global score down 
one point   
 
6. Once you've finished filling out the paper coding sheets open your SPSS document 
located in your folder on the U:drive. Carefully transfer the codes into the SPSS 
document, verifying that you're on the right row, and are starting at the correct column. 
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REMEMBER that when you add up the timeslice totals, DO NOT INCLUDE THE 
FINAL TIMESLICE IF IT'S LESS THAN 8 SECONDS. 
 
7. Save your SPSS document twice, so that you always have 2 copies. Save in between 
every child. 
o Sometimes, you are unable to code an event or an entire situation. If this is the 
case, then input the number “999” into the excel sheet. The best example is 
when an entire video of a situation, like Clipboard, is missing. Before marking 
"999", be sure to code whatever you can based on the post-lab notes. 
8. After all tasks have been coded and entered into SPSS, go back and double check that 
all codes were transferred correctly from paper to SPSS. 
 
9. Clip all coding sheets together and file them in your folder. Store the folder in a secret 
location and bring to every coding meeting. Put completed packets into your file folder in 
the cabinet.  
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Appendix N: Coding Sheet; Infant Cry Task




1:ID  3 __ __ __      2. CoderName___________________   
 






B.  1st WATCH - ORIENTATION, CHECK FOR TIMING ERRORS, CALLING FOR 
HELP, AND ATTEMPTS TO LEAVE 
 
Start time ________________     Stop Time___________________ 
 
Total time for baby cry: __________________________    
 
Was there an error (BabyError)?          1  (YES )          2  (NO) 
 
C. WATCH AS MANY TIMES AS NEEDED: FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE TYPES 
 











 1      
 2      
 3      
 4      
 5      
 6      
 7      
 8      
 9      
 10      
TOTALS (not including 
timeslice of <8 seconds) 
     
 BabyComf BabyNeg BabyDis BabyIgnore BabyOther 
 
Number of timeslices included in totals count:____________ (BabySlices)   
   













ID  3 ___ ___ ___  
 
D. LATENCY OF RESPONSES - Watch segments again as needed 
 
Did the child show a COMFORTING response (BabyComfPres)?  
 
1   (YES)        0   (NO) 
 




Did the child show a NEGATIVE response (BabyNegPres)?  
 
1   (YES)        0   (NO) 
 




Did the child show a DISTRESSED / AROUSED response (BabyDisPres)?  
 
1   (YES)        0   (NO) 
 




Did the child CALL FOR HELP (BabyHelpPres)?  
 
1   (YES)        0   (NO) 
 




Did the child ATTEMPT TO LEAVE THE ROOM (BabyLeavePres)?  
 
1   (YES)        0   (NO) 
 




E. FINAL WATCH - GLOBAL CODE 
 
What is your overall impression of how comforting this child was toward the baby? 
**Consider diversity, quality, and activity of child's attempts** 
 
26: Baby_Global  1 2 3 4 5 
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